Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Question Presented

The question at hand here is one that is relatively simple. Does Uncle Rico have a case against Pedro Sanchez for negligent infliction of emotional distress? Even though Rico did not actually see the event occur, is there still a case strong enough to bring to court? 

Brief Answer

As will be shown, the simple answer to the question here is that no, Rico does not have a case against Pedro for infliction of emotional distress, even though the other side of the argument, that Rico was nonetheless present at the time of the incident and, therefore, experienced emotional distress, is strong as well. There are a number of key legal elements that contribute to Rico not having a strong legal foundation against Pedro. There was a case in Pennsylvania wherein it was stated that it was possible for emotional distress to be inflicted even when the individual was not present at the exact place. However, in this case, there was a clear line of sight as a woman saw her minor daughter struck and killed by a car (Sinn at 674). For obvious reasons, this is a ruling that has been challenged, like Roe vs. Wade, both casually and legally, throughout the years. In Neff vs Lasso, there was a case cited where a father was denied damages from emotional distress from seeing his son after an accident. This was because the father did not witness the actual occurrence of the accident Brooks (Cited in Neff at 1310). There is the possibility that the Court may rule that because the event was not witnessed, there is no emotional distress. 

Facts

Rico, Napoleon, and Pedro Sanchez were talking in the front yard of Mr. Dynamite. Napoleon and Rico live with Mr. Dynamite. After a while, the three boys decided to ride around in Pedro Sanchez’s car. This put Rico and Napoleon in Pedro Sanchez’s car. A little while later, how long is not stated, all three of the boys became bored. The decision was then made by all three boys that stunts should be practiced in order to impress girls and that Napoleon should be the one to “car surf”. This is when Napoleon got on top of Pedro Sanchez’s car.  The car was driven by Pedro Sanchez. Rico was not in the car. After observing the stunt several times, Rico turned his attention to tossing the football.  While Napoleon was on top of the car, Pedro yelled out of the car that he was “going to increase the skill level”. That is when Pedro increased the speed of the car. Rico heard a crash and immediately turned to see Napoleon bleeding on the ground. Napoleon was injured and recovering at the Hess Rehabilitation hospital.

Discussion

1. Does Rico have a claim against Pedro Sanchez that the accident has caused Rico emotional distress and that Pedro Sanchez should pay damages?

Rico claims that being in the same general area as Dynamite was when he fell off the car while "car surfing" is what caused emotional distress. The issue is one that is difficult primarily because of the ways that previous court cases in Pennsylvania have handled the issued. Perhaps most importantly, the consensus that emerges here is one that is foggy at best. Therefore, in order to better understand this issue, it is necessary to take a closer look at some of the previous court cases.  

The simple fact of the matter here is that there are two key differences in this case and that of Rico versus Pedro. First, the plaintiff in Sinn v Burd, Sinn was able to see the injury or death in this case. This compounds the possible emotional distress. The other key distinction is that the daughter died as a result of the accident, whereas Napoleon was, although injured, nonetheless alive. There are also no lifelong injuries noted in the Rico v Pedro Sanchez case.  The key rule that is at play here is that of the "impact rule," which played a key role in the case that led to the precedent being set here, that of Sinn v. Burd, (Cited from Sinn at 672). The actual witnessing the event helped to establish the concept of damages for injuries, especially psychological ones, that come about as a result of mental or emotional distress. 

Looking at it from this perspective, it is clear that applying the impact rule here, Rico is not justified because of the ways that the impact rule has historically been observed and considered. Even in the aforementioned case, the impact rule, which regulated recovery for damages, was found to have its own flaws, and these flaws can be easily extrapolated to apply to this case as well. 

It is clear that Rico was not able to experience the emotional distress that he claims he did because he was not actually able to see the accident occur, and this violates some of the core elements that apply to the impact rule. Failure to apply practically to this rule severely limits the ability of Rico to be able to pursue further litigation because there are already a large number of precedents that exist which would fly in the face of what he himself seems to believe. This is why this issue is one that has also emerged many times before, and through these different times that it occurred, the divide that has been formulated has always been one that divides the legal and moral equations. 

At the same time, though, it is important to recognize and understand some of the other court cases that have come about in Pennsylvania that have supplemented this original court case. One of the most obvious of those is that of Mazzagatti v. Everingham, wherein the relative in question here did not actually witness the event itself (Cited Mazzagatti at 517). This means that this particular court case is one that has a large number of correlations to the theoretical court case here, in the sense that there was not a direct line of sight to the accident in question here. In particular, the plaintiff, Jane Mazzagatti, stated that she had an acute nervous condition, as well as mental distress and that this caused her to not be able to return to her job at Sperry Corporation, which complicated the case even more here (Mazzagatti at 517). What was particularly damaging for Mazzagatti here, then, was that of the aftermath of the accident, again caused by an automobile, and this led to more concrete and observable mental disorders on her part (Mazzagatti at 517)? More specifically, it led to not only mental pain and suffering but also severe depression as well as an acute nervous condition that was severe enough to impede her ability to work, as was alluded to earlier.

The ultimate findings of this case, though, were similar in many ways to the original court case, wherein the relative in question here was not actually an eyewitness to the accident and, as such, was not entitled to these rewards that are synonymous with witnessing something despicable firsthand. This meant that she was not able to actually formulate a claim for emotional distress, and of course, this decision is one that was appealed, arguing that other court cases, namely Dziokonski v. Babineau, by considered and cited, wherein recovery was allowed when the parent arrived at the scene of an accident where they saw their injured child. This, however, was not persuasive, and, for this reason, it is likely that any efforts put forth by Rico would not be effective from a legal standpoint because, even when looking at just these two court cases, it is clear that there is already a firm precedent for whether or not these claims of emotional distress are warranted. Even worse, for Rico, these situations in which these parents found themselves were considerably more perilous than the one that Rico found himself in, and in comparison, it makes Rico's claim appear flimsy, at best. 

Another of the court cases to be examined here is that of Neff v. Lasso. In this case, there was a ruling that was more in favor of the position that Rico is striving for. More specifically, in this case, it was found that there was indeed a legal precedent to be made for sufficient facts for the cause of action to be stated, and, like Rico, the defendant was also present at the accident, only hearing it instead of seeing it (Neff at 556). This case is important because it helps to formulate the opposite argument here. Even though the argument being posited here is that Rico does not have the legal backing necessary to establish enough evidence to build a case for his own emotional distress, there are still legal precedents that have been set that help to demonstrate positively that there are a number of other elements here, including that of obvious emotional damage, observed, regardless of circumstances, that can be leveraged. In these sorts of examples, Rico relies heavily on things like verified psychiatric evaluations in order to establish that he was indeed mentally and emotionally scarred by Napolean's accident, even if he was not there to immediately see it. 

Indeed, this particular court case here is one that seems to focus much more on the more pragmatic effects of the accident, and this is the core angle that is utilized in these sorts of court cases. It is an effective angle, too, because it is one that speaks to the overall nature of what these accidents bring about for those aside from the victims. Looking at it from this perspective, it is clear that this viewpoint is one that is more generalized and widespread, whereas the previous two court cases took a somewhat more tunnel-vision approach here. This is perhaps why courts seem to have repeatedly gone back and forth on this topic. Although there is an obvious legal foundation to be had here, there are nevertheless a large number of individual elements that exist that obfuscate this issue within person to person that allow for the ruling to actually be different depending on minor alterations. 

Indeed, the other key case that is frequently cited when it comes to the opposing side of this argument is that of Blanyar v. Pagnotti Enterprises. In this case, there were a number of "tests," for lack of a better term, that were formulated and eventually implemented in a more widespread way here (Blanyar at 793).  This consisted of three parts: first, whether or not the plaintiff was actually located near the accident itself, as opposed to one who was far away. Second, the shock that came about from the accident must be a direct emotional impact on the plaintiff as a result of sensory observance of the accident, as opposed to learning it second-hand. Lastly, the relationship of the plaintiff and the victim is a key component here, and being family, or very close friends, has a major impact here for obvious reasons as well. Each of these components of the test can be leveraged and applied to the case of Rico here because each of these components was one of the key components of this case itself, making it a perfect fit. Rico was in the immediate vicinity, was family, of course, being the uncle of Napoleon, and there was indeed at least some sort of shock that came about from direct emotional impact of the car surfing accident.

However, although this court case is frequently cited as a major component of the opposing argument, it is missing one key element that keeps it from being able to be applied totally to the case at hand here: that of sensory observance. Indeed, although one could make an argument for Rico being able to hear the accident take place, it was by his own admission that he did not see it. One could also argue that merely hearing an accident of this caliber take place is all that it takes to instill emotional distress in someone, but considering the other extraneous facts of the case, such as that Napoleon was merely injured, not killed, it will be difficult for this case to advance much further than it already has. Rico should not pursue this case any further because he will not be able to prove beyond what has already been established.

Court Cases

Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979). 

Mazzagatti v . Everingham, 516 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1986).

Neff v. Lasso, 555 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 

Blanyar v. Pagnotti Enterprises, 679 A.2d 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).