In a League of Their Own: Theories of Justice from Nozick and Rawls

Many philosophers and political thinkers throughout the years have taken on the question of distributive justice. In the years since the Enlightenment, when the intellectual and philosophical changes have led to liberalization, the question has taken on an institutional meaning as well – such as in the discussion of the welfare state. Despite many thinkers addressing the issue of distributive justice and the welfare state, there are perhaps none more influential and substantial than Robert Nozick (The Examined Life) and John Rawls. Each of these authors offers a unique perspective on the issue of distributive justice. Their writings cover many bases of distributive justice, but this paper addresses, specifically, Robert Nozick’s contention that forced redistribution of wealth within a society should not occur except as restitution for past injustices - his idea of justice and social equity. John Rawls, of course, takes a different approach. However, the two great thinkers may have more in common than one might initially believe. Ultimately, this paper argues that Nozick’s approach to distributive justice is correct, as Rawls does not necessarily or sufficiently account for the individual. Of course, both arguments have merit – which is precisely the point of this short paper. The paper will address the “who, what, and why” of each argument, outlining them in as detailed a manner as possible in the space allowed. After the arguments surrounding distributive justice are laid out, I contribute my view on Nozick’s claim and Rawls’ response.

Nozick’s conception of distributive justice is based on a theory of entitlement. His entire argument is summed up in the rather oblique phrase, “from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen” (Nozick, 1974, p. 158). Nozick specifies his argument by describing three major ‘types’, or principles, of justice in our society: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in rectification. The principle of justice in acquisition, as the name implies, is concerned with how things are acquired – how “unheld things come to be held” (Nozick, 1974, p. 151). The principle of justice in transfer is concerned with how one acquires what something held by someone else – transfer of “held things” from one person to another. The principle of justice in rectification, which is the most important to this paper’s discussion, is concerned with making right – rectifying – situations in which the principle of justice in acquisition and principle of justice in transfer go wrong. In other words, the principle of justice in rectification is to address injustice.

In a society that operated perfectly under a perfect system of justice, the principle of justice in rectification would not even be needed. Only the first two principles – justice in acquisition and justice in transfer – would be needed. These first two principles would completely cover the justice needs of any given society. Nozick (1974) outlines these definitions accordingly:

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principles of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.

2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.

3. No one is entitled to a holding except by repeated applications of 1 and 2” (p. 151)

Thus, in an ideal society operating under the principle of distributive justice based on efficiency and entitlement, there would be no forced redistribution of wealth at all. However, given that the first two principles are often violated, the third principle of rectification must be employed. This is in cases of fraud, theft, and any other form of monetary or economic injustice. However, Nozick argues that this is the only time when forced redistribution of wealth should occur.

The overarching principle supported by Nozick’s position and his subsequent arguments is that of a free market society – the basic structure of unfettered economic exchange. The key here is that Nozick bases his arguments on efficiency, rather than the normative conceptions of difference introduced by Rawls. He argues that Rawls’ difference principle is asymmetric at its core. In a certain sense, it does not equally favor both the worse-off and the better-off – famously expounded upon in his Wilt Chamberlain example. Instead, it favors one over the other. This does not fit within Nozick’s conception of fair process rather than a fair outcome. For this reason, Nozick applies his theory of justice to the state – he argues that the most minimal state possible is the only state that can be justified. Any state that takes a more extensive role in the redistribution of wealth, according to Nozick, ultimately violates individual rights.

While we do not have a direct response to Nozick’s argument from John Rawls, we can know that the two thinkers would have disagreed – not on the core of their arguments, but on what the outcome for state-mandated (or, forced) redistribution of wealth would look like in a truly just society. For Rawls, the primary subject of justice is “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (1971, p. 6). In a phrase, Rawls proposes justice as fairness, rather than justice as a process as discussed by Nozick. Rawls’ difference principle sums this distinction up nicely. In basic form, Rawls’ difference principle images that rational individuals under a ‘veil of ignorance’ about their hypothetical social status would develop a system in which the “worst-off group is at least well off as the worst-off group would be under any alternative institutional structure” (Rawls, 1971, p. 7). While this does not lead to a conclusion that mandates a complete redistribution of wealth for complete wealth equality, Rawls argues that fairness simply means the worst-off in society are better off than they would be under a less fair system. The key difference here between Rawls and Nozick is that Rawls says deep inequalities must be addressed by redistribution of wealth, while Nozick says that justice derives from equal exchange, regardless of what the original holdings were. While the two thinkers have common arguments and may agree on some aspects of justice, the key differences are laid out here.

As the above introduction states, I contend that both Nozick and Rawls have important implications for a just society, and both of their arguments have substantial merit in determining a just course of action. However, I ultimately argue that Nozick’s conception of justice as a process and the establishment of a just system normatively overrides Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness. While there may be many reasons to criticize Rawls’ argument, the most significant aspect that lends to my view is the fact that Rawls does not sufficiently account for the individual in his difference principle. While a system of fairness (Rawls’ idea of justice) may mean a more just society overall, individual choice and preference often casts the longest shadow in terms of its effect on economic well-being. However, as someone who holds high the individual rights espoused by American ideals, I assert that Nozick’s conception of fairness is both normatively better and economically more realistic. First, the conception of fairness based on individual rights is normatively superior because it assumes the value and autonomy of the individual. In a phrase, it places individual rights above almost any other political or philosophical claim. Second, Nozick’s conception of fairness is economically more realistic because it is simply easier to achieve. Redistribution based on anything other than restitution is arbitrary both philosophically and politically. That said, both authors have greatly influenced the concept of justice – especially individual arguments regarding distributive justice. The works discussed above have put Nozick and Rawls in a league of their own, and their arguments will continue to be debated for years to come.

References

Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Rawls, John. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.