Humanitarian Assistance in Southeast Asia

Humanitarian assistance operations are programs designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation’s civil authorities or other non-governmental agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing basic human civic services. When these types of operations are conducted by the Department of Defense, they are part of forward presence operations, and are performed to support the national security interests of the United States. Humanitarian assistance over the past decade has enhanced our security posture in terms of DIME(FIL): The elements of national power diplomacy, information security, military, and economics. Often included are financial institutions, intelligence, and law enforcement.

We recognize challenges as well as opportunities in a region that covers 52 percent of the earth’s surface and includes some 3.6 billion people in 36 nations. Asia and the Pacific represent half the world’s trade, a transit point for most of its energy supplies, home to three of the world’s largest economies, and most of its major militaries. ADM Locklear has stated that the President’s Strategic Strategy is recognition that we, as an American people, are a Pacific nation, as well as an Atlantic nation. What happens in the Asia-Pacific region matters to us (Kay, 2012). Locklear has outlined five basic priorities for Pacom:

-- Strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships;

-- Mature the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship;

-- Develop the U.S.-India strategic partnership;

-- Remain prepared to respond to a Korean Peninsula contingency; and

-- Counter transnational threats.

Alliances and partnerships are key factors for regional security and stability. Humanitarian assistance, if properly used with DIME(FIL), could help achieve those objectives. This would definitely help strengthen the United States’ alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. Responses to regional natural disasters and other contingencies will be far better if the nations understand each other’s operations, share basic principles, and learn from each other’s experiences. Everyone must use their individual tools to build bridges and not walls. Our Navy has integrated humanitarian assistance missions into our normal operational schedule (Mandelbaum, 1996). Annual events such as Pacific Partnership in the Asia Pacific region provide medical care and training to build the capacity of our partners in these important regions and enhance our combined ability to respond to disasters when they occur.

The foreign policy of the Obama administration for East Asia displays a great deal of continuity with the foreign policies of the preceding administrations of Presidents Clinton and Bush (Hayes, 2009). The United States recognizes the importance of the security of its bases and allies in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia, such as Guam, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. The security of the entire region of Southeast Asia is of ongoing strategic importance to the United States given the continued involvement of the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2012, the administration developed its “Pivot to East Asia” regional strategy (Clinton, 2011). This strategy involves maintaining mutual security alliances in the region, enhancing the relationship between the U.S. and regional powers, increased trade and investment, promoting human rights and democracy in the region, mutual cooperation through international institutions, and maintaining an ongoing and expansive military presence.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are also a component part of the administration’s strategy. The Obama administration has indicated a desire to increase the amount of humanitarian aid offered to other parts of the world, and not only in Southeast Asia. At present, all humanitarian assistance is approximately one percent of the national defense budget. The amount of such aid has increased approximately sixty percent during the Obama administration over what it was during the previous administration. It is estimated that humanitarian assistance is now $110 million of the overall annual defense budget. The Obama administration further provided $775 million in aid to the U.S. armed forces for the sake of disaster relief in response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Bowers, 2013). Indeed, the Obama administration has been arguably less reticent about the provision of such aid than any previous administration.

Southeast Asia is of particular importance to the United States for a variety of reasons. The East Asian region is where more than fifty percent of the world’s natural disasters occur, as evidenced by the pervasiveness of such disasters in such nations as Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand in recent years. Many of the United States’ most important allies, such as Japan, and trading partners, such as China are also located in the region. The Department of Defense has played a major role in the provision of aid to Southeast Asia in past times, though not a solitary role. The governments of other nations, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations have also been key players in the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to Southeast Asia.

Among the most important considerations involved in the provision of humanitarian aid are communications between the various relief agencies involved, and between the United States and the nation to which the aid is being given. There is also the necessity of coordination between the Department of Defense, the agencies of other states, and non-state institutions that are involved in the aid provision process. Efficient cooperation between regional parties is vital to the successful provision of humanitarian assistance. Lastly, there is the relationship between the provision of such assistance and ongoing U.S. national security concerns.

The Rand Corporation (2013) has provided multiple case studies of how the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by the United States has impacted various nations of Southeast Asia. Each of these case studies involved the response by the United States and others to incidents of severe natural disasters. One of these was the cyclone which impacted Burma in May 2008. “Cyclone Nargis,” as it came to be called, had the effect injuring or displacing approximately 2.4 million people who subsequently needed humanitarian assistance. The primary foreign policy advantage this presented for the United States was a diplomatic opening to Burma, a nation that has previously been very resistant to American influence. Cyclone Nargis also marked the first time the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) involved itself in disaster relief.

The Padang earthquake occurred in Indonesia in September 2009. The provision of disaster relief following this devastating earthquake provided an opportunity for cooperation between the United States and Indonesia. In particular, the United States was able to deploy its Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team (HARRT) for the very first time. HARRT is a mobile Air Force field hospital that is capable of providing immediate care for both civilians and military personnel. A major earthquake also occurred in Japan in March 2011. The earthquake overlapped with a simultaneous tsunami and resulted in a nuclear disaster. The United States provided massive responses to these events. More than 24,000 U.S. military personnel and $90 million in aid were provided by the U.S. as part of the humanitarian assistance effort. This incident of provision of disaster relief allowed the United States to demonstrate its power on the international level and allowed its capabilities for the provision of such efforts to be shown (Moroney, et. al. 2013). The effective provision of aid following this disaster was particularly important to U.S. strategic interests in Asia, given the importance of Japan to the U.S. as an ally and trading partner.

The Rand Corporation (2009) has noted a variety of observable patterns in these case studies and offered a number of recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the U.S. provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A set of core objectives have been identified with regards to U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts. The first of these is to enhance the ability of the Department of Defense to provide aid more effectively. Greater cooperation and more efficient coordination between agencies are also necessary, along with a similar enhancement of cooperation between the nations involved in humanitarian assistance efforts. There also needs to be a more effective working relationship between the United States, the United Nations, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). The ability of the United States to provide humanitarian assistance should be incorporated into the wider national security objectives of the nation. This point is particularly important as the provision of such assistance is an important diplomatic tool.

The possibilities for the use of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for the advancement of U.S. national security and diplomatic interests have also been examined in a study of U.S. aid to Pakistan published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2011). Pakistan is a nation that is of particular significance to the interests of the United States given America’s need to fight terrorism on an international scale. Pakistan has been a key nation in the war on terrorism, and U.S-Pakistan relations have been strained during the course of the anti-terrorism efforts. The U.S. military effort in the border nation of Afghanistan has at times spilled over into Pakistan. The U.S has criticized Pakistan at various points for not being fully cooperative or engaged in the war on terrorism. However, Pakistan has responded to these criticisms by suggesting that the war on terrorism is primarily an American effort and that Pakistan’s interests have been compromised in order to advance the foreign policy interests of the United States. For instance, it will often be pointed out by Pakistani critics of American actions in the region that the economic costs of the fighting which has occurred in Pakistan have been three hundred percent of the American aid provided (Zaidi, 2011). Further, there have been 35,000 deaths in Pakistan due to the fighting which has transpired there, a higher number of casualties than the U.S. has suffered to date.

The U.S. has provided aid to Pakistan since at least the 1950s, with much of this being intended to assist economic development. American engagement with Pakistan increased dramatically after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Much of American involvement in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war had an unfortunately negative impact on Pakistani society. This included a strengthening of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services which allowed these institutions to undermine greater efforts towards civilian, democratic rule in the country. Further, American assistance to Afghan rebel forces during the period generated a large influx of militant Islamists into Pakistan, allowing them to create bases there, and increase the amount of terrorist or subversive activity within the country.

These problems have been exacerbated by the present U.S. war on terrorism that began following the incidents of September 11, 2001. Increased U.S. military aid to Pakistan has only served to strengthen the military and intelligence services still more, and further undermine efforts at liberalization or democratic reforms within the country. Also, most of the increased aid to Pakistan since 2001 has been of a military rather than economic nature. The Carnegie report (2011) describes the variety of ways in which increased aid of a humanitarian or economic nature would serve to enhance U.S.-Pakistani relations, and advance America’s strategic interests in the region. It is unquestionably necessary for the U.S. to cultivate a cooperative relationship with Pakistan for the purpose of curbing the proliferation of terrorism, and enhancing the stability of the region. It is also in Pakistan’s interests to receive American aid towards the purpose of economic development, humanitarian relief, and strengthening civilian, democratic institutions (Zaidi, 2011).

Of course, the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts of the United States (and other nations) are not without their critics. Polman (2010) argues that such aid often has unintended negative consequences. For example, aid intended for the assistance of victims of famine or natural disasters will often be absorbed by the governments of countries to which aid is given without ever reaching its intended target. When this occurs, aid that is intended for humanitarian purposes often has the effect of strengthening incompetent or oppressive political authorities. Polman further points out the vast array of bureaucratic entities that have developed a vested interest in the continued expansion of aid programs whose actually effectiveness is disputed. These include both public sector agencies within various nations, and private or semi-private relief agencies with powerful motivations to ignore their own ineffectiveness for the sake of organizational self-interest.

Some critics of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief efforts, and other international aid programs have even suggested that such efforts may not only be ineffective at achieving their stated goals but may even have net negative effect. Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute (2011) points out that the United States has provided nearly $30 billion in aid of various kinds to Egypt since the 1970s, yet Egypt is presently more unstable than it has been at any point during the ensuing decades. Bandow argues that American aid intended for economic growth and development has had no discernible impact on lifting Third World nations out of poverty. Echoing Polman, Bandow likewise suggests that international assistance programs intended for humanitarian purposes fail to achieve their ambitions, and instead frequently serve the purpose of entrenching authoritarian political leaders with a vested interest in resisting reforms in their own countries.

The Cato Institute report (2011) cites the findings of Tom Porteous, a director of Human Rights Watch in London, who observes: “Multibillion dollar programs funded by the World Bank and others have been politicized and manipulated by the Ethiopian government and are used as a powerful tool of political control and repression.” Bandow also cites a Wall Street Journal report indicating the failure of U.S. disaster relief efforts following the Haiti earthquake. The report observed that much of the aid intended for earthquake victims was falling into the hands of black market entrepreneurs, and that food shipments have the effect of running local farmers out of business, thereby decreasing food production over time. The economist Dambisa Moyo (2009), a native of Zambia, has voiced similar criticisms of international assistance programs. Moyo has observed that aid programs that are ostensibly intended to provide humanitarian relief and foster economic development in African countries have instead served to further entrench corrupt and inefficient political leadership, and prevent African nations from developing self-sufficient economies.

It is clear enough that significant problems exist regarding the provision of international aid to poor countries. These problems affect efforts at humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as programs intended for general economic development. However, it does not follow that U.S. efforts at the provision of humanitarian assistance should be curtailed. For instance, Moyo (2009) points out the efficiency of assistance programs that have been implemented regarding Africa by the Chinese. Indeed, the recent tragic events in the Philippines offer yet another case study of how U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief can be utilized in an efficacious manner, and in ways that serve America’s own foreign policy interests.

In mid-November, 2013, the Philippines experienced the worst natural disaster in its history when a typhoon claimed at least 10,000 casualties. American efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the Philippines following this disaster have once again raised the question of the efficacy of such efforts, and how they can be most efficiently provided. There is also the question of what role the military should play in such relief efforts. Often, there are aspects to relief efforts that necessitate a military presence. USA Today (2013) points out the need for naval vessels, airplanes capable of transporting cargo, and helicopters during such efforts. Military vehicles are also needed for the purpose of debris removal and clearing roads. Clearly, the logistics of disaster relief alone justify U.S. involvement in such efforts, including military involvement.

A primary purpose of U.S. foreign policy and military deployment throughout the world is to maintain stability in troubled regions. No regions are more troubled than those suffering from a humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief help to promote American interests in many ways, and on an incalculable level. Not only is enhanced stability derived from such efforts, but humanitarian assistance serves the vital foreign policy interest of incurring the goodwill of peoples all over the globe (Blank, 2013). This applies to Southeast Asia as much as any other region.

Indeed, it would be ideal if the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief were to become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. Given the enormous population of the region, and its importance to American strategic and economic interests, it is clear enough that maintaining the stability of the region is a foreign policy imperative for the United States. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts do not present severe logistical problems for the U.S. armed forces given the enormous amount of military resources that are already deployed in the region. As the example of the recent humanitarian crisis in the Philippines demonstrates, few foreign policy efforts generate international sympathy for the United States and elevate the nation’s standing in world opinion, more than the preparedness of the U.S. to provide assistance of this kind when necessary. The extension of such efforts through well-coordinated programs clearly advances the vital interests of the nation. The provision of humanitarian assistance is not without its challenges, but it is a challenge worth meeting.

References

Bandow, D. (2011). U. S. foreign aid hinders more than it helps. Washinton, D.C.: Cato Institute. Originally published in Japan Times, March 7, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-foreign-aid-hinders-more-it-helps

Blank, J. (2013). November 14). How Philippines typhoon helps USA: Rescue efforts boost America’s image in Asia. USA Today. Retrieved http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/11/11/philippines-typhoon-us-aid-column/3500637/

Bowers, B. (2013). Obama boosts military’s humanitarian aid budget. Polifact.Com. January 11, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/153/include-humanitarian-international-missions-in-lon/

Clinton, H. R. (2011, October 11). America's Pacific century. U.S. Department of State through Foreign Policy Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm

Hayes, S. F. (2009, December 10). Thoughts on an Obama doctrine. The Weekly Standard. Retrieved from http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/12/thought_on_an_obama_doctrine.asp

Kay, S. (2012). Global security in the twenty-first century: The quest for power and the search for peace. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

Mandelbaum, M. (1996, January/February). Foreign policy as social work. Foreign Affairs, 16-32.

Moroney, J., Pezard, S., Miller, L., Engstrom, J., & Doll, A. (2013). Lesson of Department of Defense disaster relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. Santa Monica, California; Washington, D.C. RAND Corporation:

Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Polman, L. (2010). Feeding the beast: What’s wrong with humanitarian aid. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Zaidi, S. A. (2011). Who benefits from U.S. aid to Pakistan? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Policy Outlook, September 21, 2011. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_aid2011.pdf