The Ethics of the Human Diet

Alastair Norcross makes extremely impassioned arguments in, “Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” that colorfully illustrate the perplexing paradoxes of supporting the production of factory-farmed meat. His obvious frustration with the common laissez-faire attitude towards the farming and consumption of factory-raised animals is understandable given the clarity of his arguments. While it is common to accept that animals cannot reciprocate moral agency and are thus undeserving of moral treatment, it is hypocritical and disingenuous to the very nature of human morality to disregard a group of beings because of ultimately superfluous distinctions.

It is difficult to determine exactly what human feature elevates mankind to the status of moral patients but excludes animals. This is the central crux of the debate regarding the ethical treatment of animals, and opposition to puppy mills, factory-raised animals, and exotic pet ownership. While Norcross and other advocates of animal rights tend to very consistently defend the idea that animals have rights regardless of their differences from humans, opponents of this position point out the nearly universal tendency to place greater value on the lives of humans when given the choice. Peter Carruthers poses an extremely challenging question by pointing out, “Our common-sense belief that human and animal lives cannot be weighed against each other appears to be particularly central to morality” (Carruthers 9). He goes on to suggest that even the most staunch advocates of animal rights, maintain a preference for human life that could be seen as inconsistent with their other arguments, and concludes his point by suggesting, “If we are to be forced to give up this aspect of common-sense morality, it will require, at the least, a theoretical argument that is very powerful indeed” (9). It seems as though Carruthers considers these advocates of animal rights hypocritical. Certainly, there is an emotional tendency to favor the lives of one’s own species, but this does not allow for the needless and extensive suffering of simple creatures, nor does it account for the many special circumstances that affect the groups in question. For example, some people believe that exotic pet-ownership is a form of animal abuse, while others think it absurd.

The “marginal cases” Norcross draws his arguments from, clearly illustrate the difficulty in separating moral considerations based on superficial factors. One cannot give a healthy child full moral privilege while denying it to a child with mental disabilities. In both cases, the individual is powerless to elect or refuse moral consideration, and this shifts the question of morality away from the recipient onto the fully acting moral agent. In the same way, simply because an animal does not display human sentience, pain inflicted is still pain, and the obligation continues to rest not on the shoulders of the helpless, but on those who have the potential to act in a moral capacity. This concept of moral obligation allows the conversation to shift away from questions about who deserves to be treated morally and refocuses the debate onto what it means to act morally and to be a moral being in the first place.

True moral conduct can be defined as adherence to certain statutes, whether or not those statutes are of immediately perceived value to the practitioner, and very importantly, regardless of reciprocity. Tom Regan perfectly encapsulates the dichotomy of those who have moral agency versus those who are merely the subjects of that morality:

Morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract ...Those who understand and accept the terms of the contract are covered directly; they have rights created and recognized by, and protected in, the contract. And these contractors can also have protection spelled out for others who, though they lack the ability to understand morality and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved or cherished by those who can. (Regan 2)

The privileges of being treated ethically extend beyond the bounds of those who actively practice the moral code, to those who are loved by the practicers. It follows then, that morality is afforded not only to those who are capable of reciprocating a similar conscientiousness but to any life which falls within the bounds of a moral agent’s sphere of interactions.

The answer to the question seems obvious to Norcross. Animals are disregarded as undeserving of the same moral considerations as humans, but the justifications for this treatment absolutely begin to dissolve upon any serious examination. If humans are to be considered ethical, it must not be as a result of creating a code of conduct that is only beneficial to those who do not truly need such protection. It is a question that demands self-reflection, after all, if we cannot make a clear, simple distinction between animals and humans in terms of eligibility for ethical treatment, what does it mean about our own sense of entitlement. Norcross’ outrage may not be at the questionable treatment of animals but borne of the realization that perhaps humans are too quick to elevate themselves above things that are defenseless. The conclusion then seems obvious, if humans are deserving of ethical consideration themselves, they must extend that consideration to those who cannot freely do so.

Works Cited

Carruthers, Peter. The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. Print.

Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California, 1983. Print.