The Existence of God: The Cosmological Argument, Principle of Self-Sufficient Reason, and Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor

Question I: The Cosmological Argument

Thomas Aquinas proposed a casual version of the cosmological argument in the 13th century, arguing that the universe cannot be the result of an infinite series of causes. Aquinas’ ideas were very influential in the Christian tradition, and for that reason, I’ll focus on his version of the argument here. Aquinas’ argument proves the existence of God through a reductio (1947, 1.2.3). He asks the reader to first assume that the universe is the result of an infinite series of causes. This would mean that there was no first cause. If there were no first cause, Aquinas argues that the present universe would not exist. But because the present universe does exist, Aquinas concludes that his original assumption was wrong, and thus, that the universe cannot be the result of an infinite series of causes.

This position is developed further by Leibniz in the 17th century through the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz argues that everything must have a reason, including the existence of the universe. A sufficient reason, for Leibniz, is that something is for the best. God need have no reason to create the world other than that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Because everything has a reason, an infinite regress is impossible – there must be some first cause to set the process in motion. The notion of self-causation is necessary to account for (1) the fact that everything must have a reason, and (2) that an infinite regress is impossible. The first cause must cause itself, or else there would be an infinite regress of causes. Aristotle’s “unmoved mover” is one example of this phenomena, setting the universe in motion, and thereby causing all existence without being moved by any prior motion. This is essentially unproblematic.

Question II: Pascal’s Wager

In the Pensées, Blaise Pascal proposes that all humans engage in a type of wager when deciding whether to believe in a god. If one wagers that God does exist and lives their life accordingly, and it turns out that God does exist, one will be rewarded for belief in the afterlife. If one wagers that God does not exist, when he really does, one will experience damnation in the afterlife. Pascal summarizes this idea in the Pensées, proposing that we “weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is.” He asks that we “estimate these two chances,” and concludes that, “If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing” (1976, 3.233). If God doesn’t exist, one loses nothing in assuming that he does. In this section, I’ll argue that Pascal’s Wager gives us a good pragmatic reason to believe in God.

If God does exist, the benefits of belief are infinite. If one believes, one will achieve an “eternity of life and happiness” (1976, 3.272). Since the alternative is misery and damnation, belief is the most rational course of action. Atheism is a foolish wager, as the consequences greatly outweigh any perceived benefits in this life. If it turns out that God does not exist, you lose nothing. If God does not exist, it does not matter how you wager, because there is nothing to win after death and nothing to lose. Whatever must be given up is only finite, occurring in this life. Because the rewards or punishments associated with God’s existence are infinite, it is reasonable to give up something finite for something that is infinite.

While we may not have control over all our beliefs, we have control over those that are pragmatic. In The Will to Believe, William James criticizes Pascal’s Wager, arguing that we don’t always have control over what we believe, and thus, don’t have control over whether we take the wager. While James is correct that we don’t always have control over our beliefs, we do have control at least some of the time. Because pragmatic considerations are a factor in belief, the rational benefit of belief in God can be a convincing reason to take the wager.

Question 3: Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor

In book five of The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky presents the story of the Grand Inquisitor. In this parable, Christ returns to earth during the time of the Spanish Inquisition, preforming miracles like those he performed in the Bible. The Grand Inquisitor arrests Christ and lectures him on the implications of free will. He argues that Christ misunderstands human nature and, through his gift of free will, has doomed all of mankind to damnation. The Grand Inquisitor tells Christ that he should have given in to the temptations that Satan presented when he was in the wilderness. When offered each temptation – comfort of bread, the ability to ensure belief by jumping off the temple, and the power of ruling all the kingdoms of the world – Christ refused, demonstrating that he could resist these things through free will. The Inquisitor argues that men and women are not so strong. Most humans do not have the power to resist temptations like Christ, and thus doom themselves to eternal damnation. The Inquisitor argues that Christ shouldn’t have offered free will in the first place since it only results in eternal misery and suffering.

Milgram wanted to know how ordinary Germans could allow the atrocities of the Holocaust to occur. In his experiments, he demonstrated that people are easily led to engage in morally repulsive behaviors. People are excessively obedient to perceived authority and are easily compelled to “sin” or harm others. The Grand Inquisitor, like Milgram, argues that people want to be told what to do. In this section of the book, the Grand Inquisitor claims that “Man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over quickly that gift of freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil” (p. 268). I would disagree with the Inquisitor – I believe that freedom has more value than momentary happiness and security in this life. While Dostoevsky’s concerns are valid – free will can, and does, cause suffering – he underestimates the positive potential of freedom. Humans exercise free will to make mistakes, but they also use it to do a great deal of good. To focus on one at the expense of the other would be a mistake.

References

Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica. (1947). New York: Benziger Bros.

Dostoyevsky, F., & Garnett, C. (1999). The brothers Karamazov. Grand Rapids, M.I..: Christian Classics Ethereal Library.

James, W. (1999). The will to believe. Raleigh, N.C.: Alex Catalogue.

Pascal, B., & Sellier, P. (1976). Pensées (Nouv. éd. établie pour la première fois d'après la copie de référence de Gilberte Pascal / ed.). Paris: Mercure de France.