The Firebombing of Dresden

In “Dresden 1945: Reality, History and Memory,” Tammi Davis Biddle sets out to debunk some of the most famously fabricated myths of World War II. In so doing, Biddle addresses the now infamous firebombing of Dresden, which has been famously misunderstood over the years as a gratuitous act of violence on the part of British and American forces, as applied to helpless German women and children. In unveiling the actual bases for the bombing of Dresden, Biddle speaks to a broader policy of war undertaken by the British and American Armies and a time at which no militaristic cost could be spared if Hitler was to be stopped. While there is an extent to which it may be argued that the military ends sought through Dresden were disproportionate to the brutal means employed in order to achieve them, Dresden represented something of a revolution in precision bombing and, as such, there was not as much potential as history imagines for consideration of the loss of civilian life.

The aftermath of the Dresden bombing has brought with it so much in the way of misinformation and misunderstanding, much of it wrought of political agendas and opinions. For example, the great Kurt Vonnegut took the Dresden bombing as the central theme for his novel, Slaughterhouse-Five. Vonnegut, a prisoner of war in Dresden during the time of the air raid, used the novel to evoke a kind of universal sympathy on behalf of all that was lost in Dresden in the way of socio-cultural artifact (Vonnegut 3). Nowhere does Vonnegut mention that the Dresden bombing was designed to aid the Russian advance into the West, as the German military retreated from the East. In generating mass confusion and concern along this route, as per Biddle, the American and British bombers were able to hinder efficient municipal and civic functioning in hindering Hitler’s retreat (Biddle 440). And this is to say nothing of the fact that Dresden was a hotbed of Nazi munitions development and production.

It is true that the Dresden raid represented something of a revolution in strike efficiency in that it was targeted with meticulous attention to detail and executed to perfection. Nevertheless, aerial bombing technology during the World War II-era was significantly less advanced than it is today. As such, civilian casualties were inevitable, though this was largely not understood by the vast majority of British and American civilians. Many at the time suggested that the raid amounted to a form of terror designed to force Hitler into premature surrender and, over the course of time, the Cold War came to define Dresden as an attempt by the West to demonstrate its force as post-war Europe was about to be settled with Russia at the negotiating table (Biddle 442). While American consensus was to avoid departure from its so-called “precision bombing plan,” this consideration is rendered somewhat superfluous by history in that the Americans would soon unleash an atomic bombing plan with little regard for precision and far more for absolute destruction.

Ultimately, American and British public opinion was highly skeptical of the need for the Dresden raid in light of the primary purpose for it being so insidiously linked to the military ends sought to be achieved by it. In other words, while the military goal of protecting the Russian advance was a legitimate one, the means by which this end would be achieved amounted to civic disruption and wholesale interference with municipal services. This exacerbated the harm caused to civilians by the raids themselves in that it became nearly impossible for women and children to seek medical attention. But nevertheless, Biddle strongly suggests that as much consideration of human life as could reasonably be expected was given to determining the proper means of effectuating the military ends at issue. This is not to say that there is an artificial civilian life threshold over which loss of such life is unacceptable, but only that Dresden did not amount to the most violent bombings of its kind, and thus occupies a somewhat unwarranted place of attention in the American conscience, which was largely manufactured by feelings of guilt in the immediate aftermath of the Dresden bombing.

The Dresden firebombing has occupied a curious position in the American conscience since it took place towards the end of World War II. Many would identify Dresden as merely a premature reflection of the same brutality with which American Bombing forces descended on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the Manhattan Project's atomic bomb. Over the years, Dresden has been declared an attempt by Western forces to intimidate their soon-to-be Soviet allies or as a simple act of war intended to terrorize a demoralized enemy. In reality, there were infrastructural targets in Dresden in the form of munitions factories and the Russian advance was in need of support. These were the military bases underlying the Dresden bombing and they have not been questioned, but only examined as to their seriousness. It is true that guilt pervaded certain swaths of the British and American public in the immediate aftermath of the bombings, but this guilt was rooted largely in an age in which precision bombing campaigns were only evolving as a means of war. In other words, the manner in which modern bombings take place was not yet understood and, as such, the means by which to execute them were not available. In place of this kind of strategic thought, basic humanitarian considerations were examined in retrospect. As a result of these moral questions, Dresden has been historically misappropriated as a gratuitous act of violence when, in reality, the bombing of Dresden served at least two legitimate military purposes. The fact that the achievement of this military goal came at the cost of many civilian lives does not obviate the goals at issue.

Works Cited

Biddle, Tammi Davis. “Dresden 1945: Reality, History and Memory.” The Journal of Military History 72, April 2008. 431-449.

Vonnegut, Kurt. Slaughterhouse-Five. New York: Random House Inc., 1969. Print.