Defining Virtue in Plato’s Meno

The Meno, like many of Plato’s other teachings, examines the nature of “virtue” from various angles without arriving at any definitive definition. In the Meno, Plato attempts to define virtue through a Socratic dialogue with Meno, a prominent Athenian sophist. Through this dialogue, Meno proposes a series of definitions, each of which proves to be problematic. In this paper, I’ll argue that Plato’s characterization of virtue as wisdom is his most accurate definition. I’ll demonstrate (1) that this definition is superior to the alternative formulations, (2) that if virtue produces happiness, it must be a form of wisdom, and (3) that there are, in fact, teachers of virtue.

The alternative definitions of virtue proposed by Plato and Meno are each problematic. The first definition – virtue as a function – merely provides examples; it doesn’t tell us what the form of virtue is (Plato 60). The second definition – virtue as the ability to rule over people – doesn’t account for the virtuous behaviors of children or slaves. Plato’s qualification of this definition, that such rulers must rule justly, is circular, attempting to define virtue by reference to itself (Plato 62). The third definition – virtue as desiring beautiful things and having the power to acquire them – is subject to the same criticism. Acquiring beautiful things is not enough; they must be acquired justly (Plato 67). But defining virtue in terms of justice doesn’t help us to better understand virtue. Defining virtue as wisdom, unlike justice, adds information to the concept that wasn’t there before.

Plato argues that only wisdom produces happiness and that because virtue produces happiness, it must be a form of wisdom. On this account, wisdom is an epistemological branch of knowledge, and thus the sort of thing that may be learned. Through this dialogue, Plato is able to establish that virtue is something beneficial that makes us good. Similarly, “all that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom, ends in happiness” (Plato 80). Thus, virtue, “being beneficial, must be a kind of wisdom” (Plato 81). Plato accepts this line of reasoning, though he goes on to qualify his position on the subject.

Though Plato argues that there are no teachers of virtue, his argument is unconvincing. Having presented the previous argument for virtue as a form of wisdom, he questions his reasoning on the basis that there are no “people who teach it and people who learn it” (Plato 82). If there are no teachers or learners, he concludes that the subject is something that cannot be taught (Bluck 96). If virtue cannot be taught, it cannot be a form of knowledge, and thus cannot be a form of wisdom. I would argue, however, that there are teachers of virtue. These people may not teach virtue as a career, and they may not even be clearly identifiable within society. Parents, professors, religious figures, and friends can all “teach” virtue, and almost anyone can “learn” from these types of people (Hoerber 102). The art of virtue may not be taught in a traditional manner, but it may be taught nonetheless.

Though Plato doesn’t arrive at a final definition of virtue, I believe that his characterization of virtue as wisdom is his most accurate attempt. The alternatives he presents are each problematic, whether circular or uninformative. The argument he presents – that if virtue produces happiness, it must be a form of wisdom – is convincing, whether or not he accepts the definition in the end. Further, the argument he presents against this definition – that there are no teachers of virtue – is ultimately unconvincing. For each of these reasons, I believe that defining virtue as a form of wisdom is the best alternative.

Works Cited

Bluck, R. S. “Plato’s “Meno.” Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 6.2 (1961): 94-101.

Hoerber, Robert G.. “Plato's Meno.” Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 5.2 (1960): 78-102.

Plato. Five Dialogues. Trans. Grube, G. M. A. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2002. Print.