Making Autonomous Choices

The question of whether or not an individual is truly autonomous in their decision to drink, or not drink, alcohol for the purposes of any type of acceptance is a complex one. In evaluating this ethical scenario, one must first evaluate the definition of autonomy before even examining what kind of choice was made. It would only then be appropriate to determine whether their choice was an independent, competent or authentic choice.

The text explains what it means to be autonomous. In order to be truly autonomous, certain independent conditions must be met (Burnor 32). This includes that an individual must be free of external constraints (such as those imposed upon an individual by an outside force), as well as inner compulsions (such as those imposed upon a person from inside themselves) (Burnor 32). Assuming that under this scenario an individual is, in fact autonomous, we may examine the kinds of choices an autonomous person may make.

Individual choices may be independent, authentic or competent. In the simplest terms, in making an independent choice, an autonomous person must be capable of understanding their decision and also be able to make that decision without “constraint or compulsion” (Burnor 32). Authentic choices come from within, with the individual acting solely upon his own goals and values (Burnor 32). A competent choice is contingent on the ability of an autonomous person to rationally deliberate their choices and reach an independent conclusion after that deliberation (31). Each of these decisions, while slightly different, hinge on the autonomy of the individual making them.

In the case of underage drinking, it is well-established that the phenomena are prevalent in high school students. This demographic is also subject to considerable peer pressure, which may encourage them to drink. This same pressure makes drinking socially acceptable while ostracizing those who chose not to follow the crowd. Absent a constraint or compulsion, an individual is still autonomous (Burnor 32). It can be argued that social influences may affect the decision to drink or not to drink, but they do not physically control the decision-maker (Burnor 32). As such, external pressures may certainly influence a decision, but should not determine or control the ultimate choice to drink, or not (Burnor 32). If peer pressure is the only consideration, it does not affect the level of autonomy in the individual.

However, in the case of teenagers, many of their life decisions are still left up to their parents. Further, they still generally subscribe to their parents’ values and beliefs. As previously touched upon, in order to be genuinely autonomous, an individual should be able to make independent choices about their own values (Burnor 33). However, if their sense of value is based on the values of their parents or their peers, instead of their own, then this individual is no longer autonomous (Burnor 33). Instead, the individual is controlled by the environment. In their effort to “fit it”, they have altered their own beliefs, and effectively lost their autonomy.

The second factor undermining their autonomy, and the right to exercise their individual freedom, is the likelihood that their choices will result in physical harm. As Burnor suggests, the likelihood of harm affects the level of autonomy (Burnor 31). Given that alcohol consumption often leads to either self-harm or harm to others, underage drinkers should be prevented from exercising their autonomy and freedom of choice. This privilege (and it is a privilege) should not be extended to someone who lacks the ability to make an authentic choice because drinking has become socially acceptable, instead of relying on what would be the intelligent choice – teenagers should not drink.

Lastly, alcohol consumption has been proven to impair judgment and would adversely affect a person’s (arguably more so a teenager’s) ability to exercise good judgment over whether or not to drink alcohol. Paternalism is the act of protecting people and deciding to overrule their choices for their own good (Burnor 35). If being under the influence of alcohol renders an individual unable to remain autonomous and exercise a competent choice, the ethical decision would be to invoke paternalism and make the decision for that person. Under this scenario, it would be appropriate to remove their right to choose.

Objectivism

In a world influenced by so many different cultures, and so many different religions, many argue that it is difficult (if not impossible) to develop a morality that would fairly apply to all societies. Objectivism holds exactly that – one universal moral standard should be applied to everyone (Burnor 55). However, objectivism does not deny the right of an individual to live their lives in observance of cultural traditions, nor does it prevent members of a particular religion the freedom to practice their religious beliefs (Burnor 54). Instead, objectivism holds that there are certain moral theories that exist, regardless of culture or religion (Burnor 54). For this reason, moral objectivism must exist.

In looking at the example in the text, certain cultures practice female genital mutilation. While African culture believes that the practice is important for young women in order to help ensure that they will be faithful to their husbands by making sex less enjoyable, the procedure also results in physical harm for many young women (Burnor 69). Many women suffer medical complications as a result of the mutilation, including infection and even death (Burnor 69). Moral relativism would argue that the practice of female genital mutilation is morally acceptable because the practice is largely accepted within that society (Burnor 55). However, a higher moral standard should apply if the practice results in harm to another individual.

In order to convince people in another society or culture that an objective and universal moral standard should be applied for everyone, it is first important to convince those members that an objective moral standard exists. Again relying on the case discussed in the text, it is clear that the African culture values loyalty and condemns adultery (Burnor 55-56). However, nowhere else in that culture, or arguably any other, does that culture’s morality advocate intentionally harming another person. Many religions call for its followers to help others whenever possible. One would also be hard-pressed to identify a culture or religion where murder was culturally acceptable. As such, the argument for the application of a universal moral standard would be to first objectively look at what is widely accepted within the culture itself. The same morality should then apply to all activities within the culture, eliminating any practices that contradict those principles.

The second argument to convince a society or culture to accept an objective moral standard would be to persuade them to look at the results of their moral (or immoral) practices. Any decision that has adverse consequences for a population should be determined to be immoral and against any objective moral standard. Again looking to the case in the text, the benefits realized by female genital mutilation (that is increased likelihood of fidelity), should not be realized at the expense of the harm imposed on the women (that is bleeding, infection, or even death) (Burnor 55). In using this standard as a litmus test, it is relatively simple to judge whether an action is morally good, or bad. If the action is good, it would be so under the universal moral standard as well. The converse would also be true – bad is bad no matter where you are.

Lastly, it would be impossible to argue that there would never be a good enough reason to affect a society’s values and moral practices. On the contrary, an objective moral standard alone is good enough reason to mandate the influence. For those societies or religions where the common practice is immoral, it would be appropriate to work to correct the societal or cultural wrong.

Ethical Egoism

Although it has been argued that egoists may not maintain true friendships, it is as simple to argue that this may not, in fact, be true. Much like rational egoism, ethical egoism requires that the actor behave in such a way that “produces the greatest amount of utility (or least amount of disutility) for oneself” (Burnor 103). However, ethical egoism accepts actions where an individual’s behavior results in a win-win scenario for everyone involved, so long as the “greatest amount of utility” is still realized by the agent (Burnor 103). Lastly, it is also important to note that while certain behaviors may result in harm to another, this is largely unintentional on the part of the egoist. Instead, such harm would be incidentally harmful to another person (Burnor 103). This behavior certainly impacts friendships between two people.

In evaluating my own friendships, egoism may be compatible with those friendships, although it admittedly poses a challenge to interpersonal relationships. While it is a commonly held belief that friends should help one another -- or at a minimum, not harm one another – there is another component to friendship that may also be examined. The people that surround you in your life should make you a better person. Whether that be through the inspiration to act better, or a resulting effect on individual behaviors, an individual should be better because of his friends. While this is not to say that a friend/egoist should exploit others to improve the quality of his own life, it is possible to imagine a scenario where those friendships would serve as a foundation to produce utility for the egoist. For example, in befriending someone of authority within a particular company, the friendship may result in an employment opportunity for the egoist. There is nothing to suggest that this friendship could be anything less than genuine. However, its existence could result in utility for the egoist. The friend would also enjoy true friendship and not be harmed as a result.

Work Cited

Burnor, Richard, and Yvonne Raley. Ethical choices: an introduction to moral philosophy with cases. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print.