An Analysis of the Democratic Deficit in Canada

The democratic deficit refers to fundamental flaws that undermine the linkage between citizens and government in democratic political systems. In many developed countries, cynicism of the government combined with low voter participation contribute to a divide between the political preferences of the people and the outcomes of the government. From this view, it is easy to see why a democratic deficit is a problem. Finding the root cause of the problem and its solution is a little trickier. To properly counter the effects of any democratic deficit, it is prudent to first understand why the problem has occurred. For Canada specifically, the democratic deficit could be caused by a myriad of different problems including excessive appointment power of the Prime Minister, lack of transparency, districting issues, or even voter apathy. The greatest and only truly efficient solution, however, is effective campaign finance reforms combined with increased efforts to engage the populace in government oversight. In order to change the general thought process of a country though, the best place to begin is in the classroom.

Overview of the Democratic Deficit

Democracy is considered to be one of the biggest achievements of Western society. However, the democratic deficit questions the assumptions that democratic institutions truly serve as a linkage mechanism between the people and the political bodies that represent them. A democratic deficit can be conceived as the failing of democratic institutions to deliver upon their promise of connecting citizens to the decision-making processes utilized by democratic institutions in their society. As political scholar David Beetham asserts, the democratic deficit should be defined as “a substantial and systematic failing in relation to international standards of good practice in some important feature of a country’s democratic life” (Beetham 77). As Beetham notes, the failings of a democratic institution can be measured through universal criteria that identifies components that must be in place in order for a democratic institution to function properly.

Yet, it is necessary to consider what Beetham means by the terms “substantial” and “systematic” in order to appropriately identify democratic deficits. As Beetham notes, substantial refers to significant failings that cannot be merely a minor flaw or inconvenience in the system (77). Thus, attributes such as infrequent dissatisfactions in an election or infrequent scandals do not constitute a significant failing. Further, Beetham identifies that the term systemic implies failings that are repeated and that point to a significant deficiency in the system (77). This further compounds his point that the identified flaw cannot be minor, but rather it must be indicative of a fundamental failing in the democratic system. These criteria will be further applied in analyzing the phenomenon of the democratic deficit.

Because Beecher’s definition calls for a systemic examination of flaws in democracies, it is appropriate to evaluate the historical component of the democratic deficit. While the phenomenon has been expanded to include shortcomings in governments throughout Western society, the term originally pertained to a very specific case of voter disenfranchisement. Describing the origins of the democratic deficit, political scientist William Cross writes:

Much was written in the 1990s and early years of the 21st century concerning a ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘democratic malaise’ in Canada. There was substantial evidence that many Canadians were dissatisfied with the state of their democratic practices and institutions. The Canadian party system was in the midst of significant upheaval, voter turnout rates had reached a record low and public confidence in democratic institutions was in significant decline (Norris 23).

As Norris establishes, the concept of the application of the democratic deficit to state policies was originally used to describe a Canadian phenomenon. Further, it refers to several components of a declining democracy, including low voter turnout rates and low levels of confidence in democratic institutions. Thus, while other states will be analyzed to elucidate components of the phenomenon, Canada will serve as a base for examining the democratic deficit at the state level.

Yet, it has been popular among theorists to speculate that there is a sense of malaise in Canada, it is also necessary to verify the evidence that supported these contentions. The first symptom of the democratic deficit to be assessed involves voter turnout. Voting is significant for evaluating the performance of democratic institutions because it serves as the primary linkage mechanism through which citizens can impact the composition of government and indirectly influence the policies that are adopted by their governments. Following the criteria imposed by Beecher, it is not sufficient for turnout to be low in just one or two elections. Rather, there must be evidence that there are fundamental electoral shifts that evidence the long-term trend of low voter participation.

The long-term trend of low voter turnout is well documented in the Canadian electoral system. As political scientist Lisa Young noted, a decrease in voter turnout among Canadians began following World War II (Young 143). During the twenty-first century, voting turnout rates threaten to fall below 50 percent of all eligible voters. With 2012 as the base year, the prior five federal elections recorded turnout rates between 59 and 65 percent of registered voters (143). The primary issue that Canada faces is that the majority of voters are from older demographic groups that will soon be replaced by less active demographic groups (143). Further investigation into Canadian voting trends provides little hope that future generations of Canadians will lead a revival in civic engagement through voting.

An assessment of youth voting trends provides strong support for fundamental flaws in the Canadian electoral system. As Jared Wesley assesses in his report on youth voting trends in Canada, there is statistical evidence that voting has declined significantly in Canada over the last decade. According to Wesley, though turnout among eligible voters increased by 2.3 percent in 2011 over 2008, this still reflects a downward trend from the 2006 election where turnout was 3.6 percentage points higher (Wesley 135). The low voter turnout rates among youth are not only indicative of trends among this narrow demographic but might indicate the overall direction of voter turnout in Canada.

As Wesley establishes, trends among youth voters reflect a pervading attitude towards the function of democracy that is held by young citizens. Consulting scholarship on the attitudes and beliefs held by Canadian youth, Wesley posits that these trends in low participation can partly be explained by the increasing belief among Canadian youth that they do not possess a civic responsibility to vote (137). The implication of this attitude is that the trends recorded by Canadian youth today are likely to reflect the future trends when the youth become older. Without possessing a fundamental belief in the importance of voting, it is likely that the trends of low turnout will become exacerbated when young voters replace the older voting populace.

As the dilemma of youth voter turnout in Canada demonstrates, voter attitudes are a critical component of strengthening support for democratic practices. Adhering to the criteria established by Beecher, persistently negative or apathetic attitudes towards government can be considered a major systematic flaw in a democratic institution because of the relationship that civic pride has in fostering democratic participation. Yet, evidence highlights that Canadians are increasingly pessimistic in matters concerning government.

A primary concern is raised by surveys assessing the trust that Canadians place in their government institutions. According to a report published in the Canada and the World Backgrounder, public opinion polls highlight that public confidence in government has consistently eroded over the latter half of the twentieth century. In a 1969 poll that asked Canadian citizens “How much do you trust government to do the right thing,” 59 percent of Canadian respondents answered, “just about always” or “most of the time” (Democratic Deficit 8). However, in 2000, only 30 percent of Canadians provided the same response to those questions (8). Additionally, the survey determined that less that one in four Canadians believed that the interests of the general public were served by public policy decisions (8). This documented pessimism is among the factors that undermine a politically engaged society and the sustainability of government institutions that are dependent upon the trust and support of citizens.

Consequences of the Democratic Deficit

The democratic deficit is such a hot button issue because it is indicative of some level of dysfunction within the government. No matter the cause, it creates frustration among the general populace because it means that there is a discrepancy between what the voters want and the policy decisions that are actually made. The disparity between the ideologies of the government and governed offers evidence for the weak linkage between citizens and their institutions. While the ideology of a population can be disputed, the proof lies in the numbers. The reality is that according to a poll conducted by The Vancouver Sun, 89% of Canadian voters support a liberal agenda, and yet somehow the government ended up with a 58% conservative majority in the 2011 elections (Elliot). As the statistics suggest, the government is far from reflective of the ideological preferences of the general population.

Solutions to the Democratic Deficit

The disproportionate ratio of conservatives to liberals is a primary issue that needs to be addressed in order to increase accountability of the Canadian government to the public. Many question the source of the ideological gap between governments and citizens in Canada. Yet, these disparities more than likely have something to do with the fact that the current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, is himself a conservative. Not only has he consistently campaigned and supported conservative runs for government since his switch from the Reform party in 2003, but his power to appoint Senators has a direct effect on which party is in control (Pare 33). This has led some to suggest that the reason behind the democratic deficit flaw is inherent in the structure of the government itself. For instance, Pare states that many Canadians are pushing for an elected Senate or its removal altogether (33). The reasoning behind this call to action is that the decision-making power of the Senate is purportedly compromised if the position is filled through appointment.

Pare, however, makes an excellent case for retaining nonelected Senate officials in an attempt to retain what little nonpartisan politics still remain within their government, but simply transferring the appointment power to a committee within the House of Commons. He believes that the need for constant reelection within the House of Commons necessitates support from the Prime Minister to win votes. Yet the Senate, which does not have to worry about popularity, is able to concentrate on the issues (34). However, regardless of whether or not any members of the legislative branch are elected or appointed, it is human nature to push one’s limits.

Matters of finance have often been cited as the source of widespread distrust in the government. In democratic countries, the connection between campaign spending and access to government creates a conflict of interest that is not easily resolved through policy measures. As political scientist Lisa Young noted, conflict over party financing in 2008 was a primary factor that contributed to the defeat of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government (Young 138). His defeat serves to demonstrate the connection that is made between the issues of finance and accountability.

Public opinion in the United States, a state that is noted for its reliance on large levels of private spending to fund political elections, reveals the detrimental effect that political campaign finance practices have on democratic institutions. According to 1988 survey of the American public, 59 percent held the perception that interest groups possessed too much power in the political system (Boatright 162). The main impact that disproportionate spending by the wealthy in elections has on politicians is that it contributes to the perception that citizens lack true input in government decisions. According to surveys conducted between 1970 and 2000, the number of respondents agreeing that “government [was] pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves” increased from 48 percent to 76 percent (162). Thus, campaign finance reform is a critical focus in efforts to address the democracy deficit.

As Young proposes, it is necessary to assess how regulatory frameworks impact the overall performance of democracy. In Canada, the first set of political finance regulations were adopted during the 1970s in effort to govern election finance practices in order to prevent campaign funding practices that undermined the democratic process (Young 139). Specifically, the 1974 Canada Elections Act established spending limits for political parties and candidates, requirements for the disclosure of donations exceeding $100, requirements to report all campaign spending and reimbursements, and the establishment of a tax credit for political campaign contributions (140). These reforms were significant in reducing opportunities for wealthy donors to purchase the loyalties of political parties and leaders by making their donations transparent to the public.

However, Constitutional considerations limit the ability of the Canadian government to enact financial reforms that could strengthen public accountability. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, established in the Canadian Constitution, has been used to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions in the Canada Elections Act (140). For example, in the Figueroa decision, the provisions that required parties to run in fifty electoral districts in order to obtain registered party status and the limitations on third-party advertisement were modified or struck down (140). To many observers, the inability to enact lasting checks against abuses in electoral spending is a major weakness of the constitutional framework.

However, there are recent reform measures taken it the twenty-first century that could potentially set precedence for future reform efforts. In effort to bypass the limitations imposed by the courts, the 2003 Liberal government implemented new regulatory reforms through Bill C-24 (140). The significant component of the 2003 legislation is that it attempts to bypass prospective court challenges by adopting a new strategy to limiting the influence of large-scale donations in politics. Deviating from the spending limits that characterized past reforms, the 2003 legislation instead provided state funding to parties and candidates in effort to decrease the reliance upon private donations (141). The legislation also increased the frequency of state funding to political parties and candidates to a quarterly basis in order to match the frequency of private contributions (141). Through these collective measures, the Liberal government created a new regulatory framework that improved transparency and increased the appeal of public funding for political candidates.

Yet a main risk in instituting financial reforms is the risk of decreasing turnout. While corrupt spending practices decrease the linkage between regular voters and public officials, legitimate spending activities are necessary for engaging the public and encouraging the public to vote. As studies determine, election spending on advertisements in competitive races serve the benefits of providing information to voters and increasing their interest in the election (143). Further, research demonstrates that voter turnout decreased in five elections that were held since the 1970s reforms were enacted (143). Thus, Young asserts that the approach of increasing public spending for campaigns to replace private donations provides the effect of enabling political parties to engage voters while limiting the exploitative impact of seeking large donations from private sources (143). As a review of Canada’s finance reform efforts reveals, campaign finance reform is an important component to increasing linkage between the government and citizens. However, the limitations of spending reforms demonstrate the necessity of a multi-faceted approach to solving the democratic deficit.

Accountability is also critical for strengthening democratic institutions. While many tend to believe that being voted into office is the epitome of being held accountable, this is not necessarily the case. If the public doesn’t take the time to keep track of the issues and the steps each member has taken for or against that particular agenda, then every vote becomes a wasted vote because it is an uninformed vote that does not hold the government accountable on an individual level for the decisions being made. If the solution to the democratic deficit does not lie within the structure of the government, then perhaps it lies within the information reporting process.

One thing nearly every Canadian political activist is striving for is more transparency. This is simply the act of making the processes and candidates more open to the public. Transparency is a wonderful thing, but every coin has another side. With the appointment of Justice Marc Nadon and other controversial leaders, the Canadian government has taken steps to become more transparent. The problem though, according to Adam Dodeck, is that much of the attention given to the candidates act much like a red herring in that excessive information about a person’s past and subsequent dirty laundry distracts viewers from the real issue – why they were chosen to begin with (Dodeck A17). The truth is that there is plenty of media coverage at present, but if Canadians don’t like the answer that is given to them by the Prime Minister, who is holding his feet to the fire? Much like the idea of elected officials, the presence of media seems to automatically equate to accountability in the public’s mind, but, as is evident, the two are mutually exclusive. Attention from the media can help put pressure on officials to do the right thing, but it is just as easy to hide scandal in plain sight as well.

Another factor to consider when dolling out blame for the democratic deficiency is the possibility of districting issues. In the United States, citizens might believe they are unique in our plight to keep or not to keep the Electoral College, but Canada suffers from the same dilemma due to voter districts. Some have claimed that the lines for the districts are already unfairly cut, so we are likely to see a rise in complaints as the October 2013 changes make their debut this year (Pilon 34) While some lines have remained the same, there are quite a few changes to the new electoral districts (34). Politician are famous for drawing district lines based upon their support base of voters, but with an 89 percent liberal majority, it is hard to believe the lines could have been spliced any particular way to give only 11 percent of the population most of the control over voting. So, if the democratic deficit is not the fault of the Prime Minister, the media, or the district lines, whose fault is it?

Finally, while financial and electoral reforms are necessary for increasing public confidence in the system, the public must also make efforts to increase the accountability of their government. As Canadian political scientist Genevieve Johnson asserts, deliberative democratic theory provides a beneficial framework for enhancing civic participation. Defining deliberative theory, Johnson writes:

Deliberative theorists argue that the inclusive, informed, and uncoerced dialogue of persons reflective – or better, representative – of all those who could be affected by certain policies provides an appropriate standard of justifications for those policies (Johnson 681).

As the theory holds, vigorous public participation in debates is necessary for producing sound public policy that represents the needs of citizens. Applying the theory to Canadian institutions, reform efforts that increase linkage must also determine avenues through which citizens can increase their participation in discussion over policies and engage in debate that ultimately impacts policy decisions.

Summary and Conclusion

The linkage between the interests of citizens and the policy outcomes of government is a critical component of democracy. In order for democratic societies to function properly, citizens must have assurance that their participation in government will lead to outcomes that represent their preferences and serve their interests. Yet, the dilemma of democracy deficit undermines this basic assurance that citizens seek from their representative governments. According to commonly accepted definitions by scholars, the democracy deficit refers to low participation in government that results in a disconnect between the preference of citizens and the outcome of governments. Further, the democracy deficit must refer to fundamental flaws in government that are systemic in nature.

By definition, Canada is currently experiencing the fundamental and systemic flaws that characterize democracy deficits. As a review of the evidence determined, Canada has experienced low rates of voter turnout beginning after the Second World War. Over the past decade, low rates of voter turnout continued to persist in Canada. Trends in youth voting are also problematic from a political standpoint. As research determined youth voting trends also note decline and attitudes held by youth minimize the importance of voting as a means of civic participation. When young voters replace older voters, it is expected that the trend of low turnout will be exacerbated. Further, the pessimism that all Canadians express over the performance of their government undermines the trust that citizens have in the function of their democratic institutions.

The primary consequence of the voter deficit is that the linkage between Canadian citizens and their government is diminished. As a poll of the difference in ideology between the average citizen and the Canadian legislative body notes, there is a large gap between the ideology held by the public and the ideology held by elected representatives. As a result, citizens are less likely to be represented in the decisions made by government officials. The low voter participation among the population serves to further compound this problem.

However, there are several measures that can be taken to remedy the democracy deficit in Canada. As a survey on the relationship between campaign finance practices and citizen attitudes on government reveal, excessive spending by private donors to influence elections undermines public confidence in government. Yet, through recent reform efforts that increase public spending for candidates, the Canadian government can take significant steps in reducing the influence of private parties on government. Further, efforts to reform the electoral mechanisms through monitoring the practice of redistricting can reduce redistricting practices that lead to disproportional gains by political parties in the legislative body. Finally, increasing the opportunity for citizens to deliberate on policy matters and participate in the decision-making process can provide direct accountability and avenues for public participation. Through these measures, Canada can strengthen its democratic institutions by addressing the systemic flaws that undermine citizen representation in government.

Works Cited

Beetham, David. “Defining and Identifying a Democratic Deficit.” Imperfect Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and the United States. Ed. Patti T. Lenard and Richard Simeon. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2012. 161-180.

Boatright, Robert G. “Campaign Finance Reform in the United States.” Imperfect Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and the United States. Ed. Patti T. Lenard and Richard Simeon. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2012. 23-52.

"Democratic Deficit." Canada and the World Backgrounder 01 2003: 8-11. ProQuest.

Dodek, Adam. "Wrong person on the hot seat." Globe & Mail [Toronto, Canada] 5 Nov. 2013: A17. Opposing Viewpoints in Context.

Elliot, Rachel. "Canada's Democratic Deficit Needs to be Addressed." The Vancouver Sun, Nov 09, 2012.

Johnson, Genevieve F. (2009). Deliberative democratic practices in Canada: An analysis of institutional empowerment in three cases. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 679-703. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423909990072

Norris, Pippa. “The Democratic Deficit Canada and the United States in Comparative Perspective.” Imperfect Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and the United States. Ed. Patti T. Lenard and Richard Simeon. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2012. 23-52.

Pare, Jean-Rodrigue. "Don't throw the senate out with the bath water." Canadian Parliamentary Review Autumn 2013: 31+. Opposing Viewpoints in Context.

Pilon, Denis. "Proportional Representation--A New Strategy for the Left." Canadian Dimension 34, no. 6 (November 2000): 28. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost.

Wesley, Jared J. "Youth and the Democratic Deficit: Why have Young Canadians Tuned Out of the Political Process?" Inroads. Winter 2012: 135-40. ProQuest.

Young, Lisa. “Regulating Political Finance in Canada Contributions to Democracy?” Imperfect Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and the United States. Ed. Patti T. Lenard and Richard Simeon. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2012. 138-160.