Policeman of the World

In the short period between 1941 and 1945, America changed from an isolationist nation to a world-influencing superpower. There are many causal factors for this major shift, which has influenced American actions, attitudes, and outlooks on the world up to and including the present day. In contrast to its prewar stance as “isolationist,” the United States became “interventionist.” This came about first as a perceived need to thwart the spread of worldwide Communism; that threat largely ceased in 1989 but was almost immediately replaced by that of rogue states, terrorism, and Islamic extremism. America became the self-appointed world policeman, and subsequently became enemy number one.

This new role can be seen in two recent minor but significant military interventions. In 2011, the U.S. culminated its hunt for Osama Bin Laden with a military strike inside the borders of Pakistan. Though Pakistan was ostensibly a U.S. ally, the U.S. didn’t seek permission, let alone notify, the Pakistani authorities prior to the strike. The strike was successful, and Bin Laden was killed, but the unilateral nature of American actions rankled the Pakistani government and people and strained relations. Mazzetti, Cooper and Baker noted that “For an intelligence community that had endured searing criticism for a string of intelligence failures over the past decade, Bin Laden’s killing brought a measure of redemption” (2011). This suggests that the collective ego, if you will, of American military and intelligence organizations trumped diplomatic niceties. Also, in 2011, the U.S. carried out a series of drone strikes in Somalia; this marked the sixth nation into which the U.S. had fired missiles in an attempt to assassinate a militant or terrorist leader. The U.S. formerly had both an expressed policy and a general societal revulsion against assassination of enemy leaders. Wachtel noted that “Most people cringe when they hear the word assassination because it reminds them of some of the most tragic events in history” (677). In America’s role as policeman, it has become acceptable to shoot to kill rather than allowing a suspect to surrender and face justice.

As a precursor to this role, America’s WWII experience had propelled the nation onto the world’s center stage. At the war’s end, America was pretty much the last man standing; France, England, and Russia, though also the victors, were exhausted and logistically destroyed. The U.S. had emerged from the conflict almost intact and had suffered far fewer casualties percentage-wise than all the other major combatants. Thus, there was a power vacuum, and the U.S. reluctantly filled it. Reluctantly, because the American soldier felt he had fought the good fight and now wanted to go home to a family to enjoy peace and prosperity. However, the threat to the world posed by fascism was almost immediately replaced by that of communism. Russia turned intransigent and then openly hostile almost as soon as the last shot was fired. It became apparent that Stalin wanted to add Eastern Europe to his empire as war booty and compensation for having borne the brunt of Nazi. So, the Axis threat to freedom and self-determination was immediately replaced by a similar threat from the Soviets. Many in America felt that standing up to this threat was absolutely necessary, as the world had not defeated one tyranny only to hand control over to another. America was now a world power, with all the responsibilities thereof.

However, in the prewar period, America had largely been an intermediary and peacemaker and sought an isolationist role. President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” signaled a new, hopeful mindset. The boom years of the twenties came to a crashing halt, though, and so did many people’s dreams for a better life. America turned its eyes inward and concentrated its efforts on rebuilding its economy even as Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo took power. The indifference America showed to Hitler assimilating whole nations in 1937 and 1938 contrasts markedly with the postwar period, when U.S. forces were rushed to far-flung places all over the globe. The area the American policeman patrolled had become much larger; the justification was that communism was a worldwide threat.

That basic justification for U.S. postwar military interventions persists. That is, “Somebody’s got to do it (stop communism, fight terrorism, bring down Saddam Hussein), and we’re the best and strongest, so it might as well be us.” This fervor cooled off quite a bit after Vietnam, but not much later, the U.S. again found itself the last man standing after Soviet Russia collapsed. The U.S. was the world’s only intact superpower—and with great power, it was felt, came great responsibility. Significantly, the American victories in WWII and in the Cold War were seen as vindication of the American philosophy and way of life. There is now a problem, however. As von Hippel noted (2011), “Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy no longer has the luxury of subsuming all decisions under one sweeping campaign, but rather it must encompass a range of issues.” Interventions in chaotic situations such as the Libyan or Syrian civil war are highly complex; yet, America’s leaders still try to couch such decisions in the simplistic terminology of “the war on terror” or “fighting rogue states.”

In addition to its effects on U.S. politics, the rise of the U.S. to world superpower has had lasting effects on American society. Defense spending in every year since WWII has been greater, usually much greater, in both absolute terms and as a percentage of gross domestic product, than in any prewar year. This is a more or less permanent condition since the U.S. does not, in fact, confine its military spending to “defense.” Of course, the nuclear arms race and the doctrine of “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) meant that the only defense was a good offense, but that threat has largely been perceived as greatly reduced. The goal of American military doctrine has been to maintain fast, mobile striking forces that can reach anywhere in the globe. This is justified by saying that America’s interests are in fact worldwide and that threats can appear anywhere. This thinking tends to sweep questions of national sovereignty and diplomatic solutions under the rug, as well as subordinate the values of privacy to those of security (whatever that term may mean in a given context).

On the issue of privacy vs. security, many have criticized the Patriot Act and the actions of Homeland Security since the 9/11 attacks as excessive. The constitutionality of the Patriot Act in its many assaults on the Fourth Amendment has in particular come under scrutiny. Particularly in the first years of the last decade, the U.S. government has often seemed to assign higher priority to security than to civil liberties. Privacy issues were raised with the revelation that the government was engaged in widespread wiretapping and other forms of covert surveillance. Many felt, and still feel, that the tradeoff is not worth it, and most crucially, that if America’s enemies force a fundamental change in American life, then they’ve won.

Additionally, America’s choice of leaders also reflects the security-focused mindset prevailing after 9/11. Certainly, George W. Bush would have faced a much more arduous, uphill battle for reelection if the country had not perceived a need for leadership continuity in the face of the terrorist threat. And of course, decades earlier, Ronald Reagan was elected and re-elected because the country felt that he could stand up to communism and help heal the prevailing American malaise after Vietnam and Iran.

So, there are two components to America’s assuming the mantle of world leader and policeman: the fact that twice in the last century, the U.S. found itself to be the world’s only superpower, and the ongoing shift from a culture of personal freedom to that of a heavily armed, ever-watchful surveillance state. America has become the world’s policeman because it assumes the world is a chaotic and dangerous place that needs to be policed, and “we’re the ones to do it.”

References

Mazzetti, M., Cooper, H., & Baker, P. (2011). Behind the hunt for Bin Laden. The New York Times, A1.

Von Hippel, K. (2000). Democracy by force: US military intervention in the post-cold war world. Cambridge University Press.

Wachtel, H. A. (2005). Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a Tool of US Foreign Policy. Duke Law Journal, 55(3), 677-710.