Has Germany Been the Hammer or the Anvil?

In the second act of his play Der Gross-Coptha Goethe writes, “You must either conquer and rule or lose and serve, suffer or triumph, and be the anvil or the hammer”. In light of this quote, this paper shall consider Germany’s history since the seventeenth century, examining the three distinct eras of modern Germany (1648-1871, 1890-1945 and 1945 to the present day). It shall consider how oftentimes the country does not play exclusively the role of hammer nor anvil, but rather, ultimately ends up undertaking both roles. One can see many times throughout Germany’s history that the country does indeed often play the ‘hammer’. In its quest to be powerful and mighty – the opposite of the anvil, in a sense – Germany is often extremely militarily aggressive. However, it is often those times when Germany exerts its hammer-like aggression most greatly that it ultimately transforms into its weakest and most humble anvil-like state.

Austro-Prussian dualism, which began in 1740 and did not truly resolve until 1886, conveys a period when Prussia certainly played the aggressive role of the hammer. Consider the antagonistic and hostile actions of King Frederick in the art of warfare. In 1740, 20,000 troops in tow, the king, boldly and unprompted began the First Silesian War, invading and annexing Silesia. Soon after, in 1744, he initiated the second Silesian War, invading Bohemia. Years later, Bismarck led Germany in another hammer-like display of aggression and rivalry. Prussia invaded Bohemia, ultimately defeating Austria at Koniggratz in 1886.

Frederick’s and Bismarck’s motivations further highlight these wars as events whereby Germany undertook the role of the hammer. Frederick’s greatest motive was a ‘desire to win fame for himself by making his monarchy respected as a power among the great nations of Europe” (Holborn 210). Meanwhile, Bismarck “fervently believed that … Prussia was not to play second fiddle to Austria” (Herwig 119). Thus, in these wars, Germany undertook the role of a hammer by attempting, through military triumph, to establish itself as a major player in Europe, one which would not serve more powerful countries, but rather be served – one which could never be an ‘anvil’.

Although Frederick and Bismarck ultimately succeeded in their military aims, as stated, often when Germany plays the hammer, it ends up the anvil. For instance, the final Silesian War took its toll on Prussia. By 1761, “Frederick was truly desperate” (Herwig 59), debasing the coinage and making young teenagers lieutenants. Furthermore, again, despite Bismarck’s military success, 1886 was a “German tragedy. One-half million soldiers had fought … at Koniggratz … and one in four became a casualty” (Herwig 121).

Post unification, in the era spanning the World Wars, one again sees Germany acting extremely aggressively in their bid for prestige and domination. It is in these years that its ‘hammer’ actions and ‘anvil’ conclusions are, arguably, most wildly juxtaposed. Firstly, significantly, not so unlike King Frederick’s aspirations for greatness, ‘the young German Empire with its fledgling national pride aspired … to the glory of a colonial empire’ (Raff 195). (Indeed, it was largely this mindset that fuelled their entry into the World War.) As such, in the years leading up to the First World War, attempting to out-do the great European powers, Emperor William II violently enacted a policy of aggressive, and rather mindless, colonialization. In fact, Germany desired dominance enough to antagonize powers as great as “Britain and the United States for pieces of Samoa in 1889 and almost went to war with the United States in 1898 over the Philippines” (Herwig 177). Germany’s Navy, furthermore, newly expanded to compete with the famed British fleet, again represented “the craving for recognition, and the willingness to confront recognized powers for a piece of the colonial pie” (Herwig 175).

As discussed earlier in relation to Austro-Prussian dualism, this aggressive rivalry conjures Goethe’s quote: Germany decided to conquer and rule, not lose and serve other countries. One sees a similarly hammer-like foreign policy under Hitler’s regime. Germany’s extremely aggressive entrance into World War Two conveys this. Overtly disobeying the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler militarized the Rhineland (1936). Moreover, in blatant breach of the Munich Agreement (1938), Hitler annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia before rapidly spreading his military control to Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and France.

These ‘hammer’ aspirations, which led Germany into two World Wars, ultimately transformed the country into its most anvil-like states. After WW1, with two million men dead, a debt of around 175 billion marks, and later, hyperinflation, Germany was crippled. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Versailles meant that rather than being a world power, Germany’s actions were greatly dictated by world powers. Likewise, after WW2, ‘Hour Zero’ fell upon Germany. 14 million families were homeless, and Germany was, once again, ruled by world powers, split into militarized zones by the Allies.

The final era of Germany’s history to explore is 1945 to the present day. During this time, one sees Germany rise out of its anvil-like status and into its most hammer-esque position to date, becoming one of the world’s most stable leading powers. In the post-war years, West Germany’s economy expanded rapidly into “what would later be termed the ‘German economic miracle’” (Raff 357). In 1952, Germany further promoted its commitment to peaceful European growth and relations and its significance on the world stage by co-founding the committee that would ultimately become the European Union.

Meanwhile, Germany’s acceptance into NATO in 1955 was extremely also significant. The action bolstered Germany’s prominence as a Western power, essentially establishing the country as an important ally of the West in the Cold War. After unification in 1990, East Germany began also to embrace the social reforms and economic success of West Germany. Currently, Germany is a great world power. However, it wields this hammer-like status in a very different way than in past eras. The country now approaches military action extremely cautiously (as its refusal to join the Iraq war conveys). Rather, Germany now tends to limit its international involvement to humanitarian aid, crisis management and peacekeeping (Crawford 168).

Considering Germany’s history, one can see that the country often swayed between acting the hammer and acting the anvil. Indeed, as we see especially with the World Wars, Germany’s desire to be a leading world power often resulted in its weakest and most tragic periods – its most anvil-like states. It is also interesting to note that the ‘anvil’ and ‘hammer’ periods in Germany’s history are often intimately related. For instance, partially as a result of the humiliation and economic depression of the years following World War One, Germany ultimately embraced Nazism. Likewise, after the national shame which Hilter’s regime instilled, Germany opted to turn utterly away from its past aggressions and move into the future as a world power, a ‘hammer’, mighty but not aggressive. Thus today, rather than interpreting Goethe’s quote literally, in terms of violence and conquering, Germany rules as a world power in a peaceful, pragmatic fashion.

Works Cited

Crawford, Beverly. "The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany’s Post-Wall Foreign Policy." Germany Politics and Society 28.2 (2010): 166-184. Print.

Herwig, Holger H.. Hammer or anvil?: modern Germany 1648-present. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1994. Print.

Holborn, Hajo. A history of modern Germany. [1st ed. New York: A. A. Knopf, 195969. Print.

Raff, Diether. A history of Germany: from the medieval empire to the present. Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK: Berg, 1988. Print.