Throughout American history, the nation’s role in policing the world and ensuring democratic ideals has undergone drastic shifts. During the period of the Cold War and up through the 1970’s, the U.S. behaved as though it was accountable for maintaining world peace. This translated into foreign policy that was overtly interventionist in nature and problematic when the wars were prolonged and difficult to label as a ‘win.’ In comparing the foreign policy of both the Nixon and Bush (2002) administrations, it is important to consider the similarities and differences in terms of policy judgments. Both administrations sought to protect American freedoms domestically while ensuring that the world was a safe place for democracy. However, domestic tensions were the reason that an aggressive foreign policy of protectionism was heavily subdued throughout both administrations. Ultimately, while both administrations’ foreign policy efforts still sought out to actualize America’s legacy of international idealism, domestic tensions played an integral role in mitigating its support.
The United States has historically sought to retain and establish a liberal world order that is indicative of democratic values. For instance, the end of World War Two was a period of history where American influence in global affairs was prominent. Throughout the Cold War period, the U.S. engaged in aggressive containment policies and efforts to undermine Russia’s growing sphere of influence. Mainly, legislation such as the Marshall Plan and various experiences in Greece and Latin America gave testament to these values. While foreign policy efforts of the Bush and Nixon administrations did not fully actualize the American vision with the same vigor and efficacy, the same conservative agenda was present when it came to addressing global problems. The key determinant of policy actualization was public consensus and it was not present in the latter half of the 20th century.
Nixon’s administrative actively promoted and worked towards promoting a liberal world order where the U.S. was the core protectorate of the global landscape. Nixon, like his predecessors, still held strong beliefs that the United States had a role of policing the world and ensuring democratic values. Throughout the course of his administration, Nixon and Kissinger still continued efforts to undermine Vietcong forces and resolve the escalated Vietnam problem. Despite rising death tolls and an upset domestic population, the same premise of aligning foreign policy with U.S. international idealism was still evident. Even when the public persisted in protesting against the war, Nixon’s foreign policy still reflected the notion that the U.S. is not a nation that can just be left out of such important global matters: “Nixon did not believe that the newfound ‘isolationism’ of the leader class accurately reflected American heartland’s values.” Consequently, Nixon pushed forward with allowing more troops to be sent and soldiers to be drafted. These efforts reflected a continued effort to pursue the same agenda that the Cold War era presidents had worked towards before him.
While the Vietnam War did end in an effective stalemate, it was because of domestic upheaval, not a shift in foreign policy goals. For instance, the justification for staying in the war periodically changed to reflect domestic sentiment. During the latter period of the Vietnam War, it was often cited that the U.S. could not leave because it wanted to retain its credibility and commitment to getting the job done. Aside from that, public support for international goals became less important in the eyes of the American public. Robert Litwak, in DeÌtente and the Nixon doctrine: American foreign policy and the pursuit of stability, cited that by the mid 1970’s international politics and containment policies became less relevant as only 6% of the population considered it a national priority. Consequently, Nixon and his administration had to take a different approach towards justifying why they would continue foreign policy that was protectionist in nature. Despite still longing for an active role in international politics, the U.S. under Nixon’s administration had little choice but to “permit a new, less overt US role in Third World regions.” However, this shift in tangible foreign policy efforts does not signify a change in attitudes or a paradigm shift in terms of the U.S.’s perceived role; instead, it is merely a reaction to the domestic backlash.
The Bush administration also carried forward the conservative agenda of a liberal world order, albeit Bush utilized fear to gain approval for his aggressive foreign policy. During and after the tragedy of 9/11, Bush capitalized on the opportunity to continue Nixon’s same dogma of American idealism with respect to foreign policy. Only this time, the justifications for war and armaments were much more readily available and publically acceptable. Firstly, Bush’s policy is easily classified through his intent on defending American people on their own soil. Secondly, the impeding threat of other rogue nations that housed organizations with the same beliefs as Al-Qaeda was used as a means of invigorating the notion of a network of foreign threats. We can see clear evidence of this when Bush labeled nations as being part of the “Axis of Evil.” This is the same propaganda and rhetoric that was used during the course of the first two world wars. The major reason why Bush was able to pursue the Iraq invasion and deployment of troops was because the public supported his actions in favor of the nation’s well-being. The prevailing attitudes from Nixon’s administration that the U.S. should not enter the international arena became moot: it no longer mattered that Nixon “overcommitted our country- it overcommitted our policy, our resources, and our rhetoric…” The legacy of being a protectorate became a publically held belief again and for that reason, Bush was able to actualize his foreign policy agenda.
Ultimately, U.S. foreign policy did not change in terms of the core ideology and attitude behind it, the public consensus was the determinant of whether it was actualized. A period of twenty years between Nixon and Bush was merely a time when military and political intervention was not endorsed by the public. However, this did not mean that the push for a liberal world order was not in the minds of the presidents of those administrations. Bush’s foreign policy was highly aggressive, yet still relented to the public the notion of a defense related endeavor: Bush labeled “defense instruments as the principal instruments of U.S. foreign policy.” In effect, the actions and attitudes of both administrations were the same while the public justifications changed over time to reflect a more understanding and passive reason. However, it is important to reflect that America has had a long tradition of protectionism that has remained unchanged, despite the circumstances:
American political institutions, practices, and norms-indeed, the country’s very political identity-are so deeply informed by the past narratives of past American wars, each successive war politically strengthens and emboldens those forces that earn political capital from the prosecution of those wars, enabling them to shape the country’s future in their own image and according to their own nationalistic ideals and militaristic values. It is clear that foreign policy remained consistent in terms of its intent and overall mission with respect to international oversight and policing.
As we have seen, both the Nixon and Bush administrations held closely related foreign policy beliefs and attitudes regarding America’s role as a protectorate of the liberal world order. However, the domestic backlash against the Vietnam War sidelined such efforts to retain that role. By the time Bush came to office, he capitalized on the 9/11 attacks in order to draw up public support for the consistent ideology that the U.S. used for foreign policy. The U.S. has a strong historical legacy of being a protectorate and Nixon’s efforts during the Vietnam War supported it too. Despite the public’s backlash towards the Vietnam War, Nixon still attempted to retain the U.S.’s vision for idealism. It was not until Bush’s presidency that it came back as part of the same set of beliefs that Nixon had. Ultimately, foreign policy changed very little in the span of those two administrations while public sentiment influenced whether foreign policy initiatives actualized.
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