Free Will

Introduction/Thesis

Free will, free action, and predestination is exciting and complex philosophical ideas wrought with philosophical debate. This paper will examine the determinist and compatibilist arguments for free will consider briefly dualism and moral responsibility as a key feature of the compatibilist argument. It will be argued that the determinist view of free will is more compelling because it accounts for the fact that free will exists only as a choice among actions in response to circumstances beyond the control of the actor or agent. It is suggested then that true free will implies control over the circumstances. Circumstances include the physical world as well as the culmination of the personal experience of the agent in taking actions of will. Consideration will be given to the compatibilist argument as it is necessary to include moral responsibility to the determinist view to advance its soundness. It will be concluded that free will and free action is true only when the circumstances are under the influence of the agent.  

Evaluating these arguments requires an understanding of certain philosophical terms including determinism, compatibilism, and dualism.  These terms will be defined here as they will aid in discussion of the merits of the arguments on free will.  

Determinism is the philosophical notion, “That everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with natural laws” ("Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"). This means that the current world is the result of the culmination of prior actions of people. Also, these prior actions work in conjunction with the laws of nature compounding into a set of circumstances that require a certain action. Therefore, if this is true then-current actions are consequential and therefore not genuinely formed by the actors, and therefore, there is no free will. This notion of no free will is the incompatibilist argument. In contrast the compatibilist holds that even if determinism were true that the actor still has choice because of rational capacity and moral accountability. 

Included in this argument is the notion of mind-body dualism. In this sense, the duality of is the physical body is perceptive of itself and the physical world around it. This information is processed by consciousness and this consciousness makes moral choices and activity choices. The relevance of dualism to the notion of free will intercedes tangentially with determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism.

Main Argument

The notion of free will suggests that actions are unfettered by external factors. “To have free will, in this uncompromised full-blooded way, is to have the power to be the ultimate or final creator of her own intentional mental life” (Bernstein 2). While it may be true that actors have choices, it is inevitable that they are influenced by something including the physical world (external) or the moral (internal) world. Bernstein continues, “It is not merely that we cannot have a will other than the one we have, but also that the cause of both the content and inevitability of our will is something beyond our say” (Bernstein 2).  This is the insolvable problem, that there is no reliable predictable model for individuals choosing one action over another. This philosophical vacuum is not filled with the notion that there is true free will. The vacuum is filled with consideration of the myriad of influences that will affect free actions. Actions are responses to both the physical world as well as the internal rational and moral character of the actor. These influences are deterministic in that they exist and exert influence. The laws of nature are permanent, however, the moral character of a person culminates over time, experience, and the consequences of a priori judgments.

Free will needs to be distinguished from free action according to Robert Kane. “To act freely is to be unhindered in the pursuit of your purpose (which are usually expressed by intentions); to will freely, in this traditional sense is to be the ultimate creator (prime mover, so to speak) of your own purposes” (Kane 4). The difference here is the consideration of the actor based on intentions and desires. The duality of this idea is not merely to be in control of your actions in a deterministic sense, but also to have some power to influence the external and internal mitigating factors. In certain circumstances, there are conflicting choices with differing ends. Persons may be forced to make choices that are undesirable because the physical circumstances do not provide for a viable way of reaching desires. 

The determinist theory accounts for the lived world which includes both the physical world and antecedent conditions. It does not matter if the agent has any control or influence over these conditions, a choice must be made to act or not act, it doesn’t matter, both are choices. The point is that they are influenced by external factors and this is inescapable. To have true free will would be to have the ability to alter the natural laws or other mitigating factors forcing the choice. While free will does not exists and this may be discomforting, choice does exist. Although the compatibilist argument is insufficient to prove free will, it offers insight into the great expanse of human will by highlighting a variety of choices. 

Response to Alternatives

Denying determinism requires the denial of the influence of the physical world, its natural laws, history, and relies on the moral character of the individual actor. The crux of the compatibilist argument is that this moral responsibility for the consequences of action predicated on free choice. Additionally, the indeterminist argument includes notions of libertarianism and the possibility for plural voluntary control over a variety of options.

While Sartres questions human freedom, he concludes that people are self-determining only when nothing is interceding with their ability to make a choice. Hobbes further conceded that to have ultimate free will, the actor must have power or control over itself, ergo some things left undetermined. In these instances, there is no controlling force, including the actor or agent themselves. “Whatever is merely undetermined is not controlled by anything, including the agent. It is, therefore, a confusion to simply identify freedom with indeterminism” (Kane 11).  Thus it is philosophically possible to understand a state of pure free will, however, this state is without scope for understanding and does not exist. This brings in the epistemic notion of free will in the sense that it requires some capacity to comprehend. 

In all philosophical instances, there must be a frame of reference, awareness, reason, and the ability to appreciate and communicate phenomena. This is how natural laws are understood and communicated. There can be no exercise of free will if there is nowhere to exercise it. This invites the idea of mind-body dualism, first that there is a physical self as a precondition to comprehending that there are other physical things. “Mind-body dualists such as Descartes affirm that human beings are composed of both a material body and a supernatural aspect” (Cowan and Spiegel 200). Comprehension of these physical things comes from the mind part of dualism, where reason and beliefs exist. Through the mind-body connection, a perception of the world is developed and understood. This dualism is in part epistemic and is necessary for the understanding of the lived world both physically and socially constructed. 

Consider the case example presented by Mark Bernstein regarding Dora. Dora was convicted of shoplifting, she was caught, convicted, and sentenced to one year in jail. Later its discovered that she stole while under the influence of a substance motivating her to steal. Considering this evidence her conviction is commuted. It is later discovered that she intentionally had this substance injected because Dora wanted the experience of being a thief. In light of this she is again punished. The example continues to illustrate that her free will was influenced by something else, it was determined to be a likely outcome of the substance. 

This case illustrates a number of important points to this discussion. First, Bernstein’s point is to show that Dora was not acting on free will she was under the influence of a controlling force. Second, it is assumed that had she not been injected with the thief serum, she would not steal. The conditions for evaluating Dora’s will as free will requires comprehension of the fact that stealing is wrong and punishable, that most rational people do not steal, that there may be some reason to stealing. All of these points require some understanding of the world and a way to communicate it. This is the determinist world. Without this world, there is no way to evaluate the notion of free will because the notion is based on making a choice to do something. Evaluating such ideas requires some epistemic understanding of natural laws. A challenge to the idea of free will is Hilary Putnam’s Brains in a Vat notion inspiring the movie series the Matrix. Is free will really free when the conditions for which it is exercised are constructs? Certainly not. 

Combatibilist have been successful in merely diluting the determinist argument by introducing consequentialist moral responsibility and plural voluntary control. “Philosophical defense of these answers [combatibilists] traditionally include a defense of judgment about whether free action and moral responsibility are compatible or incompatible with determinism” (Mele 1). Incorporating the mortal realm into the notion of free invites accountability of the rational mind. 

For some incompatibilists, the attack on determinism is motivated by a general dislike of the idea that free will is not as free. “The incompatibilist qua incompatibility thinks that there is something about the very nature of free action and something about the very nature of determinism such that one precludes the other” (Finch 152). Finch relieves actors of the responsibility for the past and natural laws. “But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us” (Finch 152). Finch’s position suggests a sense of postmodern existence whereby since the world was inherited and the laws of nature are immutable it should have no bearing on free will. However, merely diluting the determinist argument is insufficient to render it invalid. As Bernstein suggests, free will presents a plurality of choices. 

Bernstein describes an ambitious woman en route to an important business meeting when she happens upon a person being assaulted. The deliberation includes differing options, to focus on the meeting ignoring assisting a stranger, or to help the stranger and potentially hinder her career. The conditions are determined, the choice is what to do. Bernstein uses this example to elucidate that choices are not always either-or, they could be both. “Despite the fact that an indeterministic process...produced her decision, she has plural voluntary control over her set of options; that is she can bring about both options” (Bernstein 5).The indeterministic process is the moral deliberation this case highlights. If free will exists it exists in this realm of navigating competing desires. “Although a hinderance to one-way control, [it] is absolutely necessary for plural control and consequently, is necessary for individuals to be ultimately responsible for their acts” (Bernstein 6). This is furthering the compatibilist argument that although the conditions are determined the choices are not, and this is where free will lies. 

Conclusion

This paper examined the idea of free will and predestination. It evaluated the determinist and compatibilist arguments. For free will to be truly free, the agent must be unencumbered by external or internal factors motivating a particular choice under immutable circumstances. These immutable circumstances include the natural world and the culmination of the human experience as it was on a particular choice. Choices made are in some relation to the effects of determined conditions. These conditions are beyond the control of the agent, so in essence free will is merely a choice of action under certain conditions. Compatibilist augment the determinist argument by adding a sense of moral agency to these choices. However, this addition does not influence that actual circumstance for which a decision must be made. The most compelling compromise came as the notion of plurality in choices, and while this expands the options for choice actions, it still does not exert any control over the underlying circumstances. Therefore, the determinist argument that free will does not exist except in the idea of freedom of choice among competing values. 

Works Cited

Bernstein, Mark. "Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free?" Midwest Studies In Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-12. 

Cowan, Steven B., and James S. Spiegel. The love of wisdom: a Christian introduction to philosophy. Nashville, Tenn.: B&H Academic, 2009. 

Finch, Alicia. "On behalf of the consequences argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action." Philosophical Studies, vol. 163, no. 1, 2013, pp. 151-170. 

Kane, Robert . "Free Agency and Laws of Nature." Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 46-53. 

Mele, Alfred R.. Free will and luck. Oxford University Press, 2006. 

"Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Stanford University, n.d., http://plato.stanford.edu/.