Nuclear Development and Military Theory

The development of nuclear weapons drastically changed military theory after World War II directly after and for decades to come. The changes that directly followed after the end of the war determined how nuclear weapons would be incorporated into military theory. Nuclear weapons were a unique force that needed a new military strategy in order to determine the best use for them. In his article on nuclear weapons Freedman (1986), reported how the military strategy was focused around how not to use these bombs due to their destructive nature. However, before a clear strategy could be developed after World War II the events surrounding the Cold War required the incorporation of the possible use of these weapons into military strategy.

As other nations, apart from the United States such as the Soviet Union, began to develop the ability to create their own nuclear weapons the military strategy became a contradiction. Despite the stated goal that these weapons should not be used the threat from other nations resulted in an escalation of the development of nuclear weapons. Each nation strived to be the first nation to create the deadliest weapon while claiming that they do not want to use these weapons. This escalation in the development was authorized by military powers. The increased escalation of these weapons brought the threat of use closer to the brink. The overt military strategy continued to be that of a non-use of the weapon, therefore making the threat of nuclear weapons as a protective shield against other nations. Although these changes occurred directly after World War II, the escalation of nuclear weapons has occurred as a military strategy in other nations, specifically Indian and Pakistan, around the world. The impact that the development of nuclear weapons can be seen to exist in the military strategies of these nations. As a nation begins to develop the ability to create a nuclear weapon, they tend to follow the contradictory strategy of non-use and escalation.

Reference

Freedman, L. (1986). The first two generations of nuclear strategists. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 735-78.