Ottoman Empire: Preparation for the Congress of Berlin

As the Ottoman empire entered the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the battle had been lost for the most part and the main aspirations of the nation were intangible rather than physical. Ultimately, the process of disintegration had been going on for many years and Turkey was in a brutal position: “The empire’s vital forces- her army, her navy and her financial credit abroad, were in a critical condition” (Bey 396). A recent war with Russia had left the empire struggling to maintain social and political hegemony throughout their once vast empire across the center of the earth. Intense foreign intervention into their territories in the Balkans severely jeopardized the Sultan’s rule as well (Bey 397). Consequently, the congress of Berlin had little hopes of tangible salvation in terms of land or economic prosperity. As far as Europe was concerned, the Ottoman empire was the sick man of Europe and it was merely a matter of time until their presence and influence would be completely gone from the continent. 

Despite these harsh realities, the Ottomans went into the meeting with some aspirations that needed attention. Short term, ending violence and terror on religious grounds was an immediate priority. Because of the diverse nature of ethnicities in the Balkans, the pressure was on the government to either settle the differences or dissemble the empire. Indeed, an immediate aspiration was to “satisfy the grievances of the Christian population without antagonizing Muslim opinion” (Lowe 21). This would hopefully help regain a sense of social control within the Ottoman empire was opposing nations like Russia and Austria-Hungary had their eyes on this territory. Another short-term aspiration was to mend the bankruptcy of 1789 and economic problems of managing a massive empire (Lowe 20). Surely, European nations like Britain were looking to Turkey as a passage to India for further trading routes. However, the Ottomans were focused on getting healthy rather than growth.  Finally, the long-term aspiration was mainly to “preserve the integrity of what remained of this once great empire” (Lowe 19). That is, the Ottomans knew that their empire was a faint version of what it used to be and respect from other great powers had diminished. 

In terms of Alliances, Turkey was both geographically and politically alienated from other European powers in terms of a friendly neighbor. With the Triple Alliance of Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans were left the likes of nations who either wanted their land, resources or workforce. While under the leadership of skilled diplomat Bismarck, Germany had no ambitions in the east; however, Pan Slavic claims from Russia as well as a recent war prompted the officials in Moscow to move forward on territorial ambitions. Between England, Austria-Hungary and Russia, the only concern was “an east-west partition of influence in the Balkans” (Lowe 21).  This meant that as far the other alliances were concerned, the Ottomans were simply not included in any circles of powerful nations. Even before the Congress of Berlin, Russia and England were scheming for ways to divide the Turkish lands up. 

Of course, Turkey faced intense domestic pressures from their massive empire that they could not control. Mainly, the issue in the Balkans was that there were diverse nationalities struggling to coincide among one another. Within the Balkan communities, religious tensions also developed because of the “growth of nationalist feeling among the Balkan Christians and Slavs” (Lowe 21). This problem stemmed from the fact that the vast Ottoman Empire did not have the best infrastructure to handle administrative tasks. The diverse colonies were not managed properly and did not produce economically as well as they should have. This produced a high level of poverty, reliance on foreign sources of funding and a longing for different leadership. Indeed, Sultan Abdul Hamid II struggled with these domestic problems and did not handle them appropriately. Rather than fair elections and a rise of democratic ideals, Sultan Hamid shifted his rule into an autocracy and resorted to military use, violence and ethnic targeting in an attempt to maintain hegemony throughout his empire. 

Even worse than the domestic pressure of fighting and violence was the imperialist attitudes of neighboring nations. For example, England has had a penchant for imperial expansion for hundreds of years. After the new world colonies did not work out as England had wished, their efforts were shifted towards both weaker neighbors and mainly India. As the main passage to India, England wished nothing more than to clear a path through the middle-east (Lowe 20). As the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Hamid II certainly did not forge a solid relationship with England either. In fact, England overwhelmingly criticized the Ottoman empire and its dynasty of Sultan’s with a barrage of insults. Historian Allan Cunningham remarked that the Sultan “disliked Great Britain and the British intensely throughout his reign, finding them most censorious and interfering of his critics” (Cunningham 229). It wasn’t enough that the Sultan had domestic tensions, but he had to constantly deal with the international haste of nations like Britain who were egging him on along the way. 

The negative relations between Europe and Turkey were also based on opposing ambitions in terms of economics and national affiliation. Naturally, Russian leaders felt it was appropriate to promote their Pan Slavic heritage within Eastern Europe as the territories became available to foreign invaders. This affinity to Eastern Europe was thus driven by economic interests and disguised by nationalism. In fact, Russia desperately wanted a means to have access and influence in the Mediterranean Sea (Lowe 20). With access to ports on the Adriatic, Russia could advance their international goals and further economic growth. 

A major problem going into the Congress of Berlin was surely the reputation and legacy of hopelessness that the Ottoman Empire had. For instance, as European powers emerged from industrial and economic development, land acquisition and organizational structure was the growing trend. However, since the early 1800’s, Turkey was losing land and overall influence. John Lowe remarked that throughout the course of the 19th century, Europe was anxiously waiting and annoyed at the fact that Turkey was “failing to disintegrate quicker” (Lowe 19). That is, the reputation of being the sick man in Europe had persisted for so long that it was only a matter of time until their presence and influence was completely non-existent in Europe. 

The implications of these circumstances are that Turkey would be forced to deal with feelings of alienation. The true super powers merely felt the need to include Turkey as a mere formality as the empire had been steadily collapsing for a long period of time. The future and longevity of the empire was surely compromised as there was little hope for returning to their previous state of power. Consequently, the Ottoman presence during the Congress of Berlin 1878 was overshadowed by clear feelings of alienation from the different alliances that had formed. Furthermore, nations like Russia and England had economic ambitions that purely took advantage of Turkey’s disposition. In the final analysis, it would appear that Turkey would behave in a very passive manner. They clearly did not have the influence politically to make a difference. In terms of an arms presence, their resources were minimal. Any disagreements that would result during this conference would most likely end with Turkish representatives taking a passive and silent approach. As no major alliances were aligned in their direction, they were also completely alienated from any diplomatic partnerships that could have been made. Ultimately, the Congress would be summarized by a sad experience as Europe eagerly carved up their land to nations who had no interest in seeing Turkey reclaim their former glory.

Works Cited

Bey, Mundji. "The Regenerated Ottoman Empire." The North American Review 188.634 (1908): 395-403. Print.

Cunningham, Allan. Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays. London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1993. Print.

Lowe, John. The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem, 1865-1925. New York: Routledge Publishing, 1994. Print.