Diplomatic Conferences: Versailles, 1919

The Paris Peace Conference represented a relatively recent turning of the tide. Until 1917 the entente had been steadily losing ground to the German war machine. But when the United States arrived in Europe with fresh forces and resources, it tipped the scales. Up to that point Germany had been, almost by itself, fighting and winning against England, France, Italy, and Russia. Even with the added weight of another superpower it was over a year later, in October of 1918, that Germany finally approached the United States and asked them to negotiate peace (Lowe 241). It was a much anticipated acknowledgment of Germany’s waning military power, though that had seemed more rumor than fact along every point of conflict up to the agreement to talk peace.

What followed was an avalanche of diplomatic oppression of German forces and people, and of some of the Allied forces as well. The French insisted that the initial armistice include military occupation of Germany. The United States agreed to the condition and even participated in the occupation, a choice that kept U.S. forces in Germany for a further four years (Nelson 1). This agreement was the first taste the U.S. got of European politics and possibly prompted President Wilson’s choice to participate personally in Paris. He believed strongly in his role as Commander in Chief and wanted to show that he took his responsibility to the American troops and their families seriously.

When President Wilson arrived in Paris to meet British Prime Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister George Clemenceau, and the other Allied leaders, he found the French capital desolate, hostile, and torn. Margaret MacMillan writes, “Neither the British nor the Americans had wanted the Peace Conference to be in Paris…The French were too excitable, had suffered too much and were too bitter against the Germans to provide the calm atmosphere needed” (27). President Wilson had wanted Geneva and Prime Minister George would have been happy with anywhere else. Prime Minister George said of the decision, “Both House and I thought it would be better to hold [the conference] in a neutral place, but the old man wept and protested so much that we gave way” (MacMillan 27). France’s earlier aggression in setting the terms of the armistice and now their insistence on hosting the peace conference was just the beginning of their aggressive approach to the peace talks.

Though Great Britain and France had fought side by side throughout the war and Britain’s loss of life and infrastructure rivaled that of France, the peace talks in Paris found Great Britain and the United States taking sides against a vindictive France on most points of peace. Despite President Wilson’s personal attention to the conference, he and his experts were largely unaware of the European political and cultural climate at the time. America turned took many of its cues from Great Britain at the conference and the British remained true to their customary disdain of most things French.

The different degrees of concern about Germany between France, Great Britain, and the United States were also a matter of simple geography. Part of France’s national identity was a long-standing fear and hatred of Germany. They saw the peace conference as an opportunity to permanently reduce Germany’s military strength and to claim the Rhine on the grounds of historical significance and strategic advantage (Nelson 6). These demands appeared to be vengeful and excessively aggressive by the other Allies. Great Britain was more concerned with Germany’s naval power than land forces so they did not understand what was at stake for France (Nelson 7). The United States was even more apathetic about limiting Germany’s military. They and Great Britain were in agreement about returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, but neither wanted to see Germany occupied or dismantled further. Neither were prepared to negotiate as fiercely as France and neither realized what a web France had woven beginning with the armistice conditions.

France’s advantage was further enhanced by the slow formation of the bond between the United States and Great Britain. When President Wilson first landed in Europe he was warmly and publicly greeted by all the Allied leaders except Prime Minister George who was still in London at the time. While President Wilson was being entertained, European leaders went to London to meet behind his back, hoping to form a united front for the conference (MacMillan 20). This secret meeting resulted in more squabbling than agreement, however, and France gave up on Great Britain’s support.

When President Wilson went to London to meet with Prime Minister George, he did little to endear himself to the British people. He rebuffed any gestures of kinship, instead insisting that the only significant commonality between Great Britain and the United States was a community of ideals and interests. Ultimately George and Wilson realized that they had to be as one mind to temper France’s fury and a bond of genuine affection formed between the two men, sparking the close relationship between Great Britain and the United States that would endure long after.

Despite the shared ambitions of Great Britain and the U.S., the peace conference itself and the Treaty of Versailles in particular were driven and defined largely by French interests and intentions. The conditions of the armistice set the stage for France and the Allies, through the various treaties agreed upon, to pillage Germany of military power, resources, and national pride. The United States was primarily a voice of temperance throughout the talks, partly because of their geographic distance from the conflict, partly because the American people did not want to get involved in European affairs in any major way, and partly because Germany had come first to the United States and the President Wilson felt an obligation to respect that. France and the other continental European Allies had their strategy planned and executed it well, however. In the end the United States was almost as much a prisoner of the treaties as Germany, obligated to help enforce the treaty conditions.

Works Cited

Lowe, John. The great powers, imperialism, and the German problem, 1865-1925. New York: Routledge, 1994. Print.

MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world. New York: Random House, 2002. Print.

Nelson, Keith L. Victors divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Print.