Piety in Euthyphro

A consistent theme in Socratic dialogues is that Socrates uses his questioning style to help people clarify their own thoughts about abstract concepts such as the examination of reality. Just as The Republic features an investigation into the nature of justice, The Euthyphro focuses on a discussion surrounding the definition of piety, or holiness. Throughout The Euthyphro, Socrates discusses several possible definitions for piety, discovering fatal flaws in each of them, but always with an eye towards helping Euthyphro clarify his own meaning, much as he would benevolently critique a newer definition less rooted in universal terms.

Given that both Euthyphro and Socrates have met in front of the Athenian courthouse, it is natural that the primary focus of their discussion would be the circumstances surrounding their respective court cases. After Euthyphro explains that he is at the courthouse in order to pursue criminal charges against his father for homicide, Socrates expresses shock that Euthyphro would be so certain in the rightness of his case that he would pursue charges against his own father. To this point, Euthyphro confidently replies, “My dear Socrates, in a case of right and wrong, relationship has no place. My father killed a hired servant (a murderer himself) by willfully neglecting him in chains” (p. 14). Euthyphro’s certainty in the rightness of his actions surprises Socrates, who is himself on trial for perpetuating impiety in the youth of Athens. Since Euthyphro is so confident in his grasp of what is holy, Socrates, in his typical ironic fashion, asks Euthyphro to illuminate him as to the meaning of piety so that Socrates might better defend himself against his own charges, seeking to overcome the injustice. Moreover, as Panos Dimas (2006) clarifies in a contemporary analysis of The Euthyphro, this is not merely a scholarly effort to deduce a definition for curiosity’s sake, but rather “to identify that thing which is always the same and alike in all different actions that are pious and which may be used as a model to determine whether an action is pious” (p. 1). To Socrates, then, this definition functions as a moral barometer by which to judge the rightness of actions.

In response to Socrates’s request, Euthyphro puts forward three definitions of piety. Euthyphro’s first attempt is simply to say that his act of prosecuting his father is pious, just as Zeus acted against his own father, Cronus. Socrates immediately responds that this is no definition, merely an example of a holy act. This example, Socrates continues, does not encapsulate the “general definition”(p. 15) of holiness. In response to this, Euthyphro attempts a more general definition by stating that “holiness is that which is dear to the gods, and vice versa” (p. 15). Socrates counters this second definition by pointing out that the gods do not agree among themselves about the rightness of actions, which would lead to an action being both holy and unholy simultaneously. Euthyphro concedes this point, but asserts that there are some areas in which all of the gods must agree. The final definition, then, is that “what all the gods love is holy, and what they all detest, unholy” (p. 15). Socrates immediately counters by asking, “Is the holy loved by the gods because holy, or holy because loved by the gods” (p. 15)? Socrates continues, “Everything borne, led, seen, become, loved, implies something that bears, leads, sees, makes, loves. And this something is prior to the other. Therefore, ‘the gods love’ is a prior notion to ‘loved by the gods’” (p. 15). Through this clarification, Socrates is asserting that an object is not “loved” by someone because it already possesses some unique attribute before the fact called “loved-ness”, but rather it receives the attribute “loved” because someone loves it. Therefore, the gods do not decide to love something because it is pious, but rather it was already pious before the gods loved it, meaning that the adoration of the gods is not a sufficient definition of the essence of holiness.

Since Socrates both begins and ends the discussion in a somewhat sarcastic fashion in saying that his purpose in this exchange is to learn the true nature of holiness so that he might better defend himself in court against charges of impiety, a superficial analysis of the exchange between he and Euthyphro might yield a conclusion that Socrates conducts himself in this way to belittle those with whom he debates. However, it seems more likely that Socrates’s goal in his discussion with Euthyphro is a desire to assist the general public in discussing ideas clearly, in that Socrates does not dismiss Euthyphro’s points out of hand, but rather painstakingly points out the errors in reasoning, even clarifying his own points when asked. Similarly, Socrates does not spend the entire conversation assaulting Euthyphro’s definitions, but instead puts forth a possible definition of his own for Euthyphro’s examination. Given these facts, it seems likely that Socrates is genuinely interested in helping Euthyphro attain a better understanding of piety.

A further definition of piety, one not mentioned in Socrates’s conversation with Euthyphro, might be “acts in accordance with the ethical system of one’s choice.” Since the world of today is far more religiously diverse than that of Socratic Athens, tying a definition of holiness to a single religious belief seems overly limiting. Socrates likely would not have a problem with this definition being removed from the realm of religion, given that his own proposed definition of piety as a subset of justice did not involve an involvement of the gods. Indeed, contemporary philosophers such as William Mann (1998) contend that the “argument central to the Euthyphro is a dilemma that challenges the project of assigning moral preeminence to the gods, or God” (p. 123). Taking a step further in divorcing piety from the sphere of religion is in keeping with the general theme of the text. Furthermore, this new definition makes it clear that piety is explicitly an ethical rather than moral quality. The distinction between ethical and moral qualities is that ethical qualities are more personal and culturally dependent than morals are. If Socrates were to be presented with this definition, he likely would first point out that this definition is too arbitrary and personal to constitute a true “universal” standard, and therefore cannot be considered a definition. Instead, this definition of piety as adherence to an ethical system would probably be characterized in the same way as Euthyphro’s first definition: merely an example of one of a series of possible pious deeds.

Situated as it is at the site of his impending trial for impiety, the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro is intensely focused on discovering a workable definition for piety. Though it does not conclude with Socrates conceding a satisfactory definition, the dialogue nonetheless showcases Socrates’s devotion to discovering universal definitions for concepts and an unrelenting dedication to clarifying ideas. Though he would likely not accept a definition that is rooted in subjective ethical systems, his critique would nonetheless be focused on using his trademark questioning style to shine a spotlight on unwarranted assumption and faulty logic with an eye toward mutual understanding.

References

Dimas, P. (2006). Euthyphro's Thesis Revisited. Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, 51(1), 1-28.

Mann, W. (1998). Piety: Lending a Hand to Euthyphro. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVIII(No. 1), 123.

Wells, G. H. (1880). The Euthyphro of Plato. With an introduction and notes by G. H. Wells. London: G. Bell & Sons.