Nietzsche and Kant

Friedrich Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant are two German philosophers that maintain incredibly different views regarding the origin, development, and impact of ethical systems of human behavior. While it can be said that Nietzsche’s views are directed in opposition to that of Kant, there are remarkable similarities between the two, and Nietzsche clearly offers a response to Kant’s conceptions of morality, Nietzsche’s account of the development of moral ethics does address many of Kant’s key points. In terms of contrasts, Nietzsche and Kant maintain different views with regards to metaphysical knowledge and moral life—Nietzsche views the world as one where the inevitable advance of scientific knowledge has led to the decline and near-collapse of western moral structures, whereas Kant is more optimistic in the sense that he views the march of history as an inherently positive trend. Kant places his belief in the conception of faith as a mechanism that can grant meaning to human actions, which are otherwise irrelevant in face of oblivion, whereas Nietzsche is fundamentally opposed to the idea of faith providing any reassurance of knowledge. Moreover, for Kant, morality is attainable for all individuals in society and a product of external autonomy from the world. Nietzsche, on the other hand, views morality as the straightjacket that constrains the actions of most of the population and sees morality as a function of internal autonomy granted by the individual upon himself as a result of his own nature. 

In order to present a contrast and comparison of the views held by Nietzsche and Kant, it must be first explained how each of the thinkers views the origins of moral systems. Nietzsche orients his views on the idea of oppositional moral systems that arise out of the need of different social classes to justify their own plot in life through contrast with their counterparts. Specifically, modern moral systems arise from the self-labelling that results from societal interaction. For Nietzsche, the birth of contemporary moral ethics is to be found through the ways in which the power allocation in society has enabled certain classes to determine for themselves what labels can be applied to others, and allow different views of “good” and “bad” to develop in a symbiotic and oppositional fashion. As the elites “set themselves and their actions up as good, that is to say, of the first rank, in contrast to everything low, low-minded, common, and vulgar”, the lower classes, or slaves, are instead seen as evil, bad, and immoral. This is a conception of history driven by the strength and power of the noble elites, who, through the use and application of power, have assumed for themselves the position of high morality in contrast to the weaker, degenerate, and “bad” classes.

For Nietzsche, good and evil become a function of what defines social class. Good and evil are not inherent to the world, but are instead forced to “runs in parallel” with existing social structures and norms (Nietzsche 8). There is no objective or universal form of what determines proper moral behavior, nor is there any external way to universally apply ethics to society as a whole. Instead, certain societal values can be contrasted against each other. Here, the first of many similarities arises between Nietzsche and Kant. With regards to piety and compassion, both thinkers are inherently opposed to the idea that piety and compassion as a social function serves any purpose. Kant’s concept of “melting compassion” is seen, fundamentally, as the “foul spot” that exists intrinsically inside human character (Kant 15). Indeed, both authors seem to agree on the idea that intrinsic self-analysis cannot be achieved in a vacuum and that it requires at least some form of external aid in order to accurately paint a picture of the internal struggles that define the common man. 

As the nobles were the first social class with the power and ability to “stake” their claim in the definitions of proper moral behavior, the elites themselves chose to define what was good as their own values. Wealth, prosperity, and power became defined as “good”, whereas weakness and poverty was defined in acceptance of its fundamentally immoral nature. From this system arose the opposing view of slave morality, which is the “original, the beginning, the essential act of conception” (Nietzsche 16). The rise of slave morality and the “revolt” of the lower classes in this regard is a marked distinction with Kant, in that now in society there are two competing concepts of what defines good or evil. Whereas Kant would argue that there exists only one moral system in which individuals aspire to attain, for Nietzsche the argument is that the world is inherently defined by respective power allocations in society that enabled specific groups to determine the merits of moral values. Once established, other groups are free to begin defining their own moral systems in opposition to the initial concepts. 

Kant’s ideas, or Kantian ethics, are, at their core, based on a conception of the understanding of free will and its function in individual ethics and moral behavior. While it is “it is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or even beyond that could be considered good without limitation except a good will”, Kant believes that free will provides the basis of all human interaction and belief (Kant 35). Indeed, while Nietzsche argues that moral systems arise out of internal tensions in society and contradictions, Kant maintains that particular values have internal or intrinsic justification and meaning that by definition explain themselves. In other words, values such as duty and freedom carry an “absolute necessity” that are universal in their application and objective in their analysis (19). These fundamental facts of society are inherent to an understanding to the world in which we live. 

For Kant, there is a very specific value judgment placed on individual action and free will. Whereas Nietzsche argues in favor of the “superman”, Kant maintains that the objectivity of good action is universal. In essence, “a good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing. i.e., it is good in itself (Kant 7).  As free will allows individual justification for every action, the intent and principle behind what a person does is the mechanism by which the morality of the action can be determined. As certain values (such as duty) are intrinsically good, any action that comes as a result of doing one’s duty is therefore moral. However, one must note that in this example, the morality of duty is derived from the intrinsically good nature of the value and not from the action itself. In other words, justification arises from the sense of duty as a principle value and trait of human action—performing an action completely because of one’s sense of duty and most certainly not because of other internal pressures means that the action is fundamentally good. If duty leads oneself to perform actions where other desires are present (e.g., other forces than duty drive individual action), than the action cannot be seen as moral. This is best seen in the sense that Kant argues that individuals should “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that is should become a universal law”(30). In other words, moral action requires the completion of a task completely for the reason of the universal moral value itself, and not because of other values.

This idea, then, is rejected by Nietzsche in the sense that there are no universal moral traits, or rather that there cannot exist moral values that are held to be intrinsically true. As the power structure of society is what drives the machinations of moral and ethical behavior, morality cannot be found in the pursuit of universal values. Instead, Nietzsche chooses to argue that Kant’s views are inherently incorrect. Nietzsche questions the very premise of Kantian ethics—there is no need for morality to be determined by the power structure of society and through the legal system, laws, and punishment. Instead, by accepting that “refined servility clings to the categorical imperative”, Nietzsche sees only weakness and slavery (75). Servility results from the societal imperative that we embrace the rule of law as the primary intrinsic justification of moral action. Indeed, Nietzsche views morality as the haven of the weak and ill-informed and that moral actions cannot be claimed as either right or wrong by external forces. Power, then, becomes the ultimate tool by which individuals and society can determine what proper and moral behavior is. Moreover, the “superman” would exist above and beyond morality—that is, the “herd” cannot expect to continually impress itself upon the will of the lion (54). For Nietzsche, there is no justification for claiming that societal standards can determine morality. Morality is weak and is an excuse for the weak to attempt to exert control over the strong.

Nietzsche and Kant agree on some points, but Nietzsche breaks with his predecessor in key areas. First, Nietzsche maintains that the origins of societal ethics is to be found in the power allocation in societies that enabled the nobles to establish their own conception of morality. Slave morality, then, develops in opposition. For Kant, the free will of an individual is key, as is the categorical imperative. Moral actions can be defined as moral if and only if those actions serve a specific purpose and offer a unified sense of drive oriented towards inherently universal and objective values (such as duty). In the end, both Kant and Nietzsche attempt to showcase the development of moral ethics, as well as the ways in which moral actions can be gauged by society. 

Works Cited

Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic Of Morals. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988. Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. Print.