The Battle of Waterloo: An In-Depth Analysis

The Battle of Waterloo was a bloody and gruesome battle for all parties involved. Perhaps one of the worst consequences of the battle, however, was that it tarnished the reputation of Napoleon Bonaparte irreparably. Napoleon, who was, at one time, regarded as a tactical genius and prodigy for his day, became the laughing stock of the world after a number of foolish military mistakes that perhaps would not have been made had the French forces been commanded by another military leader far more disciplined in warfare. Nevertheless, the Battle of Waterloo was a crucial battle for a number of reasons, and in order to gain a grasp of its details and implications, it is necessary to examine the battle more in-depth so that the factors that led to Napoleon's downfall may be better understood.

The Battle of Waterloo was fought between the French army, under the command of Bonaparte and the Allied powers, made up of Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, leading the United Kingdom as well as Allied forces from the Netherlands, Belgium, and German states, totaling about 67,000 soldiers (Hamilton 6). In addition, Prussian Marshal Gebhard von Blucher commanded about 100,000 troops, and merged together with Wellington in Belgium, on the northeast border of France, in order to consolidate their forces and increase the size of both of their armies (Hamilton 6). Realizing the importance of keeping the armies of Wellington and Gebhard von Blucher separate, Napoleon came up with the strategy of plowing right down the middle of the armies, effectively cleaving the mass of soldiers in two, and destroying the armies one at a time, or at least that was the plan (Hamilton 7). This strategy seemed to fit with Napoleon's modus operandi, which was usually focused on attacking quickly and decisively, relying on the confusion caused by his initial ferocious strike in order to capitalize on and overcome other disadvantages he might have during a battle, such as severely outnumbered forces, in this case, since Napoleon's army consisted of just 100,000 troops compared to the 200,000 or so he was facing (Hamilton 7). This kind of disadvantage did not daunt Napoleon in the slightest, and, on the contrary, gave him a great deal of confidence, as it would allow him to finally prove himself after years of exile that he was, in fact, a competent military leader.

Unfortunately for Napoleon, the initial disadvantage of being outnumbered almost two to one turned out to be his greatest downfall during the Battle of Waterloo. The madness actually began two days before the battle itself, when Napoleon engaged the army at Ligny, a village in the province of Namur, and mauled the Prussian forces, forcing them to retreat and separate from Wellington's United Kingdom forces (Hamilton 8). However, Napoleon would not allow them to escape so easily. He sent more than 30,000 troops, under the mission command of Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy, to pursue the Prussian forces and prevent them from meeting up with the British forces again, which would have effectively made Napoleon's recent victory pointless (Hamilton 8). The Prussians, though wounded, were still able to retreat effectively, and did so to the north instead of the east, as Napoleon had predicted they would, causing another wrinkle in his plans. Many also consider Napoleon's plan to leave the Prussians almost entirely to Grouchy was foolhardy unto itself, as the Prussians had previously proven themselves to be fierce adversaries, even when wounded and seemingly defeated. Napoleon also made the assumption that Wellington himself would actually withdraw to Brussels, since his "other half,” the Prussians, would have been separated from his army, thus weakening both (Fuller 504). By this time, it is safe to make the assumption that the Battle of Waterloo had actually begun in force, although no one is really certain of the time that the battle actually began. Originally, Napoleon had to delay what would become the Battle of Waterloo because of wet and murky weather conditions, which would have been problematic for heavy equipment as well as infantry and cavalry (Fuller 509). Once the weather permitted, Napoleon instructed Grouchy, the Marshal responsible for attacking the Prussians, to head north and draw near to Napoleon's army, thus crushing the Prussian forces between them in a type of pincer grip-style tactic (Fuller 513). However, Grouchy, who had previously been ordered to merely pursue the Prussian forces mercilessly, was simply too far away from the Battle of Waterloo to be able to reach it in time.

Perhaps the first major attack during the Battle of Waterloo came during the attack on Hougoumont, where Napoleon attacked Wellington's forces, with Napoleon, due to the Prussian detachment of soldiers, having a slight advantage in terms of the number of cavalry and artillery (Fuller 524). However, this battle proved to be the first of several in which Napoleon committed a major blunder. In this case, one of Napoleon's officials, Jerome, along with his army, became embroiled in an attempt to occupy the chateau, which caused a large number of French soldiers to be drawn into the battle in order to support Jerome, which was exactly the opposite of what Napoleon had planned- to draw in Wellington's forces and eliminate them easily (Fuller 524). From here, the British forces were able to find a defensive position that was out of range of their artillery and musket fire, and lie in wait for the French forces, which suffered from a decided lack of communication and cooperation (Fuller 528). Thus, once the French forces approached Wellington's army, they emerged and suddenly attacked, segregating their own army into squares so as to avoid becoming easy targets for the charging cavalry, which excels at breaking large masses of enemies, preferably in a line, and sowing confusion among the army, another favorite tactic of Napoleon's (Fuller 528). Unfortunately, Napoleon, in what some would call arrogance, was unable to see the obvious disadvantage he found himself in and refused to retreat when doing so would have been logical. Experts believe that both generals thought that holding Hougoumont was imperative to winning the battle, yet Napoleon continued to focus resources on only Hougoumont because it was one part of the battlefield that he could actually see clearly at all times (Roberts 173). Rather, Napoleon should have been focusing his visions and forces elsewhere.

Around this time, many of the Prussian forces were actually in the process of arriving and supporting Wellington's forces, which posed a number of problems for Napoleon, who had failed to eliminate these separated forces in time (Roberts 160). Fortunately, Napoleon's forces had actually succeeded in eliminating Wellington's forces near La Haye Sainte, which exposed the center of Wellington's army, leaving it susceptible to attack by both infantry and cavalry (Fuller 532). Capitalizing on this opportunity, Napoleon committed the last of his forces, known as the Imperial Guard, to attack and take advantage of this seeming weakness in Wellington's army (Fuller 532). This surprise-attack was successful initially, but as the element of surprise wore off, Wellington's forces were able to counterattack and eventually overpower the Imperial Guard, prompting a last stand for the Imperial Guard. This ultimately led to the death or capture of the majority of the Guard, devastating Napoleon's reserve forces (Roberts 184-185). While this alone would, some might say, have sealed Napoleon's fate, another devastation was underway.

The village of Plancenoit, a center of the French resistance, had already been taken by the Prussian forces, who Napoleon had already developed a nasty habit of underestimating (Roberts 183). Even worse, the forces that retreated left a large amount of artillery and ammunition for Prussian forces to make use of (Cotton 130). It was around this time that the French forces, as well as Napoleon himself, began to realize the hopelessness of their battle, as their defeat at the Battle of Waterloo appeared all but certain.

Of course, Napoleon had planned for this eventuality as well and kept a small force broken off from the west in order to protect himself as well as any remaining forces who might need to make a hasty retreat, as Napoleon did indeed do (Fuller 539). As if to symbolize this defeat, Wellington and Brucher met up and combined their forces once again (Fuller 539). Of course, by this time, the damage had already been done, with Napoleon's forces suffering about 25,000 casualties and 8,000 taken prisoner, compared to Wellington's 15,000 causalities and Blucher's 7,000 (Fuller 540). Despite the relatively heavy causalities on all parties involved, Napoleon had nevertheless lost the Battle of Waterloo, which, by the end of the battle, had turned into an absolute frenzy as many of Napoleon's forces had retreated extremely abruptly, leading to a great amount of chaos and confusion for those who had remained. Thankfully though, Wellington had offered a large number of them the opportunity to surrender, including a number of Napoleon's generals (Fuller 484). Perhaps the worst outcome of his loss at the Battle of Waterloo, however, was that of Napoleon's reputation, which by this time had been cemented as one of the worst military generals in French history, according to many. Napoleon himself was also exiled to Saint Helena as a result of his defeat at Waterloo, where he died, either from poisoning or natural causes, in 1821 (Cotton 137). Nevertheless, the reputation of both the Battle of Waterloo, as well as Napoleon himself, would not have been what they were had it not been for Napoleon's numerous tactical mistakes during this battle, marking it as a blemish on French history.

Works Cited

Cotton, Edward. A Voice From Waterloo: A History of The Battle Fought on the 18th June 1815, With A Selection From The Wellington Dispatches, General Orders And Letters Relating to the Battle, Illustrated With Engravings, Portraits And Plans. Kiessling, 1895.

Fuller, John Frederick Charles. A Military History of the Western World, Vol. Ii: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo. Vol. 2. Da Capo Press, 1987.

Hamilton, John. Battle of Waterloo. ABDO Publishing Company, 2014.

Roberts, Andrew. Napoleon and Wellington: The Battle of Waterloo-and the Great Commanders Who Fought it. Simon and Schuster, 2001.