Command in Major Combat Situations

In the context of military combat, situational awareness refers to the ability to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening with regards to the mission at hand. A related concept is known as situational understanding. This concept refers to the product of applying analysis and judgment to a given unit’s situational awareness in order to determine relationships between factors present in a given situation. By understanding these relationships, situational understanding allows a unit to form logical conclusions concerning threats to the mission and individuals within a unit. Essentially, these two concepts form a “layer cake,” with situational awareness as the base layer, and situational understanding on top. 

This integrated relationship between the two concepts of situational awareness and situational understanding is complex and can be hindered when a unit is unable to form either. The former (situational awareness) is difficult to achieve when there is a lack of information about the opponent. In the past, this would occur when infantries or battalions failed to make surveys of their surroundings and take note of “conditions on the ground and in the trenches." Modernly, a lack of situational awareness may result from a lack of intelligence emanating from informants, telephony or online sources. Situational understanding, on the other hand, occurs simply when a decision-maker is unable to make the “so what” connection between the awareness and other key factors. Essentially, a lack of situational understanding occurs when a decision maker is unable to form a logical “if-then” proposition and follow through with “how” to act based on “what they know” (situational awareness). 

In MG Cota and the Battle of the Huertgen Forest, the inability to form situational awareness and situational understanding were highlighted in a few different instances. First, in the final days of preparation before the Battle of Huertgen Forest, MG Cota failed to “conduct patrolling into the Huertgen Forest.” By failing to make any kind of sweep of the area, his unit was unable to identify the enemy’s “dispositions and strengths” and realize that the German 272nd Volksgrenadier Division was preparing to relieve the 89th Division after Cota had attacked it. Without understanding this information, Cota failed to form the situational awareness required for him to effectively understand how to deal with his surroundings. As a result, significant collateral damage was incurred.

Additionally, later on in the battle, Cota was unable to use situational understanding to make logical, tactical decision because of incomplete information he received regarding the status of the Kall Trail. Specifically, he was given information that the trail had been destroyed, but it was about 8 hours before engineers had been sent to fix the trail. Because of this incomplete information, the trail remained blocked when he arrived. German forces were easily able to identify Americans at the trail and killed many soldiers. With a more complete awareness of the situation, Cota would have been able to use the facts at hand to form a more cohesive situational understanding.