The 1980s represent the final decade of the Cold War, a half-century standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, the United States made a final radical departure in its foreign policy strategy when Ronald Reagan decided to re-spark an aggressive approach to addressing the hostilities of the Soviet Union. Under President Reagan’s lead, the political climate of the 1980s was characterized by a revitalization of ideologically charged rhetoric and an emphasis on military strength. Yet, despite the prevalence of rhetoric that affirmed America’s ideological superiority and the increase in spending to expand America’s military capabilities, the 1980s were marked by a decline in self-confidence among the American public.
The political climate during the 1980s was influenced by the progressions in foreign policy that began at the start of the Cold War and developed through the Carter administration during the 1970s. Thus, it is important to examine the Cold War’s historical developments in order to evaluate the influence that the conflict held over American society during the period. The term Cold War refers to a period between the 1940s and early 1990s where the United States was engaged in an ideological standoff with the Soviet Union. Though most historians begin the diplomatic component of the Cold War at the end of World War II, historian John W. Mason asserts:
There is sense ideologically speaking, in which it is accurate to speak of the Cold War beginning in 1917. The full impact of these events, however, was not to be felt until after 1945, when political power moved from the centre of Europe to Moscow to Washington (Mason 1). Even before diplomatic tensions arose between the United States and the Soviet Union at the outset of World War II, many of the ideological disputes between the power developed as early as World War I.
Mason further describes the origins of the ideological differences that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. As he notes, President Wilson set the ideological agenda for the United States in foreign policy when he asserted that America’s objective upon entering World War I was to dismantle the old balance of power that dominated European politics (1). This first violent conflict that spread across Europe and the rest of the world was the result of old state systems that undermined the self-determination of ethnic groups, creating strong hostilities in tinderbox regions (1). Thus, Wilson envisioned that the world would become more peaceful if the United States led in making the world “safe for democracy” under an international governance that would protect the rights of autonomy for people around the world (1). In contrast, the Soviet Union had chosen to withdraw from World War I. Under the leadership of Bolshevik Vladimir I. Lenin, the Soviets asserted its vision of establishing a world Communist revolution (1). Thus, as early as World War I, tensions between the Soviet Union and Western democracies emerged as Wilson’s vision of global democracy was pitted against Lenin’s vision of global Communism.
As Mason also elaborates, history and necessity divided the foreign policy objectives of both powers. The Soviet Union’s objectives following World War II were influenced by its history of attacks and invasions from nearby enemies, its experience of being invaded by Western allies following its withdrawal from World War I, and its Marxist-Leninist ideology which predicted and advocated for the demise of capitalism (2). In contrast, Mason assesses, “If the Soviet Union always felt weak and insecure, the United States, by contrast, felt safe and aware of its strength” (2). Though the Pearl Harbor attack altered the direction of United States foreign policy, the nation had a long history of isolationism (2). Yet, Pearl Harbor failed to alter the United States’ orientations towards liberty and openness. Following Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt established the principles of democracy and economic freedom as the basis of the 1942 Atlantic Charter and the 1945 Declaration of Liberated Europe (2). Further, the United States responded to the worldwide economic instability experienced during the 1930s by advocating for free trade and access to raw materials in order to continually stabilize the markets (2). Thus, while Soviet history created an entrenched commitment to hostility and caution towards foreign powers, United States history created openness to cooperation and a commitment to liberty.
Several key events escalated the tensions between the Soviet Union, leading to the formal establishment of a “cold war” between the two powers. First, during the 1945 Yalta Conference and the 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union and Western powers agreed to partition Germany and divide control over newly liberated states, an agreement that would become a future source of tension during the Cold War (3). Second, the United States engaged in a large-scale military demobilization, reducing its military forces from 12 million to 3 million by 1946 (4). The result is that the United States significantly reduced its negotiating power, making it reliant upon the possession of nuclear weapons and threats of nuclear violence to bargain with the Soviet Union (4). Finally, the control of the Soviet Union over Eastern European states continued agitated the West and created hostility and insecurity (5). In his 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech, Winston Churchill warned an audience in Fulton, Missouri that compromise, such as the negotiations that took place in the post-World War II conferences, were inappropriate to the nature of the threat that the Soviet Union imposed on Europe (7). The combination of these three factors led to a conflict in which direct violent confrontation was discouraged but an indirect obstruction in the name of foreign policy was seen as necessary for the survival of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Lastly, to understand how the Cold War influenced the 1980s, it is important to understand the foreign policy directives that developed leading up to the period. Shortly following World War II, intelligence advisor issued a 1947 telegram where he advised that coexistence with the Soviet Union would be impossible because of their commitment to Marxist-Lenin ideology (8). Thus, the Truman administration adopted the policy of containment, which sought to prevent the Soviet Union from spreading its influences while avoiding a direct violent confrontation with the superpower (8). Yet, the Truman administration would take further steps to influence Cold War Policy for a majority of the 20th century.
First, President Truman set precedent for influencing public sentiments in order to bypass political oppositions to expanding indirect military engagements with the Soviets. As historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley note that following World War II, a Republic-controlled Congress wished to return to the United States’ isolationist tendencies and supported cuts for domestic and foreign spending initiatives alike (Ambrose and Brinkley 75). Thus, Truman highlighted the Communist threat in Greece, restating Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s assertions that if Greece were to fall to Communism, neighboring Turkey would also be lost (75). Establishing what would be known as the Truman Doctrine, President Truman requested aid for Greece and Turkey from Congress with the following statement: I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugations by armed minorities or by outside pressures (82).
As the Doctrine established, the United States was entitled to provide support to aid parties in domestic disputes when they felt that the Soviet Union was agitating these disputes in order to spread its Communist influence.
Additionally, Secretary of State Dean Marshall further set a precedent for economic investment in the Cold War. Through his Marshall Plan, he established that the United States should provide aid to Western European powers in order to help them rebuild their infrastructure and industries (88). The intention of the Marshall Plan was to revitalize the European economy following World War II so that socialism would have less of an appeal across Europe (88). Cold War conflicts that followed decades after the Truman administration, including the Korean War and the Vietnam War, followed in suit with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan precedents that held that the United States should assert itself economically and militarily when intra-state conflict threatens to give rise to the Communist takeover within that state.
While administrations following Truman primarily abided by the doctrine of containment in their dealings with the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration marks the first departure from this foreign policy strategy. According to Ambrose and Brinkley, the primary objective of President Nixon and Secretary State Henry Kissinger was to obtain conditions of peace so that the United States could discontinue its costly military campaigns in Vietnam and in other areas of the world (229). Ambrose and Brinkely elaborate: The first step would be an arms-control agreement with the U.S.S.R. From it would flow a more general détente, trade with Russia, lowered tensions in the Middle East, and peace in Vietnam with President Nguyen Van Thieu still in power (229).
As détente entailed, the Nixon administration wished to reach greater cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than the historically adversarial relationship established by the Truman administration. The Nixon administration took several steps that furthered détente and would inform foreign policy directives of the Carter administration. First, Nixon signed to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty, which was the first significant disarmament agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States (231). The rationale behind disarmament was that it would prevent smaller powers that were perpetuating peripheral conflicts during the Cold War from obtaining the weaponry needed to maintain their armed aggression (229). Next, Nixon opened economic relations with China, fostering United States relations with the state (233). Through these actions, Nixon sought to ease the tensions and reduce direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The language adopted by the Reagan administration is most deserving of study in order to evaluate the political climate of the 1980s. Known for his rhetorical prowess, Ronald Reagan conveyed the foreign policy shifts of the United States through the language that he utilized in his political speeches. The first key feature of Reagan’s rhetoric is that it marks a return to ideological divisions as the basis of foreign policy. As Justin Garrison notes
Reagan’s vision of U.S. foreign policy consisted of a complex mixture of ideas about America, politics, and human nature. That mixture was not without paradoxes and internal tensions. He described human beings as ethically dual, that is, as capable of both good and evil, and could describe government, including democracy as a limited enterprise devoted primarily to minimizing disorder (35).
As Garrison conveys, the duality between good and evil underscored the worldview that was conveyed in Reagan’s political speeches. The necessity of pitting good against evil served as a powerful justification for many of Reagan’s Cold War policies.
Essentially, Reagan’s hardliner rhetoric can be seen as a reversal of Nixon’s accommodating Cold War rhetoric and a continuation of Truman’s stances at the outset of the Cold War. As a comparison, consider the account of the Soviet threat that Truman provides in his analysis of Soviet ideology in his 1949 inaugural address: That false philosophy is communism. Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore require the strong rule of masters. Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right to govern himself with reason and justice (Truman).
Through his inaugural address, Truman highlighted many of the differences between Western democracy and Communism, creating a clear dichotomy between the two systems. Truman’s use of rhetoric to compare and contrast the two systems reflects Reagan’s emphasis on the dichotomy between good and evil.
In contrast, Nixon provided a diplomatic tone to his speeches that reflect the policy preferences of cooperation during his administration. As Nixon stated in his 1973 second inaugural address: Unless we in America work to preserve freedom, there will be no freedom. But let us clearly understand the new nature of America’s role, as a result of the new policies we have adopted over these past 4 years. We shall respect our treaty commitments. We shall support vigorously the principle that no country has the right to impose its will or ruse on another by force. We shall continue, in this era of negotiation, to work for the limitation of nuclear arms and to reduce the danger of confrontation between the great powers (Nixon).
One key distinction between Nixon’s rhetoric and Truman’s rhetoric, as reflected in their inaugural addresses, is that Nixon refrains from isolating the Soviet Union in his speech by directly attacking Communism. Further, Nixon establishes a willingness to work with the Soviet Union through treaties rather than emphasizing the ideological conflict between the two states.
The departure that was made from détente during the 1980s can be highlighted through the rhetoric of President Reagan. As the President asserted in his second 1985 inaugural address: Yet history has shown that peace does not come, nor will our freedom be preserved, by good will alone. There are those who scorn our vision of human dignity and freedom. One nation, the Soviet Union has conducted the greatest military buildup in the history of man, building arsenals of awesome offensive weapons (Reagan).
Contrasting the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan from his predecessors reveals the changing political climate of the 1980s. Rather than emphasizing flexibility and cooperation, the rhetoric of the period established the superiority of American ideology and the supremacy of the United States over the Soviet Union. In his inaugural address, Reagan promotes a political climate that again views the Soviet Union as an ideological threat and a danger to the security of the United States.
Along with Reagan’s hardliner rhetoric came a concrete commitment to re-establishing the United States’ military supremacy over the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration took several steps to ensure that the United States became a formidable military might. First, the administration ordered the B1 bomber to be produced, even after the Carter administration had canceled this plan (Ambrose and Brinkley 303). Further, the Reagan administration arranged to have the Pershing II missiles stationed in Western Europe in order to ward off the threat of military attacks from the Soviet Union in the region (303). Further, the Reagan administration made the controversial move to reverse Carter-adopted human rights protections while increasing defense expenditures. These actions led to the significant escalation of military activities during the 1980s.
As Ambrose and Brinkley note, the United States’ refocus on military activity influenced affairs around the world. In the United States, the arms industry became the largest growth industry domestically (303). Further, the level of armaments produced in the United States hit record highs (303). Yet, the authors also note, “By the early 1980s, worldwide military spending was nearly $550 billion annually, or $150 for every person on earth” (303). Further, the authors note that during the period, the Russians exported more arms than the United States to fuel the activities of rebels in Third World countries (303). As a result, the United States’ military involvement in Nicaragua and other Latin American countries took center stage during the 1980s as the Reagan administration attempted to contain Soviet-friendly rebels from influencing the region (308). Reagan’s emphasis on the military aspect of the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in a chain reaction that escalated arms production and hostility between the two countries. Further, as these actions demonstrate, the 1980s willingness of the president to dispatch forces abroad in order to contain the Soviet Union’s ambitions in Latin America and abroad.
Though the United States emerged as the victorious power following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it is disputed whether the emphasis on ideology and military might during the 1980s helped to improve the perceived security of Americans. Though the end of the 1980s resulted in the diminishment of the Soviet threat, many contend that the United States located other scapegoats upon which to manifest their insecurities. For example, the perceived supremacy of Asians became a replacement fear for many Americans. As M.J. Heale posits, “Whatever credit Ronald Reagan may deserve for taming the Soviets, ‘victory’ in the Cold War came at a price, one which included the unleashing of old fears about an Asian master race” (20). At the end of the 1980s, surveys revealed that Americans re-shifted their worldview in order to identify the Japanese as the greatest threat facing the country (20). As Heale asserts, Reagan’s neglected an opportunity to fully address the insecurities of the American public by solely focusing on the Soviet Union during the 1980s.
During the 1980s, while the United States made many significant gains in its face-off against Russia, it became vulnerable economically. According to Heale, “In 1982 the United States was the largest creditor nation in the world. By 1986 it was the largest debtor nation” (24). Yet, the reason the United States declined economically during the period was partly that Ronald Reagan had run trade deficits in order to fund his arms buildup in competition against the Soviet Union (24). Also, because the Japanese had higher rates of saving, they were able to invest heavily in American enterprises, causing anxiety among the America public (25). As a result, while the Soviet Union was eventually destabilized, United States industries were also undergoing a process of rapid destabilization caused by this decrease in domestic investment. Thus, the increased influence of foreign investment in the American economy during the 1980s is another Cold War legacy that continues to cause discomfort among Americans.
Though the 1980s marks the end of the Cold War, the policy decisions that were made leading up to this period greatly influence the political directives of the country. Though President Ronald Reagan greatly departed from the Nixon administration policy of détente during his presidency, his hardliner approach to combating Communism paralleled those adopted by the Truman administration. First, rather than acting to appease the Soviet Union through conciliatory language, Ronald Reagan reignited the ideological battles that initiated the Cold War following World War II. The political climate of the 1980s was marked by ideologically heightened rhetoric that asserted the superiority of American political values over Soviet political values. This can be viewed as a contrast from Nixon’s appeasing speeches addressing the Soviet Union. Further, Ronald Reagan reversed the military caution of the Nixon administration by increasing military expenditures and increasing the military’s involvement in conflicts in Latin America. However, while Reagan’s heavy-handed approach to winning the Cold War is credited for the eventual victory of the United States over the Soviet Union when Communism eventually fell, his approach failed to increase American self-confidence. Plagued with economic troubles and insecurities, Americans turned their enmity towards the Soviet Union towards Asian powers whom they regarded to be an economic threat. Thus, while the rhetoric and military actions of the 1980s served to usher in foreign policy victories during the period, they failed to produce stability and peace of mind for many Americans in the aftermath of the Cold War.
Works Cited
Ambrose, Stephen E., and Douglas G. Brinkley. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Print.
Garrison, Justin. "A Covenant with all Mankind: Ronald Reagan's Idyllic Vision of America in the World." Humanitas 21.1 (2008): 34-63. ProQuest. Web. 27 Oct. 2013.
Heale, M. J. "Anatomy of a Scare: Yellow Peril Politics in America, 1980-1993." Journal of American Studies 43.1 (2009): 19-47.ProQuest. Web. 27 Oct. 2013.
Mason, John W. Cold War, 1945-1991. London: Routledge, 1996. Print.
Nixon, Richard. “Oath of Office and Second Inaugural Address.” The American Presidency Project. 20 Jan. 1973. Web. 24 Oct. 2013.
Reagan, Ronald. “Oath of Office and Second Inaugural Address.” The American Presidency Project. 21 Jan. 1985. Web. 24 Oct. 2013.
Truman, Harry S. “Inaugural Address.” The American Presidency Project. 20 Jan. 1949. Web. 24 Oct. 2013.
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