Information System Failures: Denver International Airport (DIA) and the CONFIRM System

In both cases of the Denver International Airport (DIA) Automated Baggage-Handling system and the implementation of the CONFIRM system software, the companies could have avoided monumental failure if they used their knowledge of tech-based information systems and implemented these procedures on the management of the varies parties involved. In other words, mismanagement and the lack of a coherent communication system in both cases led to the downfall of the projects in which the full scopes of the technological potentials were never realized.

In the case of BAE, the most advanced company producing such automated systems at the time, the most profound and devastating part of the DIA case is that a complete lack of an efficient information system that would have allowed for modern communication, decision-making, and shared knowledge between all of the acting parties, e.g. the construction teams, the City of Denver, the architects and designers, and BAE’s software engineers, could have better informed the entire scope of the project and what was realistic in terms of the budget and timeline. Having no such record-keeping method for over three years of the project was the beginning of the end for the successful implementation of the automated baggage system for even one airline, let alone a project that encompassed the entire airport.

The City of Denver and BAE were both in a tough position after numerous setbacks, lack of communication, unforeseen modifications, budget-stretching, and changes in management that made even day to day construction of the airport and the automated baggage system impossible. In order to save face on the millions spent by the city to invest in DIA, the City of Denver ordered a $12,000-a-day penalty fee to be paid by BAE for missing the project deadline. This action was more of a political tactic than anything. DiFonso, head of BAE, should not even consider paying this outrageous fee. First of all, BAE expressed concerns about completing the larger-scale, airport-wide automated baggage system from the beginning. BAE had to be encouraged to take on the project; they were open about the fact that nothing like this project had ever been done before. Finally, this agreement was never mentioned in the initial contract, which would have been considering nil, any way, as this project had deviated so far from its original scope.

Similarities between the DIA/BAE case and the CONFIRM case have to do with so-called design-build strategies. To build anything, from an airport to a software application, planning is key. In both of these cases, there was no set plan or list of expectations; both acted as if these sorts of things will just work themselves out. With DIA and BAE, the fact that the technology used for the automated system could not even be tested because other construction personnel was in the way is proof that the timeline and planning strategy for this project never really existed. The deadlines set by individual contractors were essentially arbitrary numbers. Similarly, CONFIRM endeavored to create a program without the proper research into exactly how it should work or realistic about a timeframe for completion. Much like the case of DIA, modifications to the original plan happened way too far down the line, making the chances of a successful system impossible.

One of the most glaring similarities between the epic failures of BAE and CONFIRM come as a result of the lack of investment in the project. This does not mean that these companies were not willing to spend money to make money; instead, this suggests that there was no one really dedicated to overseeing the project from beginning to end to ensure it went as smoothly as possible. With all of the various changes and management shifts along the way, new people in charge were not adequately equipped to take over a project that had no master plan, to begin with. While the CONFIRM case deals more heavily with the technological problems faced by the company, BAE simply made unrealistic business agreements and failed to properly oversee and negotiate the project. BAE should have never agreed to take on the airport-wide baggage handling system. While they were essentially manipulated into doing so, they were aware of how big this task was and what a disaster it would be if it didn’t work out. Similarly, CONFIRM risked its reputation and success of a highly anticipated reservation system by poor planning. If both of these tech-savvy companies would have conducted business according to the basics of information technology and systems, the lack of communication and organizational hierarchy would have been clear and these projects would have had a chance.

Works Cited

“BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System.” Harvard Business School. Nov. 1996.

Oz, Effy. “When Professional Standards are Lax: The CONFIRM Failure and its Lessons.” Communications of the ACM. 37.1, 1994.