Mission Command

Overview

Mission command is a function in the United States Army that allows a commander to provide mission details, knowledge, and direction to disciplined subordinate leaders on mission intent, while also empowering said leaders to be adaptive and flexible when executing a mission in the field (Department of the Army, 2019). It is the U.S. Army’s philosophy of command that is documented in the 2019 revision of the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, titled Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.

The idea behind this function stems from the understanding that U.S. Army commanders can never be one hundred percent certain of what events may take place in the field when a mission is being executed. Subordinate leaders and soldiers tasked with executing a mission are likely to face situations in the field that are unexpected, and they must be able to make quick unguided decisions to ensure mission success. Therefore, it is imperative that commanders have total trust in their subordinate leaders. This is exactly why field leaders are extensively trained so that they can be authorized to make disciplined agile decisions when carrying out missions in the field. This paper seeks to explain mission command through analyzation of its historical origins and modern applications, as well as personal reflections on the command function.

Auftragstaktik and the Origins of Mission Command

In order to properly understand mission command, its importance, and its application in the U.S. Army presently, it is essential to discuss where the function itself developed from and how it has evolved to become the principal command philosophy of the United States Army today.

The roots of mission command and the creation of the earliest version of this type of military command can be traced back to the early nineteenth-century German concept Auftragstaktik, which translates to mission-type tactics (Department of the Army, 2019). This concept is a direct result of Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army in the Battle of Jena in 1809. This defeat led Prussian Generals Johann David von Scharnhorst, August Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau, and Carl von Clausewitz to believe that a re-evaluation of the Prussian military doctrine was necessary. Through analyzation of the French Army, they realized that they were always a disciplined unit that moved at a rapid pace while maintaining Napoleon’s intent. Additionally, they discovered that this pace was due to a lack of hesitation in decision making by Napoleon’s junior officers because they were trained to understand not only understand Napoleon’s intent, but they were also given the freedom to make real-time decisions on the battlefield (Sharpe & Creviston, 2019). From these observations, the early foundation of Auftragstaktik was laid.

As with all reform, the implementation of Auftragstaktik did not happen overnight. Reformers debated for decades on the correct way to reform the Prussian military doctrine, but all agreed that changes needed to be made in order to produce successful campaigns with the use of large armies spanning more extensive battlefields (Department of the Army, 2019). One thing all reformers could agree on was that war was changing and the Prussian military and its operations needed to change as well.

The core belief of reformers grew from the realization that subordinate leaders in the field typically had a much clearer understanding of what was taking place on the battlefield than the commanders above them giving the orders. The theory was that those leaders on the battlefield were more likely to be successful in battle if they were given the authority to make decisions based on their real-time knowledge versus the knowledge of a commander that is not present on the battlefield. Reformers believed that the leaders on the battlefield needed to be empowered to make disciplined decisions, as well as, react to changing conditions and unforeseen events not addressed in a commander’s overall battle plan during major combat situations.

Decades of debate about Prussian military operations ensued which first resulted in the professionalization of the Prussian army and eventually resulted in the practical application of Auftragstaktik during the Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870 (Department of the Army, 2019). Almost 80 years after the Prussian army suffered its defeat at the hands of Napoleon’s well-disciplined and empowered French army, Auftragstaktik was added to military operations in the 1888 German Drill Regulation. Through reform in the nineteenth century, a new approach to command in war and battlefield operations had been implemented in Germany, but across the Atlantic Ocean in the United States, similar command applications were being implemented in the mid-nineteenth century as well.

Mission Command in the United States

The basics of the United States army’s mission command function, as well as its overall purpose, can clearly be seen in the German concept of Auftragstaktik. In Auftragstaktik, commanders are responsible for giving subordinate leaders a goal that is clearly defined, the means to successfully achieve the goal, and a time frame in which the goal is to be completed (Department of the Army, 2019). These subordinate leaders are then allowed to freely come up with a mission plan to execute it provided the mission result coincides with the commander’s intent. Just as in mission command, successful execution of Auftragstaktik required leaders to adapt to battlefield situations as they saw fit, even if their decisions went against previous guidance or directives (Department of the Army, 2019). For this type of command to be effective a universal approach to field operations is imperative and those deemed as competent subordinate leaders must be extensively trained in making decisions on their own.

Characteristics of mission command, including commander’s goal, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and mutual trust, have been part of U.S. Army culture for quite a long time (Department of the Army, 2019). The most successful U.S. Army commanders throughout history have used aspects of mission command since the mid-nineteenth century. One of the earliest examples of this can be seen in Union Army Commander Ulysses S. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign of 1864. In more recent history aspects of mission command can be seen again in Eisenhower’s plan to invade Europe and defeat the Nazi forces in World War II and even as recent as the military push into Baghdad in 2003. In each of these examples, the commander’s orders coupled with the supporting plans of subordinate leaders are clear examples of the basics of mission command. A commander giving his subordinate leader clear mission intent and mission orders, the subordinate forming a plan based on the intent, and, most importantly, an understanding based on mutual trust.

Importance of Trust

Personally, I believe that trust is the most important aspect of mission command. There is absolutely no way for mission command to work and function properly without mutual trust between commanders and their subordinate leaders. The very foundation of the function itself is built on the idea of commanders being able to trust that their leaders in the field are able to make the best decisions in the ever-changing battlefield environment. That trust goes both ways though because just as commanders must be able to trust their subordinate leaders, those leaders also must be able to trust that their commanders are giving them all the tools necessary to complete a mission successfully. Furthermore, soldiers being led on a battlefield need to be able to trust that their leader will make the best decisions to avoid casualties while seeing to it that the mission’s goals are achieved.

Military operations, and subsequently mission command, are at their core human endeavors. It is in the human aspect of military operations that army commanders and leaders create an atmosphere based largely on honesty, loyalty, respect and trust (Sharpe & Creviston, 2013). Research shows that when there is trust between subordinates and their leaders, they are much more willing to follow in their actions. Therefore, mutual trust between leadership and subordinates is directly linked to overall success, the performance of subordinates, and mission success (Antonakis & Atwater, 2017). Paralleling that research, it has also been proven that once trust is broken or taken advantage of it can negatively affect overall performance. This is one of the main reasons that I believe trust is so important to the very foundation of mission command.

Issues with Trust in Mission Command

When the accountability of leaders is non-existent or they do not exhibit the characteristics that they expect from their subordinates, they greatly risk losing the trust of their subordinates and even their direct leaders as well. Establishing trust can be very tricky in mission command due to the potential for leaders and subordinates to be physically distant from each other depending on the operations.

It is no secret that Army organizations have a hierarchal structure. That coupled with the widespread nature of many U.S. Army operations means that leaders at all levels of the U.S. Army can often be extremely distant from many of their subordinates (Sharpe & Creviston, 2013). Research has shown a direct positive relationship between leadership that is in close proximity to subordinates and the trust a leader has from those subordinates. Conversely, the same research has also shown that for those leaders that are not in close proximity to their subordinates, trust is much harder to come by. (Sharpe & Creviston, 2017).

This may seem like an issue for the U.S. Army due to the fact that leaders and subordinates are often quite distant from each other during military operations, but fortunately for the U.S. Army many other studies, however, have shown that positive personal interactions between leaders and subordinates that are distant from each other help to develop a relationship that feels closer, regardless of distance, and positively contribute to mutual trust (Sharpe & Creviston, 2017). This research explains that in situations where subordinates are separated from their leaders by distance these subordinates will often look at their leader’s past achievements and reputation in order to develop a level of trust that would only otherwise be gained by personal interaction. Personally, this makes perfect sense to me because it is very easy for a soldier to trust a leader that has a proven track record of mission success, or even a great reputation among other subordinates. However, if a leader does not have the achievements or good reputation it would be the opposite, with soldiers finding it hard to trust a leader that could potentially be across the globe form them depending on the operation.

Clearly, it is through the development of trust that leaders can truly implement the principles of mission command. Without trust between commanders, subordinate leaders, and soldiers mission command simply cannot and will not work, and while distance has proven to be an issue in the ability of leaders to build trust with subordinates, the U.S. Army has an advantage in its training and development of subordinates as well as the implementation of modern equipment and technologies used for communication. Initially, trust is built in soldiers and field leaders long before being separated from their commanders during field missions. This same trust is also built in leaders because they know that all members of the U.S. Army are being trained the same way across the board and because mission command is the functional philosophy of the Army, they can be assured that the message and importance of trust is being implemented at all stages of development for soldiers and leaders alike. Furthermore, this trust can continue to be fostered through the use of modern communication equipment that has not always been available for military operations in the past.

Conclusion

Mission command is the United States Army’s approach to mission operations on a large scale. As war has continued to evolve over the course of human existence so too has the approach to fighting said wars. Because of the evolution of war, subordinate leaders began to be allowed to make their own disciplined decisions on the battlefield because they were experiencing the mission firsthand. This allowed armies to stay on the move and improvise as needed rather than be stalled waiting on orders to come from above.

My personal understanding of mission command is that its application allows leaders to provide overall mission goals and resources to subordinate leaders who can then develop their own exact plan of execution due to firsthand knowledge form the field. Prior to this type of function in military operations, subordinates had no choice but to follow the orders of their commander (who was not present on the battlefield) rather than being allowed to make real-time decisions based on what is happening on the battlefield. For small operations, this may have been okay, but as military operations continued to grow over time it was proven to be an ineffective method. The mission command function allows the best chance for modern missions to be successful and also allows subordinate leaders to grow. Clear responsibility at every level of the Army’s hierarchal structure is understood and this is how the army fights effectively as a large unit and successfully completes missions on a massive scale.

References

Antonakis, J., & Atwater, L. (2017). Leader distance: a review and a proposed theory. Leadership Perspectives, 129–160. doi: 10.4324/9781315250601-11

Department of the Army. (2019). Mission command (ADP 6-0). Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19189_ADP_6-0_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf

Sharpe, J. D., & Creviston, T. E. (2013). Understanding mission command. Retrieved December 10, 2019, from https://www.army.mil/article/106872/understanding_mission_command.