Korean War: Outcome and Effect on American Domestic and Foreign Policy

To understand the origins and effects of the Korean War on domestic politics and foreign policy directives in the United States is to attempt to comprehend a conflict that, for all intents and purposes, divided what had been a single nation into two virulently opposed ethnic groups, each of which can be construed as having a separated cultural identity, historical legacy, and fundamentally different sociocultural values. The war itself originated in the aftermath of the Second World War, where Soviet and Chinese forces exerted strong influence in the Korean Peninsula following the withdrawal of the Japanese Imperial Army in 1945. In terms of the war’s impact on domestic politics, the conflict in Korea spurred a resurgence in the size and power of the American military, helped to breakdown racial barriers in the armed forces, and, for the first time, put what could be argued as a wartime defeat, or at best prolonged stalemate, on the forefront of American national discussion. With regards to foreign policy, the Korean War can be seen as a prelude to the later Vietnam War, and represents the first major challenge of American foreign policy and military might in the post-World War II world. 

The occupation of Korea at the hands of the Japanese began in 1905, when the growing might of the Empire of Japan found itself in a position to formally place Korea under its sphere of influence as a protectorate. This act was done with the “blessing of both Great Britain and America”, as the British received Japanese support for “British rule in India, and America [received] assurances relating to U.S. influence in the Philippines” (Carter, 158). China, the traditional counterweight to Japanese power in Asia and which had historically opposed Japanese encroachment on territories long seen as theoretically under the influence or control of the Chinese, proved incapable of mustering any support to protest the Japanese annexation of Korea. The illusion of the protectorate was shattered in 1910, when the Korean ruler was “deprived of all his rights and was replaced by a Japanese military government” (159). It is here where the Korean affinity for the ideals of communism begin to take root—the harsh rule of the Japanese occupation force led many Koreans to believe that a communist rebellion represented the best hope for Korean independence. 

Though Korea had no marked division prior to the outbreak of the war, it is clear that the Americans and Allied forces had clear plans for a future separation of the spheres of influence in Asia. Indeed, soon after the bombing of Nagasaki, the “Americans had already decided that it would be preferable to divide the country at the 38th parallel, leaving the area north of it to the Russia army” and ensuring the southern half of the peninsula would remain in Allied, and therefore democratic, hands (160). The Soviets agreed to this situation, and the backdrop upon which the Korean War would be fought had been set. 

The Korean War is not truly the story of an honest, incorruptible Korean democracy besieged by communist infiltrators, but rather a tale of a government located in the city of Chungking under the command of Dr. Syngman Rhee, a man “despised by many Korean for his arrogance and absence from Korea during its time of struggle” that was focused on providing economic and security benefits to the occupying Allied forces (160). Rhee, then, represents the very thing that the Americans initially wanted to destroy in Korea—a corrupt, dominating upper class that “had no interest in real democracy and individual freedom, but were only seeking to make themselves rich and powerful” (161). Instead of a state built to guard individual liberty, Rhee’s Korea was a country that existed to prevent the spread of communism and support American strategic interests. As a result, interest in democratic values waned, and unrest mounted. Likewise, Rhee responded with strong police actions, and Korea was seen as a state under the rule of a draconian businessmen hell-bent on oppression and domination. Eventually, the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly “announced their intention to establish a ‘People’s Democratic Republic’ that would include both halves of the peninsula. The North Koreans, led by Kim Il Sung, did not believe Rhee would negotiate in good faith, and the North eventually launched a full-scale invasion of the South following months of small skirmishes and border crossings (162). Rhee’s dictatorship became complete with the dismissal of “all minsters who revealed evidence of independence of thought” and, once Rhee took over direct control of the internal police, the war would be fully justified in the eyes of many Koreans.

While it seems that Rhee and the division of politics on the peninsula may be the root causes of the war, it is clear that both Washington and Moscow, and arguably Beijing, all had major roles to play. By 1950, “the growing alliance among the defense, science, and industrial establishments was producing a vested interest with a huge stake” in the continual expansion of the military-industrial complex (Woods, 667). Granted, it can be argued that merely increasing the spending allocated to military endeavors and the subsequent need to continually expand the military-industrial complex is a primary mover of war, but it would be more logically consistent to merely state that the growing size of the American military lent itself to a promoting a situation in which the application of armed force could theoretically be used. While the actual outbreak of the war cannot be said to have been the result of American military buildup, it can be said that the “ballooning defense and foreign aid budget” required, as a factor in and of itself, a practical use that would continue a trend of ever-growing levels of expenditure (667). Thus, the American military and economic pressure, while it did not directly contribute to the outbreak of hostilities, certainly was not opposed to the idea of a potentially large conflict on the far side of the world. 

Regardless of the reasons behind the war, it is clear that the conflict itself would drastically impact the future of the Korean state, as well as adversely affect the course of domestic and foreign politics in the United States. The conduct of the war itself is not the focus of this paper, but it will be said that the war claimed upwards of 2.5 million civilians dead and wounded, nearly 40,000 American military dead and upwards of 750,000 North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet military dead. By the time the war reached a long and bloody stalemate during the winter of 1951, it was clear the 38th parallel would remain the line between the rapidly diverging North and South Korean states. If the question is posed as to why the Americans and South Koreans could not achieve victory, or perhaps how the North Koreans did so well throughout the conflict, two primary justifications can be given. First, the Americans were fighting a limited war, limited in the sense that the American public and military command did not seek to bring the full power of the American industrial and military might to bear on the peninsula (Woods, 667). Not only was the idea of a protracted land war in Korea not appealing to American leaders, but selling that war to the public in the name of containment against communist aggression would prove to be a difficult task. 

The North Koreans, moreover, managed to do so well in the war partially because the withdrawal of the Soviets following the end of World War II left Kim Il Sung with a large, well-equipped, and ideologically motivated fighting force. The South Koreans lacked the initial equipment and support to wage war effectively, and it is clear that the South Koreans, given their lack of faith in the Rhee government, could not raise sufficient domestic commitment to wage a strong war effort in the early years of the conflict. This lack of domestic commitment, or the capacity of a population to bear the costs of war, is a primary factor in why the South Koreans, with their superior population and foreign support, failed to achieve more success in the early stages of the conflict. Lastly, the massive influx of Chinese soldiers led to the saturation of the peninsula with hostile forces, and despite the oftentimes poor performance of Chinese soldiers due to their lack of equipment and supplies, quantity has a quality all in its own (West, 86-90). In the end, the Korean conflict can be seen as a war that lasted far longer than it should have, and the subsequent stalemate of 1951-1953 did nothing strategically but cost many lives.

In terms of domestic politics and foreign policy, the war in Korea led to a massive increase in defense spending. Though the war had cost much in terms of blood and treasure, domestic commitment towards the policy of containment began to question itself. The outcome of the war, that of a “bloody stalemate” that resulted in nearly identical territory when comparing the end of the war to the start, meant that American support for Korea was almost completely gone (Carter, 437). Veterans were largely ignored, especially when compared against World War II heroes, and the Korean War would be seen as the “Forgotten War” of American domestic politics (438). Indeed, domestic American politics can be seen as having not changed really at all; support for containment had wavered, to be sure, but American determination to stop the spread of communism remained high. For the first time, American dedication to containment had been put to the test and, while the war had not been won by any party, it was clearly not a loss by any definition of the word. 

Instead, the U.N. and American goals of ensuring Korean stability had somewhat succeeded, albeit with the loss of half the country, and it was clear that Soviet and North Korean ideological goals to unify the Korean peninsula under the banner of communism had been stymied Moreover, far from being merely a strategic stalemate, the Korean War represents the first bloody example of American commitment to its post-World War II policy of containment against communism. The United States, moreover, would view communist China as a strategic foe until Kissinger’s opening of Sino-American relations in 1971, and the rather bizarre American insistence on Taiwanese independence from the People’s Republic can be viewed in the light of the split seen on the Korean peninsula. The war would heighten tensions with the Soviet Union, as it clearly exemplified, for the first time, the theme of proxy wars that would go on to define the adversarial relationship between Moscow and Washington. Lastly, the Korean War would have important implications for the idea that countries can be divided permanently in war, yet one side can still claim victory. This is a concept seen in the division of Germany, the split in Korea, and the eventual arguments for victory in Vietnam at the cost of permanently splitting the nation. 

In the end, the Korean War stands an example of a conflict where the domestic commitment of the United States towards a policy of containment would have massive ramifications on the course of history. Originating in the aftermath of World War II, the war would put America’s military-industrial complex on the forefront of the national consciousness, while simultaneously stressing America’s commitment to overseas security. The Korean War, moreover, is symbolic of the way that the later Vietnam conflict would develop, and, in particular, the impact that foreign overseas commitments would have on American involvement for decades to come.

Works Cited

Carter, David. "The Korean War At 60 Part One: Origins and Outbreak. “Contemporary Review 292.1697 (2010): 158-168. Academic Search Complete.

Carter, David. "The Korean War At 60: Part Three: Armistice And Aftermath." Contemporary Review 292.1699 (2010): 428-438. Humanities Full Text (H.W. Wilson).

West, Philip. "The Origins Of The Korean War." American Historical Review94.1 (1989): 80-96. Academic Search Complete. 

Woods, Randall Bennett. "A Transforming Experience." Diplomatic History24.4 (2000): 667. America: History & Life.