Cullen v. Pinholster: Habeas Corpus and AEDPA

Abstract

Cullen v. Pinholster was decided in 2011 by the United States Supreme Court. This case was fundamental in changing the playing field of habeas corpus, particularly in terms of the federal review. The argument from Pinholster was that his representation was insufficient within the state court system that violated his 6th Amendment rights. This argument was made as an attempt to overturn his death penalty conviction by the California courts on habeas corpus protection grounds. This case went through four courts: local, district, circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. Up until Cullen v. Pinholster, federal courts could take new evidence into account, though did so rarely. With the Supreme Court’s decision, the federal scope was further reduced to evidence presented in the state court system, thus making petitions granted for habeas protection virtually nonexistent on the federal level. Further, the Supreme Court determined that the evidentiary hearing that was pursued by Pinholster was inappropriate and that habeas relief should not have been granted by the district and circuit courts. The existing law that Cullen v. Pinholster clarified was the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), specifically Section 2254. Therefore, this case helped to explain the applicability of habeas corpus from the state to the federal court level.

Cullen v. Pinholster: Habeas Corpus and AEDPA

Cullen v. Pinholster, decided in April of 2011, was a landmark case for the United States Supreme Court. Like many other cases, the ruling left ambiguity for future decisions regarding federal court approaches to habeas corpus. The Pinholster case brings to light several important things such as dissension between the different court levels, the interpretation of the 6th Amendment as well as the applicability of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The case also brought division within the Supreme Court with a 5-4 ruling with certain justices agreeing completely, on only parts of the opinion or disagreeing altogether. While Cullen v. Pinholster left a lot of room for interpretation in future cases regarding habeas corpus, the case is pivotal in understanding when and how state and federal courts interact regarding case decisions.

The original case was tried in the 1980s and was finally decided by the Supreme Court in 2011. In order to understand the ramifications of the final court’s decision, it is important to examine the background of the case. “On the evening of January 8, 1982…Respondent Scott Lynn Pinholster solicited two friends to rob the house of Michael Kumar, a local drug dealer” (O'Regan, Shertzer, & Chen, 2010, par 6). Unexpectedly for Pinholster and his accomplices, two of Kumar’s house-sitters interrupted the robbery. Ultimately, Thomas Johnson and Robert Beckett (the house-sitters) were stabbed to death. Pinholster was put on trial for two counts of first-degree murder.

At the end of the trial, the jury found Pinholster guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to death. While this verdict has been handed down a number of times in the past, the ruling was challenged by Pinholster on grounds of insufficient representation from his attorneys. Ironically, Pinholster’s attorneys were grossly uninformed of the state’s intentions in the Cullen v. Pinholster case. “Scott Pinholster’s trial attorneys were unaware that a death penalty phase would follow a guilty verdict at his murder trial” (Kennedy & Drozdowski, 2010, p. 1). This is the premise that Pinholster used to form his argument for the request of habeas. In fact, this premise was rooted in strong evidence due to the blatant admission of Pinholster’s attorneys of their alleged negligence. “After the verdicts, Pinholster’s counsel admitted in open court that they had ‘not prepared any evidence by way of mitigation’ because they believed notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek death and present aggravating evidence had not been given” (Kennedy & Drozdowski, 2010, p. 6). After receiving his death sentence, Pinholster proceeded to request habeas protection from the California Supreme Court.

In order to win his habeas corpus petition, Pinholster had to be able to convince the California Supreme Court that there was evidence that would have deterred the death sentence and that the evidence to be presented was admissible. During the trial, the defense team relied solely on Burnice Brashear, Pinholster’s mother, for the characterization of his mental health as a way to lessen the severity of the sentence. “Brashear testified that Pinholster suffered several serious head injuries as a child, the result of car accidents and the occasional beating he received from his step-father” (O’Regan, Shertzer, & Chen, 2010, par 7). Obviously, a defense case built on the testimony of a family member, who unlikely had an objective view of Pinholster, is not a strong case to convince the jury or to lessen the sentence. However, due to the defense team’s negligence and lack of awareness of the prosecution’s intention to seek the death penalty, there were alleged expert witnesses, left out of the trial, which could have provided evidence that Pinholster was not in his right mind (O'Regan, Shertzer, & Chen, 2010, par 8). It is important to note that Pinholster was seeking habeas regarding his penalty (death sentence) and not his guilty verdict for first-degree murder.

The California Supreme Court ended up dismissing Pinholster’s request for habeas corpus on merit grounds. Pinholster then proceeded to seek habeas from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. These results were decided in Pinholster’s favor. “The district court upheld Pinholster’s conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence” ("Cullen v. Pinholster," 2010, par 1). Therefore, Pinholster’s guilty conviction stood but his death sentence was now reversed on habeas corpus grounds. Then, the case made its way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and through an evidentiary hearing, Pinholster’s habeas protection was again upheld. Ironically, the California State Supreme Court, district, and Ninth Circuit courts based their decision partially on Section 2254 of AEDPA. For the state court, “…state argues that 2254(d)(1) prevents a habeas petitioner from presenting any new evidence in federal court because only evidence first presented in state court is relevant to assessing the reasonableness of state-court decisions” (Kennedy & Drozdowski, 2010, p. 54). However, the district and Ninth Circuit courts viewed section 2254 of AEDPA as allowing new evidence not presented in the state court, to be introduced on the federal court level (King, 2011, par 2). Therefore, due to this court discourse, the Supreme Court’s decision was needed to settle the legitimacy of Pinholster’s petition for habeas.

The Supreme Court began hearing arguments on the case in late 2010 and reached a decision on April 4th, 2011. In summation, the Supreme Court ruled that the district and circuit courts were in the wrong in their reversal of the state court in California. Therefore, Pinholster’s petition for habeas corpus protection from his death sentence was denied. However, the decision contains multiple parts with some justices agreeing completely, others agreeing partially and a few disagreeing completely with the majority opinion (Borger, 2011, par 3). In order to understand the ramifications of the decision by the Supreme Court, it is important to dissect andanalyze all parts of the majority opinion.

The majority opinion was given by Justice Clarence Thomas, which consisted of three parts. The overall decision, taking into account all three parts, ruled in favor of the California state court in a 5-4 decision. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito represented the majority while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan represented the opposition ("Cullen v. Pinholster," 2010). The dissent from Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan come in parts II and III. Borger 2011 explains the viewpoint of the majority opinion:

In Part II of its decision, the Court held that under the federal habeas statute, review is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits, and that later evidence cannot be considered…. In Part III of its decision, the Court held that on the basis of the state-court record, Pinholster had failed to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to his penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Court concluded that the original trial counsel had made reasonable tactical decisions under the circumstances. (par 3)

In terms of disagreement, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented on Part II on the grounds that further evidence should be considered on the federal level. Justice Breyer agreed with the majority opinion on Part II but dissented on Part III along with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan ("Cullen v. Pinholster," 2010, par 4). Part III is arguably the crux of the case for appeal by Pinholster and is the most important part of the decision.

Part III of the majority opinion of the Supreme Court deals with whether or not ineffective counsel was present in the Cullen v. Pinholster case and whether or not, if ineffectiveness was present, that this was grounds for habeas protection from the federal courts. Pinholster’s burden of proof was to demonstrate that the state courts sentenced him with the knowledge that his representation was insufficient. On this basis, Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan agreed with Pinholster. Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion regarding Part III. “In the dissenting opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor called Pinholster’s lawyer ‘woefully inadequate.’ She said at least some of the jurors would have voted in favor of life in prison had they known the full story” (Savage, 2011, par 11). While this may very well be the case, it is impossible to know whether or not the jury would have found the additional evidence that his defense team allegedly overlooked, offered by Pinholster, to be convincing. Further, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for Pinholster to prove that the evidence that was not presented would have changed the outcome of his sentence.

This ambiguity that is present in Cullen v. Pinholster, especially in Part III of determining ineffectiveness, illuminates principle two of the Rule of Law. “The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property” ("What Is the Rule of Law? " 2008, par 3). In this case, the applicability of habeas corpus rests on somewhat unclear and unstable requirements. Since the evidence that may have reduced Pinholster’s sentence to life imprisonment was not accepted by the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the defense team was ineffective in their representation. It would appear for all conventional purposes that the lack of expert opinion and reliance on family testimony, specifically Pinholster’s mother, would qualify as ineffective representation. Ineffective or not, Cullen v. Pinholster demonstrates a problem of clarity regarding the Rule of Law and of granting habeas corpus on the federal level.

Perhaps this lack of clarity and reliance on the state court’s evidence contributed to the 5-4 ruling by the Supreme Court against Pinholster. Justice Thomas explained in the majority opinion for Part II (evidence allowed) and Part III (quality of representation). Part II for the majority opinion relied on interpreting Section 2254 of AEDPA. “Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain only those applications alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” ("Cullen v. Pinholster," 2010). Since Pinholster was tried and convicted within the bounds of the Constitution, it seems reasonable that the majority would interpret this part of Section 2254 to support their opinion to deny his habeas corpus petition.

Regarding Part III, Section 2254(d) was used to support the majority opinion. Once again, similar to the dissenting Justices, this interpretation is based on an opinion of the defense team by the Supreme Court Justices. Justice Thomas wrote, “…state-court record supports the idea that Pinholster’s counsel acted strategically to get the prosecution’s aggravation witness excluded for lack of notice, and if that failed, to put on Pinholster’s mother…trial counsel’s psychiatric expert, Dr. Stalberg, had concluded that Pinholster showed no significant signs or symptoms of mental disorder or defect…” ("Cullen v. Pinholster," 2010). Therefore, Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito sided with the defense team in their strategy while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan sided with Pinholster on his claim that his representation was ineffective. It is for this reason that the ruling by the Supreme Court is divided. The ability to interpret Parts II and III lies on broad grounds and can (and did) result in varying opinions. However, despite the lack of concrete wording within AEDPA, the Supreme Court ruling in Cullen v. Pinholster altered the applicability of the writ of habeas corpus greatly on the federal level for future contested court cases.

Due to the ambiguity in the ruling coupled with the broad definitions associated with habeas corpus through AEDPA, it is to be expected that future cases will be based on the Cullen v. Pinholster ruling. “Pinholster will have significant ramifications, not just for the habeas petitioners immediately affected, but for the resolution of fundamental questions surrounding AEDPA” (Wiseman, 2012, p. 954). While prior approvals of habeas corpus petitions by state court convicted defendants were rare on the federal level, the Pinholster case made these declarations even rarer. Perhaps most dangerous is the extra safe zone of the federal court that was virtually wiped out by the Supreme Court’s decision. “With this failsafe removed by Pinholster, the critical, long-simmering question of whether AEDPA is truly indifferent to the fairness of the state court adjudications under review will have to be decided” (Wiseman, 2012, p. 956). It appears that for now, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA to be supportive and compliant with state court decisions.

Another important aspect of the Supreme Court’s ruling is the fact that AEDPA was, prior to the ruling, an act put into place to make obtaining writs of habeas corpus more difficult. Part of the difficulty lies in the broad construct of AEDPA itself. Combining this with the broad Supreme Court ruling in Pinholster, it is obvious that more cases will need to be decided to establish a clear and patterned precedent. What is clear are the specific federal court processes that the Pinholster case stripped. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, “If a petitioner could not fully develop a record in state court he could introduce new evidence in some circumstances, and federal courts had discretion to conduct additional discovery, hold hearings, or supplement the record in determining whether a petitioner had satisfied 2254(d) (1)” (Wiseman, 2012, p. 972). It can be argued, at least for now, that Cullen v. Pinholster removed the minimal abilities that the federal courts had left under AEDPA to further examine the validity and constitutionality of state court cases that were disputed by a petitioner. Understandably, this could lead to severe injustices since state courts are largely their own authority with respect to granting habeas corpus to petitioners. Further, this ruling could be viewed as a backward display of hierarchy, where the state courts silence the authority of the federal courts.

In the current legal landscape, Cullen v. Pinholster has solidified the current state of the federal court system while simultaneously making the boundaries of AEDPA unclear due to a lack of precedent. It is reasonable to expect that the issue of federal courts granting a writ of habeas corpus will have to be sorted out over a series of Supreme Court decisions. Since the vote was significantly divided, it is likely that it will take a while for the broadened view of habeas corpus with respect to AEDPA to be narrowed. What Cullen v. Pinholster does is help to show how difficult it will be for future petitioners to obtain a writ of habeas corpus outside of the state courts.

References

Borger, J. P. (2011, April 4). Supreme court decides Cullen v. Pinholster. Faegre Baker Daniels. Retrieved from http://www.faegrebd.com/13070

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Kennedy, S. K., & Drozdowski, M. R. (2010, September 20). Brief of respondent for Cullen v. Pinholster, 09-1088. American Bar. Retrieved from http://www.americanbar.org/

King, N. (2011, April 14). Beyond Cullen v. Pinholster: When new evidence amounts to a "new claim" Habeasbook.com. Retrieved from http://www.habeasbook.com/2011/04/beyond-cullen-v-pinholster-when-new-evidence-amounts-to-a-new-claim/

O'Regan, C., Shertzer, E., & Chen, J. (2010). Cullen v. Pinholster. Cornell University Law School. Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/09-1088

Savage, D. G. (2011, April 5). Supreme court restores death sentence in 1982 Tarzana murders. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/05/nation/la-na-court-death-20110405

What is the rule of law? (2008). The World Justice Project. Retrieved from http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law

Wiseman, S. R. (2012). Habeas after Pinholster. Boston College Law Review, 53(3), 953-1007.