Homosexuality and Subjectivism

Since the earliest point in history when mankind developed the ability to think rationally and logically, great minds have debated the basis for determining actions considered morally averse. While many consider what is “right” to simply be behavior that is in accordance with the laws of a given nation, there are others who feel that the idea of “right and wrong” is simply an apparition that arose from the birth of innumerable religions around the world and that it is nothing more than a construct that limits our abilities, as human beings, to live happy, fulfilling lives. However, a different approach to the debate of right and wrong centers on the notion that actions that qualify as either the former or the latter are subjective in relation to an individual’s feelings. More specifically, this theory, often referred to as subjectivism, has many implications concerning the issue of homosexuality and human rights. Furthermore, while this theory of morality might present certain benefits to the morally abject, there are also many facets of the theory that simply do not hold up to modern-day conceptions of ethical behavior. Still, an analysis of homosexual identity through the lens of subjectivism with respect to the theory’s erroneous conceptions of logical infallibility, the impossibility of disagreement, and the fundamental concept that feelings characterize morality and ultimately have the effect of painting a drastically different picture of homosexuality.

Understanding the theory of subjectivism is not at all difficult, despite the fact that comprehension of its fundamental underpinnings might inherently arouse dissension with such conclusions. As noted in his text on morality concerning simple subjectivism, James Rachels essentially reduces philosophical stances on which people identify what they consider ethically praiseworthy or unacceptable to feelings of personal approval or disapproval (Rachels 33). To put more succinctly, the author asserts that what people may regard as morally acceptable, just or ‘right’, is actually a byproduct of that particular person’s personal feelings on the matter. Likewise, actions or behavior that an individual deems morally unacceptable, wrong, or evil are simply the individual’s opinions on what he or she feels is right or wrong, regardless of whether or not such assertions are founded in logic or reason. Looking at the issue of a homosexual individual’s orientation aptly illustrates the general foundation of the theory. In considering the individual’s sexual orientation, there are some people who will suggest that his decision is morally acceptable and others who will deem such behavior as unacceptable, but ethical subjectivism stipulates that in fact there is nothing necessarily or evidently wrong with homosexuality and that any judgments on the matter are only a reflection of one person’s personal belief structure. However, it seems that there are certain aspects of this theory that simply do not hold water as well as other theories of morality.

A rather confusing conclusion reached in lieu of employing the theory of subjectivism in assessing the morality of homosexuality arises when one considers the infallible nature of the theory itself. This idea is implicitly conveyed in the notion that as long as people ‘feel’ that whatever they are saying, doing, writing, or whatever, is acceptable, then by default no one can ever be accused of being wrong. Clearly, though, this aspect of subjectivism tends to overlook what human beings have known for many thousands of years—that there are times when even the most intelligent and well-intentioned individuals are flat out wrong. More precisely, disagreements cease to exist in a world where ethical subjectivism is the dominant theory of morality. As mentioned in Rachel’s text, when individuals with opposing ‘feelings’ debate one another on the acceptable or unacceptable nature of an act or behavior—homosexuality for example—the fact that subjectivism can be grounds for the assertion that homosexuality is both morally averse and morally praiseworthy presents quite the dilemma. By extension, neither is such an atmosphere conducive to reality, since disagreement among individuals is one of many characteristics of human beings that play a definitive role in our existence. However, the morality of homosexuality becomes slightly clearer when one considers subjectivism and the overall tenet by which actions are justified by such a theory—people’s feelings.

What many might consider the most fallacious component of simple subjectivism in ethics is the idea that an act of compassion or kindness might never be classified as such if an individual ‘feels’ that such an act was immoral. In assessing the moral nature of homosexuality, this particular component of the subjectivism theory works for arguments in either direction. A gay couple, for example, who engage in homosexual acts of intimacy might be classified as morally acceptable or morally unacceptable through the lens of subjectivism. On the one side, two partners participating in an act of intimacy would certainly ‘feel’ that their actions represent moral and individual liberties, therefore affirming the individuals’ behavior or morals. Those opposed to homosexuality, though, would ‘feel’ that such behavior or morally abject, unnatural, or even against the law, thus condemning the homosexual behavior as immoral. While the conscience might have difficulty processing the idea of an act or behavior as both morally repugnant and morally praiseworthy, with the study of morality producing what is known today as ethical subjectivism, both trains of thought could theoretically be accepted as valid and even logical. However, perhaps the morality of homosexuality might better be determined in looking at it with regards to the logic of subjectivism.

Since the days of philosophers such as Aristotle and Seneca, the subject of much philosophical debate has been focused on reason and logic, and so it seems most appropriate to evaluate the merits of homosexuality from such a stance. Moreover, countless philosophical figures of historical repute have consistently arrived at the conclusion that in order for certain actions, attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs to be considered morally acceptable or unacceptable, such judgments must be accompanied by reason. Rachels notes that this point in intellectual history was around the time that the theory of simple subjectivism ended and emotivism began since the latter entailed necessary explanations based on logic whenever moral judgments were to be presented (Rachels 40). By and large, the logic behind emotivism has, since its inception, remained a significant influence in philosophical discourse insomuch that it is still one of the primary criteria employed for debating the soundness of any moral judgment. As such, this particular evolution of subjectivism is especially useful in examining the morality of homosexuality.

Looking at homosexuality from a logical perspective, from an argument backed by sound reasoning, it is quite clear that gay relationships are no more immoral than are heterosexual relationships. In the 21st century, is quite logical to assume that some men and women grow into adults whose sexual desires are not in line with the more common desires of their peers. Similarly, it is also logical to assume that some adults’ preferences for spicy foods might exceed the more common preferences for spicy foods of their peers. While the latter is often the subject of the occasional jest between friends, the former, quite illogically, has risen to the forefront as one of the most intense debates to ever take place in the political arena. However, when it comes right down to it, one’s sexual orientation or degree of tolerance for salsa is simply a matter of preference, and never grounds for discrimination, hate, or mistreatment of any kind. Additionally, evaluating the morality of homosexuality via emotivism can help present the issue in a broader context.

Emotivism is often considered not only in reference to issues of moral ambiguity but also in regard to certain cultural dynamics that can extend to further our understanding of the moral or immoral nature of society’s regard for homosexuality. If particular, one article discusses the emotivism surrounding recent occurrences of the traditional Native American Pow Wow ceremony being imitated by other ethnic groups and more specifically discusses whether or not such events are appropriate, given their context (Roberts 196). While the author concludes that cultures with no legitimate connection to ceremonies that characterize other ethnic groups can still genuinely benefit from the pseudocultural exposure, the appropriate nature of such representations must still be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, this study brings an important issue to light concerning emotivism. Specifically, the article reiterates one of the core fundamentals of subjectivism and emotivism by noting the manner in which other cultures, often in complete disregard for the significance of such events, will imitate or redesign a festive holiday or ceremony to suit their own needs. Returning to the issue of homosexuality, this same disregard for certain individuals’ lifestyles pervades the behaviors of many young men and women. Every day, young people throw around derogatory terms in a joking manner without ever fully considering the impact that such language or gestures could have on someone for whom such terms were despicably created. Words like “faggot” or “dyke”, words that are too often thrown around with the intent of causing laughter, can be genuinely hurtful for homosexual individuals, even when such terms are not directed at them. Even though this theory asserts that such actions are wrong if they represent genuine feelings, this is one aspect of the theory that most contend is grounds the theory’s dismissal. Still, this is just one aspect of subjectivism that must be considered in understanding the morality of homosexuality.

An even greater disadvantage of the theory of ethical subjectivism is in the discipline’s overall lack of ability to prove whether a thought or deed is actually immoral or not. Especially when considering the recent advances in mathematics and science regarding each discipline’s ability to prove certain judgments or conclusions, it is no wonder why people have become less and less in favor of a theory of morality that simply cannot prove its conclusions. Indeed the theory of whether or not an action or behavior is morally acceptable is a debate that can last for a very long time. When the debate subsides though, neither party is left with a definitive conclusion which pertains to the correct or incorrect nature of his stance on the issue, which, considering the aforementioned advances in the fields of science and how positively people have responded to such advances, can be most frustrating for the ethical philosopher. As such, subjectivism presents no definitively logical explanation as to the immorality of homosexuality. While it neither supports the morality of homosexuality, sound reasoning and logic are considerably persuasive in assessing the morally praiseworthy nature of homosexuality. Even despite Carl Jung’s suggestion that subjectivism, as the only real source of human knowledge, would “make nonsense of scientific endeavor”, philosophy and the human intellect have grown much too quickly for mankind to accept the premise of homosexuality as immoral because people ‘feel’ that it is wrong (Proulx 110). In the end, there were numerous facets of subjectivism that created their own degrees of controversy within the philosophical community, but ultimately it was logic and reason that dethroned the theory of subjectivism.

Ultimately, homosexuality cannot be classified as either moral or immoral simply because one claims it to be thus. Rather, a definitive explanation, complete with logic and sound reason in support of one’s moral judgment, whether such judgment is good or bad, is essential in possessing the right to affirm that something is inherently right or wrong. Still, in consideration of the innumerable illustrations of differences among people that are overlooked, while those same people’s sexual orientations remain questionable, it seems that most open-minded individuals are beginning to see the flaw in judgment on people’s sexuality. Yet, because human nature is naturally inclined to disagreement, one must wonder if ever philosophy will be free from the argument of morality as it relates to human sexuality. Until then, logic and reason will still dominate the victories of an ethical discourse of homosexuality.  

Works Cited

Proulx, Carole. "On Jung's Theory Of Ethics." Journal Of Analytical Psychology 39.1 (1994): 101-119. Academic Search Premier. Web. 8 Feb. 2014.

Rachels, James. The elements of moral philosophy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. Print.

Roberts, Kathleen Glenister. "Emotivism And Pseudocultural Identities." Howard Journal Of Communications 14.4 (2003): 195-208. Academic Search Premier. Web. 8 Feb. 2014.