Army Force Modernization Efforts, Equipment Capabilities, and Issues of the 2nd Infantry Division (South Korea) for FY14

The world of the twenty-first century brings with it significant challenges for the armed forces of the United States that require the transformation of military organizational structure and aspects of military culture such as engaging in a worldwide effort to ban chemical weapons. The events of September 11, 2001, provided a powerful demonstration of the outmoded nature of the principles of military organization which had been established in the twentieth century. The twentieth-century model had its roots in the two world wars which had themselves generated a comprehensive alteration of military organization, structure, and tactical preparation. This model continued to be utilized throughout the Cold War era but became obsolete following the collapse of America’s only rival superpower in the early 1990s. 

As the twenty-first century began, it became clear that the challenges to American national security interests primarily originated not from rival states possessing comparable levels of weaponry or the ability to deploy comparable levels of troop strength. Rather, the new threats which emerged during this time generally consisted of stateless terrorist organizations and smaller, “rogue” states that possessed nowhere near the political or military capabilities to qualify as superpowers or primary regional powers but still possessed the ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and provide significant amounts of assistance to non-state terrorist actors. North Korea with its nuclear development weapons program provides an illustration of the former while Syria, with its ongoing role as a primary benefactor of Hezbollah, serves as an illustration of the latter. Within this new framework, the 2nd Infantry Division becomes an intensely significant player given its position on the Korean peninsula as the principal mode of defense against the rogue state possessing the foremost capabilities regarding weaponry, tactical abilities, and troop strength.

In the middle part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker outlined the necessity for the transformation of the U.S. Army’s organizational structure from the outmoded twentieth-century model, noting that this model had essentially remained unaltered since the World War Two era. A core element of U.S. national security strategy since World War Two had been an orientation towards maintaining the capacity for fighting a two-front war as the United States had done in the European and Pacific theaters during that time. General Schoomaker observed that the nature of the contemporary world order necessitated a reorientation towards comprehensive modernization including modular conversion, an alteration in the relative strength and distribution of active duty and reserve personnel, and cultivating greater capabilities for operations involving deployments of an increasingly greater duration (Adams, Hix, Lachman, Pint, 2008). 

A primary and distinctive element of the modernization process has consisted of the structural transformation of forces away from the prior emphasis on maintaining divisions of fifteen thousand troops of the kind utilized in the major theater wars of past times towards “modular” forces emphasizing smaller brigades of only a few thousand troops. Under this modernization plan, modular brigades of this kind will be subdivided into two essential kinds of forces: those whose specific purpose is to be utilized in combat and those who will serve a support role. Each of these primary brigades will likewise be subdivided into distinctive brigades of their own with specifically designed purposes and equipped in their own unique ways. The modular combat brigades will have three principal sections: armored brigades, infantry brigades, and stryker brigades. The modular support brigades will be subdivided into combat aviation brigades, air defense brigades, fire brigades, maneuver enhancement brigades, battlefield surveillance brigades, and sustainment brigades. Each of these brigades and sub-brigades will be equipped in differing ways but in ways that reflect their distinctive purpose (Feickhert, 2006). 

Under this reorganization plan, the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division clearly assumes the role of a modular combat brigade with regards to its primary purposes. Currently, the 2nd Infantry Division maintains six internal sub-brigades with a heavy orientation towards stryker brigade capabilities. Of the six brigades with the 2nd Infantry Division at present, four are stryker model combat-ready brigades. The other two brigades are of a support nature and consist of a fire brigade and a combat aviation brigade. Stryker brigades include approximately 3900 hundred troops per brigade with the troops divided into three maneuver battalions. Units with specific duties include reconnaissance, surveillance, an anti-tank company, fire and support battalions, intelligence, and target acquisition squadrons. Hardware issued to these forces includes mortar capabilities, reconnaissance vehicles, detection devices, Howitzers, mobile gun platforms, and related support vehicles. As for the combat aviation and fire brigades, the hardware includes attack, heavy and light lift, and medical helicopters, and traditional artillery fires plus information operations and capabilities for non-lethal effects.

The modernization of the U.S. Army impacts the 2nd Infantry Division not only in terms of organizational structure and species of hardware assigned but also in terms of enhancing the combat readiness of the division by decentralizing its internal makeup into smaller and more numerous brigades allowing for greater tactical mobility. More rapid deployment is the more immediately apparent advantage of the new model. Greater maneuverability of the kind necessitated by the realities of the contemporary nature of war is likewise enhanced. The modernization process and the capabilities of the 2nd Infantry Division are thereby synchronized for the sake of enhancing overall military efficiency (Tan, 2013). 

References

Adams, J.L., Hix, W. M., Lachman, B. E., & Pint, E. M. (2008). Ensuring that Army infrastructure meets strategic needs. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation. 

Feickert, A. (2006). U.S. Army’s modular redesign: Issues for Congress. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Retrieved from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67816.pdf

Tan, M. (2013). Army ban alcohol for 2nd ID in South Korea. Army Times, March 20, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130320/NEWS/303200028/Army-bans-alcohol-2nd-ID-South-Korea