McCarthyism, Korea, and the Communist Threat in America

The conclusion of World War II ushered in radical geopolitical changes. American foreign policy coped with a devastated Europe and a new adversary, the Soviet Union. The latter half of 1949 brought the bipolar order into greater focus; the Soviet counterweight to American hegemony test fired their first atomic bomb and Chinese Communist forces prevailed against the indigenous American-backed nationalist forces. These dramatic changes stoked fears of growing Soviet influence around the globe and drove concern of Soviet and communist subversion within the US. These domestic fears were manifest in what is now referred to as “McCarthyism”, a form of domestic fear mongering of Soviet-influenced Communism exemplified by the antics of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and enabled the first direct military engagement of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. Domestic McCarthyism enabled – and in some ways forced – a more robust and aggressive US foreign policy to counter what was deemed the Soviet communist threat on the Korean peninsula.

McCarthyism had a significant effect on domestic American politics. In February 1950, Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy drew widespread media attention when he claimed to have a list of Communists working inside the State Department. His allegations built upon the hysteria promulgated by the Alger Hiss trial, in which the Deputy Secretary of State was charged with being a Communist in the prior year. The core of the Truman Administration was in the McCarthy’s crosshairs. Secretary of State Dean Acheson became a “political liability” to President Truman due to political attacks by McCarthy and his acolytes. In fact, McCarthy went so far as to call for Truman’s impeachment as a traitor in 1952. Larry Blomstedt claims the salience of McCarthyism was crystallized by two events. First, the September 1950 passage of the Internal Security Act to Fight Communism in Congress granted greater leverage for authorities to crack down on domestic suspicions of communist sympathies. Second, and more important, the political victory in the Republican victory in the 1950-midterm elections was said to legitimize the McCarthy doctrine of rampant accusations. Indeed, suspicion of “communist” activities, sympathies, or past participation was enough to elicit McCarthy’s charges, which fed widespread paranoia. The heightened state of unease complemented aggressive US foreign policy. According to Howard Jones “fear of subversion [in McCarthyism] at home necessitated a stronger policy abroad.”

Developments on the Korean Peninsula amplified the effects McCarthyism. In June 1950, Kim Il-Sung’s Chinese-backed North Korean Communist forces crossed the 38th parallel – a negotiated demarcation line agreed on by the Soviets and Americans in 1945 – to invade what was designated South Korea. Il-Sung’s troops decimated the US-backed Republic of Korea troops. The invasion was viewed through the prism of Soviet expansion. President Truman claimed the North Korean invasion was “inspired by the Soviet Union” and warned his advisors if nothing was done, then “there as ‘no telling what they’ll [Soviets] do.’” In early July, the US intervened under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 87 mandate. This intervention offered more fodder and provided a “shot in the arm” to McCarthy and company. There was little domestic public support for the war from an American public reeling from the heightened tensions and constant recriminations. Truman’s decisions were increasingly scrutinized and attempts to change tracks in the war or to bring it to a close were repeatedly thwarted by McCarthyites epitomized by Truman’s decision to relieve infamous General MacArthur. Toxic exchanges ensued. McCarthy called the decision a “Communist victory won with the aid of bourbon and Benedictine” and called for the impeachment of Truman. Repeated attempts at peace agreements were also undermined by McCarthyite charges of Truman’s attempts to transition to an “isolationist” American posture. The war eventually drew to a stalemate in mid-July 1951 until the eventual armistice in 1953, when the Korean Peninsula was split by a demilitarized zone at the 38th parallel, roughly the same demarcation as before the war. Yet the damage meted out by both the respective belligerent nations, among US officials, among the American public stand as salient lessons today.

Notes

Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), Location 427 (Kindle Edition).

Larry Blomstedt, “The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War: Congress, Korea, and McCarthyism,” The Historian 72, no. 4 (2010): 781-808, 785.

Doug Dowd, “Cry ‘Havoc!’ And Let Slip the Dogs of War: McCarthyism, Korea, and Other Nightmares,” Monthly Review 48, no. 11 (April 1997): 32-42, 38.

Blomstedt, “The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War…,” 785

Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), Location 441 (Kindle Edition).

Bruce Cumings, The Korean War (New York: Modern Library Chronicles Press, 2010).

United States National Archives and Records Administration, “Teaching with Documents: The United States Enters the Korean Conflict,” Originally in Social Education (Journal of the National Council for the Social Studies). Retrieved on February 2, 2014 from http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict/

Paul G. Pierpaoli, “Truman’s Other War: The Battle for the American Homefront, 1950-1953,” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History 14, no. 3. (Spring 2000): 15-19, 18.

Blomstedt, “The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War…,” 785

Larry Blomstedt, “The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War…,” 791.

Bibliography

Blomstedt, Larry, “The Forgotten Attempts to End the Forgotten War: Congress, Korea, and McCarthyism,” The Historian 72, no. 4 (2010): 781-808.

Cumings Bruce, The Korean War (New York: Modern Library Chronicles Press, 2010).

Dowd, Doug, “Cry ‘Havoc!’ And Let Slip the Dogs of War: McCarthyism, Korea, and Other Nightmares,” Monthly Review 48, no. 11 (April 1997): 32-42.

Jones, Howard, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009).

Pierpaoli, Paul G., “Truman’s Other War: The Battle for the American Homefront, 1950-1953,” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History 14, no. 3. (Spring 2000): 15-19.

United States National Archives and Records Administration, “Teaching with Documents: The United States Enters the Korean Conflict,” Originally in Social Education (Journal of the National Council for the Social Studies). Retrieved on February 2, 2014 from http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict/