"Slice of Life" Paper: A General's Execution of the German Schlieffen Plan at the Outset of WWI

My assignment to interview the infamous Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (not to be confused with his uncle, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder), proved to be interesting from the very beginning. This man, Moltke the Younger, was a prominent general during the time of World War I, and even told me, in-depth, about what he referred to as his Ostaufmarsch, which occupies a critical position in the Schlieffen Plan debate. Moltke the Younger was one of many German generals who were responsible for executing the Schlieffen Plan at the outset of World War I, and, as such, seems like the perfect subject for an interview. This general also encapsulates, in both dress, demeanor, and personality, the German mentality of superiority and conquest that was so prominent during that time. As such, this interview has the potential to be somewhat one-sided, but interesting nevertheless.

One of the most prominent points that Moltke the Younger attempted to drive home is that both he and the general goals of his German brethren during this time were sorely misunderstood. That is to say, Moltke maintains that many considered his and the ways of many other Germans barbaric and foolish, yet there is hardly any way to debate these claims with evidence, since, of the seven volumes published about Moltke's war planning and exercises, which covered well over a thousand pages and hundreds of maps, almost all of them were lost after the destruction of the Reichsarchiv. This meant that unfortunately for young Moltke, much of the evidence of his genius is lost to the annals of time, yet this does not mean all is lost. After all, Moltke himself is still, thankfully, available to interview.

The Origins and Development of Moltke the Younger

For years, perhaps his entire life, he said, Moltke languished in the shadow of his uncle, who many regarded as the man more capable in the map room than on an actual battlefield; a scathing remark, especially during that time period, where men won their respect in the field of battle . He was also strongly distrusted early in his career, yet this largely abated after he proved himself to be honest, dedicated, and earnest; "an exceedingly honorable personality," said one of his associates, Karl von Fabeck. In fact, Moltke the Younger even told me about much of the praise he received, with the deadly beautiful Baroness von Spitzemberg mentioning that her brother, Axel Freiherr von Varnbuler, considered Moltke to be extremely cultured, and of supremely decent, brave character, especially toward superiors. However, Moltke himself seemed to be destined to be a great general (in his eyes, of course) from the very beginning. Even his name is associated with another great general, his uncle, of course. In addition, Moltke was exposed to war almost his entire life. Even when Moltke the Younger truly was young, in his twenties, in fact, he was involved in the Franco-Prussian War; a position he recalls fondly, as he was cited for bravery during that war. As Moltke became more and more experienced, his roles as a member of the military shifted to less, shall we say, brutish roles. When Moltke himself was only 32 years old, he had already attended the War Academy and enlisted in the General Staff, an accomplishment Moltke himself was none too modest about, to be sure.

The Role of Moltke's Ostaufmarsch in the Development of the Schlieffen Plan

Moltke the Younger explains that his uncle was responsible for the development of what came to be known as the Ostaufmarsch. This essentially laid the groundwork for the Schlieffen Plan by establishing a defensive barrier in the west, as a means to establish a German presence and buy some time, and limiting offensive German military tactics in the east until the time was right. Ostaufmarsch also established two key concepts that would prove to be vital in the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan: the utilization of railways and the concept of mass armies, or, quite simply, the strategy of overwhelming the enemy with sheer numbers. Many Germans, both Moltkes included, considered speed to be of utmost priority. An attack that could begin quickly would give Germans a decided advantage in the momentum of a fight, and arriving at their destination with haste was key to this strategy, hence, Moltke explains, why the rail system was considered such a high priority by so many high-ranking German officials. Moltke recalls something his father wrote in 1858: "It is nonsensical for a mobilized army to adopt a passive deployment which seeks to accommodate all possible eventualities… A mobilized army which is passive will merely lose strength to no purpose… " Essentially, the importance of the Ostaufmarsch was that it was a mode of thinking more than anything else. This mode of thinking emphasized the speed of both deployment and the overall movement of forces, especially infantry, across great distances. Having large numbers of forces was another crucial facet of Ostaufmarsch that eventually worked its way into the Schlieffen Plan. In a way, Moltke the Younger explains, Ostaufmarsch could be considered the "uncle" of the Schlieffen Plan, just as Moltke the Elder was the uncle of he, Moltke the Younger.

Characteristics and Key Concepts Regarding the Schlieffen Plan

Perhaps the most important facet of the Schlieffen Plan is that it was not some singular plan of attack or anything of the sort. It was, in a way, an entirely different mode of thinking that emphasized outside-of-the-box thinking that, the Germans hoped, would catch their enemies by surprise with both the speed and ferocity with which they attacked. This, Moltke emphasized, was the initial plan, at least. The Schlieffen Plan was not originally created with the intention of using it during World War I, but t was effective in predicting the geographical dilemmas the Germans would face during this time, and was, thus, extremely useful during this time. The basics of the Schlieffen Plan are simple: prepare Germany for a war on two fronts by placing troops in a defensive line by France in the west and Russia in the east. This way, the Germans could defend two points simultaneously and offer assistance to each front as needed. However, as the situation in World War I became, as Moltke pointed out, stickier and sticker, there emerged a need to modify the Schlieffen Plan to allow for both more speed as well as versatility. To this end, the goal of the Schlieffen Plan was to maintain these two fronts, but to focus their manpower and technology on defeating the French in the western side and then quickly moving the troops, by train, to the east side (Moltke, at this point, was quick to flash the gang sign for east side, which surprised me a bit, to say the least), to deal with the Russians, as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, Moltke said, this plan did not quite go as, well, planned, and many people, especially German higher-ups, blamed the failure largely on Moltke himself, which he said hurt his feelings quite a bit. First, though, it is necessary to examine just what role Moltke played in the development of the Schlieffen Plan.

Moltke's Role in the Design and Implementation of the Schlieffen Plan

The Schlieffen Plan was not originally Moltke's idea, although, during the interview, he was quick to claim credit for it. In fact, it was named after the man who originally created it, Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Moltke was, however, the man who actually implemented the plan during World War I, and quite well, he seemed to embellish. The basics of the Schlieffen Plan have already been established, but Moltke actually added his own modifications to the plan during the actual implementation of it, although there is much debate as to whether or not these modifications were justified, or even beneficial, to the Germans at the time. There were two primary changes Moltke made in 1906. First, Moltke believed that the Russians would mobilize much more quickly than the Germans assumed they would, and thus pulled a large number of the already considerable forces that were just entering France from the north (he did not want to sacrifice troops on the west side for fear of leaving gaping holes in their defenses), and instead used them to fortify the Russian border, as well as send a few to support German forces in both Lorraine and Alsace. Moltke was also quick to point out that he did, in fact, strongly disagree with many of the strategies in the Schlieffen Plan, but that so many of his associate generals, as well as the German army at large, supported it whole heartily that the most he felt he could do was change certain aspects of it.

Moltke also altered the original Schlieffen Plan by opting to send the Seventh Army farther north into the Netherlands in order to make contact with the Dutch, who, the Germans thought, were going to retreat into a fortified area behind the Peel Marshes. This was problematic because moving so many German forces into the Netherlands created a bottleneck at the border between Germany and Belgium, and also limited their access to Dutch railways, which were a vital component to resupplying and moving the German army to the front lines. This turned out to be a costly mistake for both the German forces and Moltke himself. As it turns out, Moltke should have placed more of an emphasis on Belgium, which managed to delay the German forces for a month by utilizing guerilla-style tactics in its cities, leading to the Germans having to use expensive and heavy artillery and other weaponry to finally take them out.

Moltke the Younger receives much of the blame for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, Moltke is quick to point out during the interview that he had numerous objections to the plan, even during the process of its implementation. For example, Moltke is said to have told the German Emperor at the time, Wilhelm II, about his numerous problems with the plan, Wilhelm had simply dismissed these fears, stating that "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!" This arrogance that was demonstrated by much of the German high-ranking staff at the time caused them to make a number of other blunders during the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan. Perhaps the greatest of these was the German's underestimation of British forces. Essentially, the British had two contingency plans for defending Belgium, which was a critical area for the Germans to capture: WF, or cooperation with the French forces, and WB, which was the name for cooperation with the Belgians. Unfortunately, the British held true to this alliance with the Belgians, and subsequently declared war on Germany upon learning that Germany planned to invade Belgium, which complicated the Schlieffen Plan for obvious reasons. The Germans took their underestimation of the British one step further by assuming that the British forces would be small and inadequate in fighting off the German army. However, this proved to be far from the case. Another significant factor that led to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan was that the Germans sorely underestimated the mobilization speed of their adversaries, especially the Russians, who the Germans thought would take about six weeks to fully mobilize their forces. This underestimation threw the entire concept of the Schlieffen Plan, that is, keeping two fronts separate from one another in order to avoid fighting two wars at once, largely pointless, since Germany quickly found themselves having to defend against both the Russians and the French at the same time, and from two different directions, as well. In fact, one historian believes that the Schlieffen Plan was actually one of the primary catalysts of World War I. The rationale behind this is that the speed with which the Schlieffen Plan had to work precluded any other outcome but pure, unadulterated insanity for the first few weeks of the war. The speed with which the Schlieffen Plan was implemented left no room for any sort of negotiation or peace talks that are often used as last-ditch efforts to avoid pesky world wars. But perhaps the greatest failing of all, as evidenced earlier, was Moltke the Younger's error in foresight in judgment. During the interview, Moltke vehemently insisted that the failure of the German army was not his fault and that he was only working with what he was given. That may very well be, but the fact remains that Moltke made grave errors in judgment that were extremely costly to the German army. Perhaps most detrimentally, he delegated too many resources to attempting to surprise and route Russia, removing crucial troops that were invading France at the time. This caused one of Germany's greatest advantages in the war, that it had access to all of its forces at once, whereas Russia and France were always geographically divided, almost entirely moot.

The aftermath of the Schlieffen Plan's Failure

Unfortunately for him, Moltke will likely be remembered as the progenitor of trench warfare, as the various stalemates that emerged as a result of the German loss at the first Battle of the Marne. This also led to the Germans being in the rather unenviable position of having to defend two fronts simultaneously: a situation that the Schlieffen Plan was originally designed to avoid. In the end, one of the primary reasons for the Schlieffen Plan's failure was simply that it came about at the wrong time. That is to say, world war I was a period where warfare truly entered what could be considered the modern era, and as such, many nations were simply not prepared, from a strategic standpoint, to account for this technology as much as they were supposed to. This mainly came to head from the perspective of mobility, as the Germans, including Moltke, underestimated just how quickly a force could be moved from a long distance away to the front lines, even without the aid of a rail system, which the Germans used prominently during the war. Another of Moltke's regrets, he said, was that many people actually think that if he had simply left the Schlieffen Plan alone and simply implemented it as the creator, Schlieffen himself, had intended, that the original plan of segregating the war effort would have succeeded. This idea, Moltke said, would likely keep him up at night for the rest of his life. Perhaps even worse, if the Schlieffen Plan had been implemented differently, or perhaps even not at all, much of the war itself could have been averted, and, thus, countless lives could have been saved. By the same token, it is also possible that the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan worked to the advantage of everyone except for the Germans and helped to end the war earlier than it possibly could have gone on for. Again, these are simply ruminations, and it is impossible to predict what would or would not have happened had the Schlieffen Plan been implemented with greater foresight and wisdom, but as it is, the aftermath of the failure of the Schlieffen Plan was great and led to one of the most horrible types of warfare to ever cross humanity: trench warfare.

Moltke's Defense of his Actions and Conclusion

Through it all, I was forced to admire the passion with which Moltke the Younger defended his actions. While he was known as "the Younger" because of the relation to his uncle, the Elder, the moniker is perhaps even more fitting when one considers the zeal with which Moltke pursued his plan. Moltke, even right now, at the interview, insists that he was only acting in what he thought was a logical manner at the time and that hindsight is always 20/20, as the Americans say. After listening to Moltke's arguments, I am forced to, if not agree with his modifications to the Schlieffen Plan, to at least admire them. The Russians represented a profound threat, especially considering their reputation for strength over speed, and it was nigh impossible for the Germans to predict that the Russians would reach the front lines so quickly, which put into motion the chaos that was the aftermath of the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. "The best offense is defense" Moltke said at one point during the interview, and once again I am forced to see the wisdom of these words. The Germans took a decidedly defensive, yet proactive, approach to war during World War I, and it is a concept that, if implemented today, would have worked much more efficiently, since Germany, with the advances of mobility and communication, would be able to maintain a stranglehold between France and Russia. As it is, the Schlieffen Plan simply occurred at the wrong time in history, with a German general who was, to many, far too headstrong and overconfident to be leading such a massive army. Moltke, when asked about whether or not he regrets his choice of career, can only hang his head and sigh.

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