Failure of the British Army at Gallipoli

When Winston Churchill wanted to end the First World War early he thought that creating a new war front at Gallipoli would cause the Germans to be unable to cope with the increasing amount of war fronts. Unfortunately, Churchill and his Generals were ill-prepared at finishing such a battle. Of the nine principles of warfare deduced by the United States Army (a profession of arms) the maneuver, security, and surprise of the operation was in peril almost every step of the way. The reasoning behind Churchill’s decision was understandable. By creating a new warfront he was assuming the German’s would have to divide their army to assist the Turkish Army. Churchill’s underestimation of the Turkish abilities proved fatal.

The principle of surprise was diminished when British Forces began to attack the Turks in the Dardanelles. Although the initial attacks proved fruitful, the Turks with a mere fighting capacity of 62,000 men allocated their resources well to defend Sedd-el-Bahr to the point that the British felt one of the largest failures of the war. This failure also showed the lack of the maneuverability principle of war and operations because of the well-entrenched Turkish force behind their machine gunners. Finally there was no surprise in much of the force pressed against the Turkish forces.

The Turkish Army was aware that it was considered weak, which ultimately doomed Churchill in his attempt to end the war early. Along with poor planning, the British troops were poorly equipped and their maps were of low quality. The final death toll of over 200,000 Allied forces incurred many deaths from disease. This fact hints that the principle of war and operations in regard to simplicity may or may have not have been another factor in its failure because the simplest of assurances in personal health was overseen as well.

Bibliography

"Gallipoli." Gallipoli. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/gallipoli.htm (accessed February 26, 2014).

"Principles of War and Operations." In Operations The Official U.s. Army Field Manual Fm 3-0 (27th February, 2008). Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2010. A-1.