Beyond Closing Guantanamo—an Analysis of America’s Relationship with Cuba

Introduction

I recently read an Op Ed written by Jonathan Hansen, from Harvard University (Give Guantánamo Back to Cuba), which addressed the ongoing issue of the Guantánamo detention camp in Cuba (Early Bird). But, this article discussed much more than the well-known topics of debate that have surrounded this facility for the past decade and more. Hansen, who also wrote a book detailing the history of America’s relationship with Cuba (Guantánamo: An American History) expressed some very strong—and often criticized—suggestions for the future of that relationship. In my position as National Security Adviser, I am responsible for reviewing a wide range of opinions and proposed solutions to troubling issues that may be applicable to the security of this country. Therefore, in this context, I was especially interested in Hansen’s suggestions as well as his accurate portrayal of America’s unfortunate misadventures in Cuba.

My duty is to present viable policy options to the President and I agree with the premise set out by Hansen, as well as his logical conclusions. This document provides my reasons for not only closing the Guantánamo facility but also recommending that the United States remove all military personnel from Cuba. I will provide a detailed analysis of my reasoning based on the four primary U.S. national interests: 1) Security; 2) Values; 3) Prosperity; and 4) International Order. Additionally, I will provide specific courses of action (COA), related to Guantánamo and the presence of American military in that country, clearly showing how these will work in harmony with the national interests of the U.S. Furthermore, this document will focus on the employment of what I consider the two most important Instruments of National Power (IOP)—diplomatic and informational—to support the COAs. Finally, I will include a discussion of the issues that will impact the entire region if my suggestions regarding Guantánamo and Cuba are acted upon.

Hansen’s Historical Review of Guantanamo

Hansen begins, as may be expected, by referring to the debate related to the closure of the Guantánamo detention camp in Cuba, but that was not the primary purpose or topic of his article. While a candidate leading up to the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama promised that, if elected, he would order the closure of the camp. Of course, following his election, the President learned first-hand that campaign promises are often easier made than accomplished. For a number of reasons, including the political environment of Congress, Guantanamo remains open and there is little attention paid to it in recent years. For Hansen, the debate related to the detention camp is barely a footnote in the history of Guantánamo and American intervention in Cuba. While some may object to the terminology used, it is difficult to dispute Hansen’s description of Guantánamo as an “imperialist enclave” (Hansen).

The contention that there is little to be gained—and a great deal to be lost—by the continued occupation of a small piece of acreage in a sovereign foreign country is both logical and insightful. Therefore, as stated by Hansen, closing the Guantánamo detention camp is the very least the U.S. could do to correct wrongs that have been committed at that base. However, Hansen is not concerned with the U.S. taking the minimum action possible, since his message is one of American imperialism at its worst operating in Cuba for more than 100 years. This history, while unknown to the vast majority of Americans, is undeniable and does not represent one of this country’s finest moments. The American intervention in the affairs of Cuba began in earnest in 1898, when the American military inserted itself into the Cuban rebellion against Spanish dominance. In 1901, following the Cuban War of Independence, the government of Cuba was forced to lease the naval base at Guantánamo to the U.S. (Hansen). In effect, the U.S. government was only concerned with Cuban independence from Spain as a step toward gaining control of the island for its own ends.

Further details of the blatant acts of American imperialism committed by the McKinley administration were provided by Hansen but I will simply include one final analogy provided in his article that should clarify how wrong U.S. actions were at the turn of the twentieth century. In spite of the fact that Cuba had gained its independence, America took control of the negotiation assessments with Spain and acted as if Cuba had no role at all in those proceedings. Subsequently, with American interests controlling more and more Cuban land, America’s motivation for helping Cuba win its independence became crystal clear. Hansen asked Americans to think about this comparison:

…imagine that at the end of the American Revolution the French had decided to remain here. Imagine that the French had refused to allow Washington and his army to attend the armistice at Yorktown. Imagine that they had denied the Continental Congress a seat at the Treaty of Paris, prohibited expropriation of Tory property, occupied New York Harbor, dispatched troops to quash Shays’ and other rebellions and then immigrated to the colonies in droves, snatching up the most valuable land (Hansen).

The point is clearly made, and Americans would no doubt be outraged. Consequently, as Hansen very appropriately concludes, America’s actions in Cuba involve far more than the operation of a despised and distrusted detention center. Indeed, it is simply the most recent chapter in a long-running drama of American making that has cost our nation the respect of many people and governments around the world. The reason I support and agree with Hansen’s conclusions is quite simply because they are correct—U.S. actions in Cuba and Guantánamo represent a “glaring example of hypocrisy around the world” (Hansen).

My recommendation to the President is to take decisive action and reverse the course that America has been on since it first intervened in the Cuban War of Independence. By beginning the process of returning Guantánamo to the government of Cuba and removing all U.S. forces from the country, President Obama will finally fulfill his campaign promise. But, even more than that, the U.S. can begin to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and indicate to the entire world that it intends to finally end the last vestiges of American imperialism in the region. The history of American-Cuban relations—while largely unknown in this country—is certainly widely known by the world at large, especially to our enemies who capitalize on any element that paints the U.S. in an unfavorable light.

National Interests of the United States

All decisions made by the Administration must be based on the national interests of the United States, and so must any advice or suggestions provided by advisers to the President. Thus, I will clarify how my recommendation of returning Guantánamo to Cuba as well as removing all U.S. troops from the country complies with all four elements of U.S. national interests: 1) Security; 2) Values; 3) Prosperity; and 4) International Order.

Security is certainly one of the most critical national interests and it is important to keep in mind that security does not refer exclusively to protecting our country from a direct attack by some foreign power (or even domestic terrorism). National security refers also to ensuring that the U.S. maintains its position of leadership in the world, since being the preeminent world power is in itself a form of security. A position of security is also based on continuing to develop domestic sources of strength that can be used to promote U.S. national interests globally. In effect, my recommendations to the President are based on a realization that U.S. security is connected to our ability to be competitive worldwide while presenting an example of moral strength (“White House” 1-2). Additionally, no country—including the U.S.—can remain secure if it fails to operate within an international system that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all sovereign nations.

In this context, American security is based on a renewed commitment to American leadership, both internally and externally. Specifically, my point is that regardless of military strength or power the U.S. remains secure due to its interconnectedness with other nations and governments. Security is affected by decisions and choices other governments make that can impact our economy, our ability to trade, or the ability to travel freely to foreign countries. If want to remain truly secure, it is vital that we are fully committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law (“White House” 2). Moreover, we cannot condone actions by other countries that violate standards of justice that are accepted by the global community. Since that is the case, it is incumbent on our country to make sure that we are not viewed by the world community as committing similar violations ourselves. Being viewed around the world as a country that sets an example for the conduct we expect other nations to exhibit is one of the best ways that we can maintain our security.

The motivation to reestablish ourselves as the global leader regarding the principles of democracy and the rule of law ties directly into the second national interest: our values. As discussed in the introduction of this document, it is difficult to see how our maintaining possession of land that rightly belongs to Cuba—which is a sovereign nation—aligns with our stated values as a democratic country. The embargo placed on Cuba by our government, which has been in place for over 50 years, results in nothing positive. How does maintaining a policy that results in shortages of some of the basic products and services required in a developed nation relate to our values? Clearly, we are isolated in this policy in the global community. Every year, in the United Nations, a vote is taken to condemn our country’s actions related to Cuba, and every year the only two countries opposing that condemnation are Israel and the U.S. In contrast, 186 countries find our policy deplorable (Orsi).

The irony—and hypocrisy—of our position regarding Cuba is highlighted by the fact that we have diplomatic relations with nations that pose a far greater risk to our security (or the global stability) than does Cuba. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has become a strategic partner of the U.S. in many ways. Additionally, we deal with Communist China which, in fact, is one of our largest trading partners. The supposed reasons for distrusting the government of Cuba, such as a fear that Castro’s revolution would inspire similar revolutions across Latin America, have proven to be groundless. Incredibly, the U.S. even has diplomatic relations with Vietnam, the place of our most debated and contentious war; a war that cost this country a great deal of respect in the world due to our actions there. Indeed, regarding Cuba, Wayne Smith (who is an unofficial diplomatic contact with Cuba) stated: “It’s no longer a matter of the United States leading a movement to isolate Cuba in the hemisphere. Quite the contrary: If anyone’s isolated, on this issue anyway, it’s us” (Orsi).

The third element of our national interest—prosperity—must be understood in the context of our position in regards the rest of the world. In a globalized economy, it is no longer possible to be a global power while being unconcerned with the security and prosperity of other countries (Albright and Powell 15). Just as there are many voices that prefer to maintain the embargo against Cuba and maintain the naval base at Guantánamo, there are also many who would prefer the U.S. to move toward isolationism. However, that is a very risky proposition and one that would not only jeopardize the level of economic prosperity we now enjoy, but would also risk the country’s security. Former Secretary of State Clinton set out a vital three-part basis of foreign policy that should be maintained and built upon by the U.S.: development, defense and diplomacy (Albright and Powell 15). That policy, which involves making sure that markets in the U.S. are open to trade by even the poorest countries will become extremely hollow and pointless if we exclude the nation of Cuba.

Finally, the U.S. must always concern itself with the enforcement of, and adherence to, international order as a matter of national interest. Understandably, many nations around the world are hesitant to follow the lead of the U.S., or respond to our calls for changes in their actions or policies as long as they observe how we treat our neighbor, Cuba. International order must be seen as exactly that—international—and not something that any single country, even the U.S., can manipulate or ignore at will. In our relationship with Cuba, we have acted contrary to what all other nations (with the lone exception of Israel) consider to be the rule of international law. The most widely accepted standard of international relations involves a combination of diplomacy and trade that seeks to overcome any differences between governments, even in cases of wide gulfs between political or social philosophies (Fendrick 167).

Abiding by international order is at the center of my recommendation to the President, which involves a necessary engagement with the international community while making sure we are measuring up to the same standards of conduct we expect from other nations. When the President took office, in 2009, the U.S. was not respected widely around the world and the goal has been to restore the standing that America once enjoyed. Regaining a preeminent place in international order will enable to U.S. to combat, in the court of public opinion, those groups and nations who would seek to do us harm or stir up hatred against us (Lord and Lynch 3). The tools that we will use to accomplish these objectives involve the use of instruments of national power. Two of these—diplomacy and information—will now be discussed in the larger context of the Cuban issue.

Instruments of National Power: Diplomatic and Informational

Diplomatic relations in the global community is one of the most widely used instruments of national power and the one that is most preferred since its success means peaceful relations between countries. There is a need to maintain diplomatic contact even between countries that are diametrically opposed in political or worldviews. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has diplomatic relations with China, in spite of that country’s well-known human rights violations. Once the diplomatic channels have been cut off, the possibility of paranoia and distrust between potential adversaries becomes the driving force of many policy makers. It is also widely accepted that having diplomatic relations with a particular country does not mean that the actions of that country are condoned (Fendrick 169). Rather, it is simply understood that maintaining open communications is the best possible method of assuring that each country can act in its own interests.

In the case of Cuba, there is currently no direct communication or diplomatic relations between that government and the U.S. However, there have usually been contacts through third-parties (such as the Swiss embassy) so that some types of activities (i.e., the providing of food and medical supplies) can be carried out. Over the years, some minor relaxation in other rules related to dealing with Cuba has been brokered but, for the most part the tension between our two nations has remained at a very high level for decades. Thus, even the communication that exists today between Castro’s government and the U.S. is conducted at such low levels that nothing of consequence could be accomplished (Fendrick 169).

Considering the commitment of the U.S. to justice—economically and politically—both domestically and internationally, it is imperative that we utilize the instrument of diplomacy effectively and consistently. This connection cannot be stabilized unless the U.S. is setting an example of fairness and uniformity in its treatments of foreign powers (Grossman 47). For the U.S. to be respected internationally, we simply cannot be seen as willing to have normalized relations with a country like China—half a world away—while completely ignoring a neighboring country just off our southeast coast. Further, how were we are able to move past our differences with Vietnam and normalize relations, yet unable to get past our issues with Cuba, most of which were created by us in the first place? Diplomacy must be at the forefront of our future with Cuba.

Another vital instrument of national power that must be wielded in regards to Cuba is the use of information. This includes information that emanates not only from the official sources of the U.S. government, but also from other non-governmental entities which can play a key role in promoting the new policy of the U.S. in regards to Cuba (Murphy 227). As readily on display in the events of the Arab Spring as well as the civil war in Syria, social media and devices, such as cell phones, play an important role in the dissemination of information to a much broader public than is otherwise possible. The power of information is therefore critical but must also be controlled as much as possible in order to promote the message desired by the U.S.

Once a policy is adopted, the executive branch works diligently to ensure that a consistent and unified message is presented by means of every avenue available. This strategy related to information dispersal will be the guiding force from which all other agencies and actors will take their lead. Part of this process includes an ability to quickly respond to—and counteract if possible—any information that may be distributed that does not comply with the unified message desired (Murphy 231-32). Any threats, such as diplomatic breakdowns or seemingly entrenched positions on either side, must be addressed in such a way that this does not detract from the underlying message. The purpose of our informational instrument is therefore:

…to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power whose primary supporting capabilities are Public Affairs; military Information Operations and Public Diplomacy (Murphy 231-32).

One of the key tools for promoting this informational strategy is the presidential national security directives process. These directives, which are typically classified communications, are developed by the administration following a great deal of deliberation and consultation. They are usually the result of collaboration between various departments and agencies within the government, such as the Department of Justice, and are designed to promote the informational policy across the entire government. Such directives are the tools that are used to assign each agency a specific task related to the new strategy (Bartholomees 447).

Recommended Courses of Action

The introductory comments of this document included my proposal for recommended courses of action, which is to not only close the Guantánamo detention facility, but to completely remove all U.S. troops from Cuba and return the Guantánamo base to the government of Cuba. Certainly, such a suggestion will be met with widespread resistance and disdain by many in Congress, and no doubt many in the Cuban-American community (especially in Miami) as well. However, the duty of this office to maintain the national security interests of the U.S. takes precedence over the difficulties that lie ahead. Of course, as the initial step in this process, the U.S. should also end its embargo and allow trade with Cuba. In every important decision, especially one that attempts to reverse the course of a policy in place for over 50 years, one is faced with uncertainties and the potential for some compromises or restructuring of initial proposals (Liotta and Lloyd 123). However, it is my clear and unwavering opinion that ending the animosity between the U.S. and Cuba is in the national interests of our country, as well as that of Cuba.

Undeniably, initial steps will need to be taken to establish diplomatic relations with the government of Cuba. At first, this will no doubt involve working through our third-party contacts in the Swiss embassy. However, as soon as possible, direct discussions will need to be arranged between representatives from both governments, although this will likely be at a lower diplomatic level initially. Since the U.S. will also have closed the detention camp at Guantánamo by this time, the reaction of the Cuban government may be favorable. The first overtures to the Castro government will be to apprise them of our intention to lift the embargo. Since this dispute with Cuba was initiated over 100 years ago, and the U.S. embargo has lasted for more than 50 years, it is impractical to expect a speedy resolution to these deep-seated issues. Nevertheless, with the full commitment and support of the President, with whom this issue has been discussed and who supports this proposal, as long as the process is moving forward it will be viewed as successful. Once a diplomatic exchange is in place, the discussions related to removal of all U.S. troops from Cuban soil will begin.

As the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA)—or National Security Adviser— I am confident that this course of action will not only allow us to establish a normalized relationship with Cuba, but it will (perhaps more importantly) allow the U.S. to regain a position of trust in the international community. While, admittedly, I have no direct authority over other departments in the Executive Branch which will need to sign off on this policy (i.e., Defense and State), my previous discussions with both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State indicates a willingness on their part to consider my proposal. Indeed, they have both expressed similar sentiments to mine regarding this issue and believe there is potential for a significant improvement in the perception of the U.S. if act on this proposal.

I intend to use my position as administrator of the National Security Council (NSC) to stress the advantages to national security by moving forward with this major foreign policy adjustment. It will also be my responsibility to coordinate with all other government agencies the details of this policy once it has been fully endorsed. While the final decision on this policy is ultimately the President’s, it is my responsibility to insure that each department and agency is aware of what is required of it to move these courses of action forward. Undoubtedly, I will take full advantage of the presidential national security directives process to make sure that critical information is conveyed to every department and agency that requires it. The dissemination of information will be a critical element of the courses of action I am recommending: 1) close the Guantánamo detention camp; 2) begin the process of establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba; 3) end the Cuban embargo; 4) turn over the Guantánamo base to Cuba and remove all American troops. Not only will it be vital to make sure information is accurate and detailed within the U.S. government agencies and departments involved, but it will also be necessary to make sure a consistent message is presented to the press. Additionally, details of our plans in this regard will be discussed with our allies around the world as well as other strategic trading partners in the region.

Issues Affecting the Entire Region

In spite of the fact that the U.S. is viewed by many as experiencing a decline in power, there is little doubt that it is still looked to by many countries as the only country capable of solving serious problems. Examples of this include attempts to adjust the exchange rate of China’s currency and working toward a peaceful settlement between Israel and Palestine (Gelb 4). At the same time, a sea change in U.S.-Cuba relations will also have major ramifications for the entire region. Normalized relations will not only greatly benefit the Cuban people and the country’s economy, but it will also allow free trade of all other countries in the region with Cuba as well. No longer will the threat of U.S. retaliation against countries who dare to violate the embargo be looming over regional governments.

Additionally, leaders such as Chavez in Venezuela have long pointed to American imperialism in Cuba as an indication that the U.S. could not be trusted. If the embargo is ended, Guantánamo is returned, and diplomatic relations are established, this will eliminate one legitimate cause for complaint on the part of similar governments in the region. Rather than being viewed as the bully in the neighborhood, it may be that the U.S. will begin to be considered as a source of support.

Some may say that Cuba is only one part of America’s imperialist agenda in the region and point to Puerto Rico as another example. However, that latter country is clearly not remotely similar to the situation in Cuba. Specifically, Puerto Rico has consistently expressed a desire to maintain its status with the U.S. (with a few minor groups as exceptions). Indeed, most of the talk related to Puerto Rico is focused on whether or not it should become the fifty-first state, rather than its feeling like an occupied territory. The citizens of Puerto Rico have benefitted from the country’s close ties with the U.S.

Thus, by acting upon my recommendation, the President will be taking decisive action and reversing the course that has dominated U.S. policy toward Cuba since it first intervened in the Cuban War of Independence. Initiating the process of returning Guantánamo to the government of Cuba and removing all U.S. forces from the country, will enable the U.S. to, first of all, establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. Secondly, these actions will clearly indicate to the entire world that the U.S. intends to finally end the last vestiges of American imperialism in the region. These actions will also disappoint our enemies who seek to capitalize on any element that paints the U.S. in an unfavorable light.

Works Cited

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Lord, Kristin M. and Marc Lynch. America’s Extended Hand: Assessing the Obama administration's Global Engagement Strategy. Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2010.

Murphy, Dennis M. “Strategic Communication: Wielding the Information Element of Power.” international Security Studies (ISS). Air War College, 2013, pp. 227-239.

Orsi, Peter. “No Cigar: Economic Embargo on Cuba Turns 50.” Associated Press, February 7, 2012. http://www.the-news-leader.com/ap%20financial/2012/02/07/no-cigar-economic-embargo-on-cuba-turns-50>

“White House. Overview of National Security Strategy.” National Security Strategy, May 2010.http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf