Democracy and the Pursuit of Public Participation: A Foreign Affair?

Foreign policy in the United States has undergone a tumultuous journey in the past two decades. Decision making of foreign policy, however, has proven to be a multifaceted account that took into consideration the participation of private and national interests in the United States on multiple occasions such as with the Iraq War and the Vietnam War. Outcomes and leadership commitments to resources in war depend on a multitude of factors that include timing, availability of resources, and the possibility of winning the war. Taking a closer examination into past foreign policies and decision making in international communities, it is apparent that the American public opinion has definitive effects over policymakers of foreign policies in the United States; yet powerful financial institutions still hold the reigns in influencing how foreign policies are devised. In effect, diplomacy in balancing the precarious virtues of American public participation and private interest is the foremost important element of executing successful foreign policies in the United States and throughout the world.

Though foreign policy decisions are remotely affected by domestic sentiments, most importantly, it serves the interest of “financial kings” whose camouflage is portrayed through the ignorance and inattentiveness of the public (Wright, p. 26). According to Wright, “every great political act, involving a new flow of capital, must receive the sanction and practical aid of financial kings” (p. 26). These financial kings normally are great businesses that form the ganglion of international capitalism whose aim is to increase profit by creating new public debts, float new companies, and to cause considerable fluctuations of value under the guise for peace (Wright, pp. 26-27). The Iraq war is a prime example where the call of spreading democracy and peace from President Bush and Congress resulted in war on Iraq, increase in public expenditure, increase in future speculations of gains for oil companies, and ultimately solidification of wealth and influence in the political arena of the United States.

The United States’ heritage is influenced by a long line of Western civilized powers indoctrination, where the new imperialism in the United Kingdom is considered to be an expansion of autocracy (Wright, 22). As Wright points out, special interest of the investor is liable to clash with the public interest, but at the same time, these special interest groups are “united by the strongest of bonds of organization” of chiefly “men of a single and peculiar group” who are “in a unique position to control the policy of nations” (pp.25-26). The financial power’s direct influence in “high politics” is supported by the way in which they manipulate public opinion through the control of the press, which is becoming “more and more their obedient instrument” in civilized countries (Wright, p. 28).

While waging a war may hardly depend on the public opinion, it is nonetheless an instigator and also byproduct of the way in which leaders of the country decide on their own foreign policies through the influence of financial powers. As explained by Russett, “the state of the economy is a major determinant” of electoral success (p.26). This is in part due to the sentiment that “leaders are expected to solve numerous social problems” and the most straightforward is to deliver what the voters want, which is most often the national pocketbook (Russet, p.22). Furthermore, the establishment of representative institutions depended in important ways on the degree to which rulers were economically dependent on taxpayers for revenues to fight their wars. In consequence, when the “economy begins to falter, the government comes under increasing pressure to do something,” such as imposing trade protection and hence, creating conflict in international trade and ultimately causing deterioration in domestic economics and strife in international politics (Russett, p.23). It was found that losing a war, or one who won costly wars by garnering short term support by initiating belligerent moves in foreign policy compromises the credibility of the leader (Russet, pp. 48-49). The Vietnam War against the Communist challenge demonstrated how leaders, when adhering to the constraints of peace and keeping the war at the lowest possible level, led to “policies of bold commitment but compromised means,” (Russett, 48).

The case of the Vietnam War demonstrated how public opinion can influence the outcome of policy choice at certain times in the governance of the United States. In this particular war case, the United States grossly underestimated the capability of insurgents to win the war, and as a result, suffered a critical blow to its credibility as a nation for its citizens. An example in which the public opinion showed considerable influence in policy choice is when, towards a critical turning point of the war, the leader of the United States accepted the recommendation to decide against the military proposal to deploy 206,000 troops to avoid “expansion of war” (Herring, p. 237). It was understood that should the president and Congress accept and choose to continue engaging combat, a major escalation in the war would take place and “impose new demands on the American people in an election year,” and risk a “domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions” (Herring, pp. 236-237). While the then President Johnson did not escalate the war, he also did not “alter his policy in any fundamental way or abandon his goals” (Herring, p. 245).Yet, inaction did not aid in President Johnson’s attempt to better avert the national crisis as the Vietnam War drew out severe divisions across the nation. In this case, civil unrest and a nation divided against itself dictated the end result of a less than desirable peace negotiation. The United States learned from this war the value of maintaining domestic and international well-being at a lower cost.

Iraq, on the other hand, showed how the outcome of a war can be dictated by public opinion. In the international community, it was deemed that the United States’ participation in the Iraq war necessitated the need for America to play a more active role in state-building efforts (Weinstein, p. 4). State-building – which Weinstein defines as creating new government institutions or strengthening existing ones – is a major foreign policy challenge for the United States because weak or failed states are “the source of many of the world’s most serious problems,” (Weinstein, p. 5). Due to the international community’s opinion of America’s role and responsibility in the state-building of Iraq, the United States partook a significant role in the process of rebuilding the Iraqi government and re-engineering of social, economic, and political functions.

While there may be merit to Bush’s argument of furthering national interest by bringing democracy to the countries of the Middle East, counter-arguments also prevail in how a bureaucratization in democratization further exacerbates conditions of instability to the region. In a study by Weinstein, it was found that war generates new bureaucratic capacity, which ultimately creates the process of mobilizing people to fight provides an opportunity to reshape their identities (p.12). In many instances, this reshaping of identity pits one group against another in a way that feeds into continued conflict of the existing problem of terrorist threat and attaches to the United States (Weinstein, p.12). As such, in order to persuade the public to support the objective of war on Iraq, Bush posed democracy as a likely reason to propel the action forward. The empirical evidence of democratic peace is evident in Bush’s speech, “We will finish the work of the fallen.” Bush’s speech is in line with Kant’s theory of perpetual peace based on the basic, contemporary understandings of Democracy. Kant explained that the elements constituting democracy consisted of “freedom (with legal equality of subjects), representative government, and a separation of powers,” (Russett, p. 4). Bush’s speech not only aligns his commitment with the theories of Kant but also goes a step further in the testament of providing support against groups who aim to deter and demolish such democratic peace.

The speech, “We will finish the work of the fallen,” testifies Bush’s commitment towards continuing the work of bringing sovereignty back to the people of Iraq. According to Russett, the concept of democratic peace rules that “democracies rarely fight each other” since “they have other means of resolving conflicts between them” and democracies believe that they should not fight each other (p. 4). Bush supposedly operated under the theoretical foundation that democracy is an element desired by the Iraqi people, that they want “strong protection for individual rights, they want their independence, and they want their freedom.” Following Kant’s discussion of democratic peace with freedom of legal equality of subjects and representative government, Bush declared that the governance of Iraq will be returned, by the June 30th deadline, set forth to hand over sovereignty from the United States back to the Iraqi people, where they will hold elections for a national assembly and elect a permanent government no later by December 15th, 2005. This will be an event “that will mark the completion of Iraqi’s transition from dictatorship to freedom,” according to President Bush.

However, in order for the delivery of freedom and democracy to be a viable option, it must also be proven that the people who are to receive the benefits of democracy must also desire it. In Bush’s speech, it is also assumed that most of Iraq rejects violence and oppose dictatorship (Bush). Bush expresses that “America’s commitment to freedom in Iraq is consistent with our ideals and required by our interests” as it will either be a peaceful democratic nation or will be a source of violence, a “haven for terror and threat to America and the world” (Bush). “America’s objective in Iraq is limited and it is firm” with seeking an independent, free, and secure Iraq as main point of focus.

Bush’s speech is further supported by the argument that War has the potential to actually resolve political conflict and lead to peace, allowing for successful peacebuilding. In particular, it is believed that war comes to an end when one group is strong enough to win decisively, or when both groups are sufficiently exhausted that they become willing to accommodate one another without the intervention of an international community, allowing them to run their natural course (Weinstein, p. 9). “Above all, the defeat of violence and terror in Iraq is vital to the defeat of violence and terror elsewhere, and vital, therefore, to the safety of the American people,” (Bush).

However, it was later speculated that Bush’s intention of spreading democracy did not appear as genuine objectives for the democratization of Iraq, but rather a smokescreen for advancing private interests through the guise of national welfare. Indeed, in Krugman’s publication, the topic of motivation for the war came into focus. The “Waggy Dog Stories” told of the realization of the Iraq war have real consequences, with “Iraq in chaos, a rising death toll among American soldiers,” and providing precedence a vicious cycle where the administration derived significant power on false premises (Krugman). He compared the wagging dog as “intelligence,” where much of the supposed justification for the war turns out to have been fictional. After initiating war, America found “no evidence of the Qaeda link has ever surfaced, and no W.M.D’s that could have posed any threat to the U.S. or its allies have been found” (Krugman). The war was justified by the administration as an “intelligence failure” (Krugman). However, Krugman points out that “intense pressure was placed on intelligence agencies to tell the Bush and Blair administration what they wanted to hear,” by using crudely forged documents as evidence of a nuclear program. In fact, it was found that the reason for the Iraq war in the first place had “little to do with the events of September 11 and the subsequent crisis and much to do with the course of U.S. policy toward Iraq since 1991” (Pollack, 33). Evidence hereafter provided further demonstrated that the political cost of war taxed the benefits of the citizens of the United States instead of special financial power groups.

There are warranted suspicions in the speculation of the war on Iraq as the United States’ way of securing oil wealth benefiting private corporations under the guise of advancing the national interest. This notion of securing oil patches as national interest of the United States transcended the Arab world and that of some of the citizens of the United States (Kramer). Indeed, in 2008, it was reported that four Western oil companies, Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, and BP returned to Iraq, after the war, and regained previously lost oil concession to nationalization under Saddam Hussein’s rise to power 36 years ago (Kramer). It is apparent that the United States’ war on Iraq has had beneficial economic results: the oil companies were able to obtain no-bid contracts to avoid the fallacy of inferring influence from gain in servicing Iraq’s largest oil fields (Kramer). To avoid the fallacy of inferring influence from gain, some counterfactual questions would be, if the U.S. did not fight the Iraq war, would oil companies have received no-bid contracts from the Iraqi government that would give them an advantage in bidding future contracts, and possibly a large scale increase in oil production? If the U.S. did not have presiding American advisers over Iraq’s Oil Ministry, would the bids have prevailed over 40 other proposals submitted by Russian, Chinese, and Indian oil companies?

On the same note, there is a strong likelihood in the plausible national interest argument, where the United States sought to secure oil patches for the good of its citizens. As Kramer points out, by increasing output in Iraq, the American government serves the “foreign policy goal of increasing oil production globally to alleviate the exceptionally tight supply” which is a cause of the surge in oil prices. Russet explains that the state of the economy gives incentives for international conflicts as leaders aim to divert attention away from domestic troubles (p. 21). Domestic economy’s decline frequently brings international conflict to its wake as leaders try to enforce more protection for the local economy by instituting harsher tariffs and trade barriers against international firms, attenuating international relations and putting stress on further foreign policies (Russett, p. 23). Yet, another outlook on the perspective of war in Iraq is the safety and security of the constituents of the United States and its allies bordering the state of Iraq.

Due to the 911 incident, Iraq became the focal center in the containment of potential violent terrorist activity and illegal incidences that violate international treaties and mandates. The terrorist activity threatened the safety and security of the United States and our allies in neighboring states of Iraq. There were diverging opinions on how containment should be performed in Iraq, whether it should be approached diplomatically or immediate invasion. Much discussion was upheld from both sides of the argument. In examining the correspondences of each side through articles by Mearsheimer and Walt against opinion piece by Pollack, it becomes apparent that an invasion is inevitable towards preserving the peace and prosperity of the American people.

Mearsheimer and Walt are against the war on Iraq, positing that advocates of preventive war, one such as Pollack, wrongly assess the past behavior of Saddam in being contained rests on distorted history and faulty logic (p. 52). Measheimer and Walt argue that deterrence had never been an option in the foreign policy’s agenda since 1990 to contain the unrest of Saddam Hussein and his governance in Iraq, when in fact; they are more than deterrable (p. 55). There are evidence citing Saddam’s ability to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction against his own people during the Gulf War and enough proof to back up the claim that Saddam “has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the United States unless his survival is threatened” (Measheimer & Walt, p. 55). Yet, proponents of war, one such as Pollack, argue the exact opposite.

Pollack is a supporter of preventive war which upholds that the United States should launch a full invasion of Iraq. It was posed in his research that the United States should “invade Iraq, eliminate the present regime, and pave way for a successor prepared to abide by its international commitments and live in peace with its neighbors” (Pollack, p.33). Pollack’s proposal is premised upon the assumption that containment is impossible with Iraq due to Hussein’s inability to cooperate with UN’s mandated constraints, the complete stop of monitoring and inspection of WMD programs in Iraq, and more frequent illegal smuggling activity that transpire across the border of Iraq and its neighbors (pp. 33-34). Pollack argues that further resources dedicated towards more diplomatic channels of regulating Hussein cannot vouch for complete containment, and as such, an immediate invasion is needed to procure the safety and security of the United States and its allies.

In examining the main points of disagreement between Pollack and Mearsheimer & Walt, it is apparent that the latter has a better policy to uphold a more diplomatic and educated manner in conducting vigilant containment, yet Pollack’s proposal is more viable in a real-life situation. Due to the fact that there is no confirmation on the availability and amount of WMD that Iraq supposedly is in possession of, there is no time to ponder a more diplomatic resolve other than to act immediately. While friendly exchanges and diplomatic measures can be carried out to deter Hussein from activities such as smuggling and obtaining/usage of WMD, such dedication of resources, in the end, may not result in any tenable benefits towards national safety and security for the United States and allies.

Indeed, if a better form of deterrence could be upheld, an invasion could have been avoided on the war in Iraq. However, as Baram pointed out, “deterrence, in short, is a more complex issue than generally assumed” as the link between rationality and deterrence is less direct than people think (p. 76). The particular case with Saddam Hussein warranted even more investigation as he acted “according to a coherent set of self-interested preferences” (Baram, p.77). It was noted that Hussein repeatedly conjured convoluted scenarios that allowed him to believe events would play in his favor, and only treated learning as an experience in drawing up past experiences to suit his current purpose (Baram, p. 77). As a leader, Hussein was not able to recognize the imminent dangers of war and how it could affect his nation and constituents, and as such, war on Iraq became an irreconcilable reality that cannot be avoided (Baram, p.94).

In today’s economy and political transparency, leadership in foreign policies often have to take into account national interest and as well as private interest that converges to form what is considered the best for the nation. Indeed, as nations become more interconnected, the decisions of any one policy can create a ripple effect that can be felt throughout the world economies and politics. As democratic peace becomes more and more prevalent, with nations becoming more interdependent upon each other for support, the balances between such different interest groups become more pronounced. As such, leaders of the United States should take precautions in the precarious balance of public opinion and private interest groups to formulate the best way of approach when instituting foreign policies.

Works Cited

Baram, Amatzia. "Deterrence Lessons from Iraq - Rationality is not the Only Key to Containment." Foreign Affairs (2012): 76-92. Web.

Bush, George W. “We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen.” The President’s News Conference. The White House, Washington, D.C. April 14th, 2004.

Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York: Wiley, 1979. Print.

Krugman, Paul. "Waggy Dog Stories." The New York Times 30 May 2003: n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2013.

Mearsheimer, John J., &Walt, Steven M. "An Unnecessary War." Foreign Policy134 (2003): 50-59. Web.

Pollack, Kenneth M. "Next Stop Baghdad?" Foreign Affairs (2002): 32-49. Web.

Russett, Bruce M. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print.

Russett, Bruce M. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993. Print.

Weinstein, Jeremy. "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective." Center for Global Development (2005): n. pag. Print.

Wright, Harrison M. The "New Imperialism" Analysis of Late-Nineteenth-Century Expansion. 2nd ed. Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Company, 1976. Print.