The Case for Liberalism: An Exchange

Summation:

On October 5, 2006, the New York Times Book Review presented a discussion between Michael J Sandel and Thomas Nagel based upon Nagel’s review of Sandel’s book Public Philosophy. Nagel, known for his views on moral luck, challenges Sandel’s position, which he infers from this book, that reasoning about justice requires us to engage directly with moral and religious controversies. Nagel claims that Sandel misunderstands the Kantian/Rawlsian liberal position of neutrality in pushing for an assessment of the moral questions as determined by, in the case of abortion, the Catholic position. He cites Sandel's error in interpreting “the priority of right as being intelligible only if it serves the good.” The most important point of contention in the discussion is whether or not a liberal position of neutrality necessitates a moral decision on the status of the fetus.

Response:

The underlying problem with Sandel’s assertion begins with: “Consider: if the Catholic doctrine were correct…” Starting with this phrase, any number of unsubstantiated conclusions could follow. For example: “Consider: if the Catholic doctrine were correct and man was to be the head of woman as Christ is head of the church, then the possibility of a woman holding office would be morally outweighed by her obligation to her husband.” If one assumes the conclusion of an unprovable position as correct, then one shall follow by proving that position. The very fact of the matter is that if the only recourse to answering the “underlying moral question” is a religious document, then the legislature that would follow not only curtails the physical freedoms of an individual but would do so also by violating an individual’s right to freedom of religion.

To engage with the argument on its basis in scripture, on its basis in religious doctrine, puts the discussion within a framework that will always be in response to Catholic Doctrine. Wherever our “morality” is drawn from our positions in American public discourse, if they are to be valid, must be reframed. Opponents must find support without drawing from a religious base of justification. Claiming to be neutral is simply beside the point. As the matter of abortion will be ultimately decided within the confines of constitutional law, ignoring (instead of merely bracketing) an opponent’s moral ground, if it is founded upon religious doctrine, neither insults nor respects those that disagree— it denies arguments about religious texts as a valid part of the discussion. While Liberals may, as Sandel claims in a flurry of bad grammar, “do better to engage their opponents on the moral merits,” they would precisely not do this in the way that Sandel is doing by discussing abortion on the terms of Catholic doctrine.

The question, time and again, is, to use a math analogy, the order of operations. As John Stuart Mill states “the burden of proof is to be with those who are against liberty… the a priori assumption is in favor of freedom.” It is not necessary to first deal with the “Catholic position,” as Sandel claims, nor must one make an implied decision based on its validity. It does then seem that Sandel misunderstands the Kantian liberal position.

As Sandel himself quotes Kant in 1982: “society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good…” The point is not the falsity of the Catholic position, but rather the falsity of the Catholic position as a valid position, presupposing, as it does, a particular conception of the good. If Sandel wished to continue with this line of thought, a more correct statement would be: “a position of which a majority of Catholics adhere to,” a statement which makes it clear that the position on abortion, in the political sphere, is necessarily an individual political choice which some individuals defend by their interpretation of a religious text. Not only is there dissent between Catholic adherents, but the “absolute” papal rule is a changing one, and because of this, the Catholic position can be thought of as neither unified nor constant.

Analogously it would be a strange thing indeed to speak of the “American position on abortion,” and then to make assumptions about all American’s positions on abortion. For just as public opinion does not necessarily adhere to (and has the power to change) American Law, so does public opinion more slowly change the Catholic stance on issues, a stance which is certainly influenced, in the long term, by the positions countries end up taking on important issues such as abortion. Just this past week Pope Francis was quite vocal about his desire to effect deep change in the Catholic Church. Thus, Sandel’s assertion that we must “bracket” the moral question only if we first determine that “the Catholic position is false” attempts to give the Catholic position a priori significance as if it were a constant in an ever-changing political storm. His argument fails because the Catholic position is itself not a position which reflects the unified belief of an essentially political group of individuals whose worldview is partially based upon the ever-changing interpretations of a text which informs and is informed by ever-changing interpretations of an ever-changing world.