The Shifting Nature of Morality

Conversations concerning morality rarely elicit casual responses among thoughtful citizens or concerned minds. The implications of it, if embraced, call the global community to action and recognizes a universal code of ethics, perhaps even something that exists beyond our control. If rejected as a premise, the absence of morality presumably leaves us in utter chaos and a vacuum where cultural norms must define each distinct situation. Today, morality takes on an additional degree of importance—its defense or dismissal will shape our immediate future more than ever and carries undertones that split the country between geographic locations and various faiths. 20th-century Australian philosopher John Mackie openly embraced the merits of relativism and supported the compatibilist interpretation of free will within the framework of his Atheistic worldview. While some may argue for the value and necessity of objective morality in an increasingly unstable world based on tenets of intuition and religion, relative morality shapes the framework of the natural world and guides the basis for cultural misunderstandings.

In his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Mackie embraces moral skepticism by immediately acknowledging critics eager to highlight common misconceptions of his viewpoint. From his point of view, responses could range from indignation to assertions that such a truth is inconsequential or that the statement itself is meaningless (Mackie 15). The author aims for moral skepticism in the global sense rather than for the individual who may reject his cultural roots, and thereby Mackie avoids any postulations about individual processes. He calls this position of skepticism a “second order view . . . about the status of moral and the nature of moral valuing, about where and how they fit into the world” (16). This represents a reality wholly independent from the individual process. Mackie also questions the fallacy of the straw man, which presents an exaggerated form of the moral skeptic argument in order to demonstrate its weakness. “How could anyone deny that there is a difference between a kind action and a cruel one, or that a coward and a brave man behave differently in the face of danger” (16)? Such assertions escape rationale considerations; no salient thinker would make this claim.

Rather, Mackie’s position gently guides the reader to consider that the parameters for describing kindness, good, evil, and courage differ on a variable scale between cultures. Concepts of rudeness between Kabul and Paris considerably contrast according to the cultural expectations of whether or not to wear a burka. Make the wrong choice in the wrong city, and an oblivious woman could find herself brutally punished or fined. Mackie wants the reader to understand that moral skepticism requires one to consider the provisions for a change in morals; when what may be appropriate in one setting may be viewed in a completely different light within another.

Such cultural expectations guide humans to habitual actions even in the case of sexual relations and monogamy. Mackie asserts “the causal connections seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy” (Mackie 36). Certainly, Mackie is not the only philosopher who values such pluralistic viewpoints as truth.

Boston University Emeritus Professor Michael Martin maintains such an attitude, supporting atheism in the face of both religious absolutism and alongside the moral skepticism proposed by Mackie. In Atheism, Morality, and Meaning, the author states the Arguments from Rewards and Punishments. The third premise—that people lacking some kind of motivation to behave objectively will ultimately reject objective morality altogether—draws particular ire from Martin. He points out that some people act with objective moral values based on habits rather than Christian values, a position echoed by Mackie in the previous paragraph. Martin states, “some believers are murderers, rapists, thieves, child abusers, and traitors. Even when believers are moral it is not obvious that they are moral because they are motivated by a belief in divine rewards and punishments” (Martin 31). Rather, the author postulates that certain actions in themselves such as fidelity to a spouse do not necessarily validate an inherent goodness. Who can truly judge the intent in each person’s heart and decipher the psychology of motives? Even people of faith may agree on this argument, the objective morality of fidelity remains with the purity of intention, not necessarily the actions performed. Who will stand to judge such minutia? Common sense guides us to look beyond the concrete expectations of society and recognize the ambiguity found in objective morality.

In his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins highlights another slippery slope to embracing moral absolutes in the world of natural selection. Altruism at face value seems to imply an inherently selfless framework through which man generously gives his energies for the good of others. This is especially true in the case of “selfish genes” making provisions for closely related family members because ultimately such sacrifices provide for the immediate survival of one’s own genes (Dawkins 88). The reality tells a more complex story. Dawkins proposes that there exist situations where “a gene can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of altruism at the level of individual animals,” (2) thereby extending beyond the implications of immediate familial ties. Common examples include people who give to charitable causes, ultimately advancing their own level of prestige and community recognition. Others show altruism in an effort to influence the actions of others, ultimately spreading their own beliefs and values at the demise of others (i.e. Imperialism). I do not mean to imply that people constantly act out of ulterior motives for their own benefit—as Mackie stated, the psychology of motives must remain within the “second order view,” hidden from the critique of individual motives. In human societies, altruism guides relative morality as a beacon for acceptable conduct.

If one insists on objective morality as a universal truth, they must also consider the thought of humans as the only animals driven in such a capacity. Otherwise, we must apply our “objective” dispositions to the animal kingdom, a prospect quite silly upon consideration.

If genes really turn out to be totally irrelevant to the determination of modern human behaviour, if we really are unique among animals in this respect, it is, at the very least, still interesting to inquire about the rule to which we have so recently become the exception. And if our species is not so exceptional as we might like to think, it is even more important that we should study the rule. (3)

What do our moral standards, however subjective they may be, imply? Man needs man to get along in order to survive. Individual motives may vary, but the psychology of shifting cultural values creates an evolving society where relative morality blazes a path to a greater good.

Even in the struggles of societal differences, the relative nature of cultural values, shaped by various degrees of supply, demand, and metacognition, fixes a shifting benchmark from which to measure universal values of love and hate. Ultimately, man is subject to his own habits and inhibitions in pursuit of a stable framework from which to build a more perfect society. With the stability of monogamy came the growth of the family unit and the evolution of society as the result of a more efficient natural selection. Like it or leave it, relative morality is here to shift.

Works Cited

Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. New ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Print.

Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Middelessex: Penguin, 1990. Print.

Martin, Michael. Atheism, Morality, and Meaning. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2002. Print.