Why Business Managers and Military Officers Require Different Leadership Styles

Leadership in both business and military organizations requires a balance between too much supervision – micro-managing – and too little, which leaves subordinates unsure of what is expected of them. The former tends to annoy subordinates and results in a loss of initiative in which they carry out orders word-for-word with little regard for whether their actions make sense; sometimes even purposefully doing things that follow the letter of their orders in a way that makes no sense, just to spite their supervisor. The latter results in slothful behavior and in different departments working at cross purposes to one another. This paper will investigate the reasons why business and military organizations tend towards one extreme or the other and whether business leaders should emulate military officers in their leadership styles.

Let us consider an example from 1940, before WWII, and then see what has changed in the military since then. The USMC (2009, Ch. 6, pp. 48-49) then dictated that “Considerable authority must be granted all leaders to act independently and on their own initiative. In the absence of orders, action on the part of the patrol’s subdivision is preferable to inaction.” At that time, infantry patrols did not have radios – tanks had AM radios, but these were easily jammed with a simple spark gap – so no patrol could count on guidance from headquarters. The initiative and ability to act independently was imperative. The danger of slothful behavior and of units working at cross purposes was negated by the presence of the enemy. They did not need a manual to tell them to stay on their toes and to cooperate towards the common goal of winning or at least surviving battles; the enemy was always there to remind them.

Now let us consider a more recent Marine manual. Gen. Gray (1994, p. 79) concurs with the 1940 manual, “subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down.” But he also writes (1994, p. 81) that, “A commander should command from well forward. This allows him to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation which he cannot obtain from reports. It allows him to exert his personal influence at decisive points during the action.” Well, which is it? Are we supposed to make decisions on our own initiative or are we supposed to have you, our senior commander, riding along and telling us what to do?

What has changed is that, in 1940, we were coming off of one world war and facing another; anybody who wanted combat experience would soon get a heaping plateful. In 1989 there had been no major war since Vietnam and, with the fall of the Soviet Union, none on the horizon. Because an officer’s career is limited without combat experience, they were desperate to insert themselves into battle and would do anything – even drive a truck – just to get that feather for their cap. Thus, in 1993, the Somalis were treated to the spectacle of a full bird colonel driving a truck, squeezed into the front seat alongside privates and corporals. This is why the Lost Convoy stayed lost. Little Bird helicopters could see the downed Blackhawk but were prevented from communicating directly with the convoy and had to pass driving directions up the chain of command and then back down, resulting in missed turns. Meanwhile, passengers in the truck could see smoke from the burning Blackhawk but were too cowed by the presence of a colonel to speak up. A total collapse of leadership! (Note that this was the Army Rangers, not the Marines, though they should at least be reading each other’s manuals.)

In conclusion, we see that the reason the military has tended towards the micro-management extreme is twofold: widespread availability of encrypted and jam-free radios; and the need for senior officers to gain combat experience. Neither of these factors is relevant to a business manager, so it is a mistake for him to micromanage just because modern military officers do so. If he is going to emulate anybody, he should look to WWII officers. But he should also keep in mind that he does not have an enemy to keep people on their toes and focused on the mission, which actually makes his job more difficult than theirs was.

References

Gen. A. M. Gray. [1989] 1994. Warfighting. New York, NY: Doubleday.

United States Marine Corps. [1940] 2009. Small Wars Manual. New York, NY: SkyhorsePublishing, Inc.