The Effects of Tutelage on Post-Colonial Middle East Politics

The religious and nationalist tensions that characterize political conflict in the Middle East received their origin from English and French colonialism following World War I. Though the colonization of the Middle East by European powers was a relatively brief point in Middle Eastern history, this period is noted for the rapid transformations that were brought about in the region. As the dominant institutions of the Ottoman Empire were abolished, fragmentation replaced regional unity and economic and social ties were altered. Though the Europeans attempted to strengthen the region through a system of tutelage, their efforts ultimately failed. While tutelage brought economic and political advantages to elite segments of the population, European colonization had a largely detrimental effect on the region by creating nationalistic and religious tensions and undermining the political legitimacy of governments throughout the reason. Faced with these challenges, post-colonial states in the Middle East had few options at their disposal to improve the political or economic conditions of their citizens.

The Middle East was colonized by the European powers following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. As Kamrava (2005) noted, the period between World War I and World War II where the Middle East is known as the interwar period and marks a significant shift in the geopolitical composition of the region (p. 35). As Cleveland and Bunton (2009) explained, the power centers in the Middle East consisted of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran prior to World War I (p. 171). Thus, Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran served as the main urban and commercial centers of the region (p. 171). Yet, the peace agreement established following World War I divided the former empire into six new states, including Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen (p. 171). This resulted in the development of over ten regional power that held different foreign policy objectives and economic strategies (p. 171). The division of the region into several states was the first act of colonialism that contributed to future regional conflicts.

The two main powers that took possession over the Middle East were Great Britain and France. Though the British and French shared an interest in exploiting the region’s economic assets, they differed in their political approaches to governing the region. Notably, the British approach to the colonization of the Middle East differed from the colonization of many other regions of the world because the British did not establish direct control in the region (p. 35). According to Kamrava, the British were primarily concerned with protecting their access to the Suez Canal in Egypt and placing allies in Palestine and Transjordan to protect their regional economic interests (p. 35). Further, the British were interested in gaining access to free oil resources in order to support their navy (p. 35). The French were primarily interested in possessing territories to boost their prestige over other European powers, but they also expressed an interest in protecting Christians in the region (p. 36). As Stewart (2009) noted, the French preferred direct rule over the northern African territories of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, where they adopted strict policies to force assimilation to French culture and required conversion from Islam as a condition of French citizenship (p. 103). Additionally, the French had strong commercial interests in the Middle East and had held 60 percent of Ottoman loans leading up to World War I (p. 36). Thus, France’s main contribution to the region was financing several public projects, such as the construction of the Suez Canal.

Though France and Great Britain were motivated by self-interest, the powers also expressed beneficent intentions in their colonial objectives. Under their agreement through the League of Nations, the two powers expressed the intent to place the newly formed states of the Middle East under “tutelage of advanced nations” (Cleveland & Bunton 172). The expressed purpose of French and English tutelage was to prepare the states of the Middle East to eventually become self-governed at an undisclosed date in the future (p. 172). Yet, during the interwar period, the elite members of Arab society gained political representation by acquiescing to the demands of the British and French while lightly pushing for self-determination (p. 172). Thus, political independence movements were primarily launched by the professional class in the countries of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine (p. 172). The establishment of elitist governments that were sympathetic to Western powers created further conflicts after states in the Middle East gained independence.

As a significant effect of abandoning the institutions of the Ottoman Empire, the political culture of the Middle East was severely destabilized. As Cleveland and Benton (2009) noted, the regional expectations of unity and cooperation were undermined by the separate economic systems that were established in the new colonial states (p. 173). Hindering inter-regional cooperation, the British and French established separate tariffs, currency, and economic agreements that met their needs rather than the needs of the states under their care (p. 173). Further, the commercial patterns of key economic regions were disrupted as the British and French chose new cities to serve as economic centers for their colonies (p. 173). The barriers between colonies established by the British and French further increased regional tensions following independence.

Finally, the establishment of the state of Israel by the British is one of the most detrimental legacies of colonialism in the Middle East. Following World War II, Arab-controlled Palestine experienced a large influx of Jewish refugees escaping persecution in Europe (p. 173). However, as Stewart (2009) explained, the migration of Jewish refugees into Palestine first gained British support when the 1917 Balfour Declaration placed a pro-Zionist British civilian at the head of the board of commissioners in Palestine (p. 105). By 1939, Palestine's Jewish population increased to 30 percent of the total area population (p. 105). Because the Arabs in the area held fewer resources and received less international support, they received unfavorable terms in land negotiations (p. 108). Thus, the Palestinians established nationalist organizations, such as the Palestinian Arab Conference, in effort to organize their opposition to Zionism and to support Arab control over Palestine (p. 108). However, Palestinian organizations also utilized violent actions to protest the increasing dominance of the Jewish population over the disputed territory. In the first wave of violence promoted by settlement disagreements, 5000 individuals were killed (p. 108). The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 marks the beginning of a perpetual source of violent conflict in the Middle East that is rooted the decisions made by British administrators.

In response to the tensions created by economic fragmentation and the establishment of Israel, nationalist and religious unity movements became a prominent political and economic force across the Middle East after independence. In many states, the emergence of leaders who had supported the colonial governments gave rise to oppositional movements that attempted to restore national or religious sovereignty. For example, the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, led by Sadaam Hussein, acted to overthrow King Feisal II in 1963 (p. 105). As an example of the connection between political and economic nationalism, Hussein nationalized the oil industry in 1972, utilizing the resources to adopt economic reforms that improved education and healthcare services for the citizens (p. 105). Notably, Hussein’s reforms led to the development of the largest middle class in the region (p. 105). However, the tradeoff for Hussein’s nationalistic reforms was that citizens were subjected to an authoritarian regime that suppressed dissent (p. 105). Thus, while nationalism promoted the economic and social interests of citizens, it also enabled the acceptance of civil liberties violations across the region.

Similarly, Egypt and Iran exemplify the connection between economic and political nationalism following independence. As Hoskins (1952) reported, in 1951, Egypt attempted to regain economic control following the colonial period by violating 1936 treaty terms that gave the British political control over the Suez Canal (p. 91). Illustrating the destructive nature of nationalist disputes in post-colonial states, riots following the 1951 Suez Canal dispute led to riots that destroyed over $287 million dollars in property (p. 91). Further, Iran experienced economic consequences following an attempt to nationalize its oil industry. During the 1950s, when Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq attempted to nationalize the oil industry, the British formed a blockade in response, resulting in the loss of over $100 million dollars in oil revenues per year (p. 112). Though Iraq illustrates the potential benefits of political and economic nationalization, the entangled relationships with European powers that were formed during colonialism pose a challenge to states that wish to assert their autonomy. The investment that Europeans placed in infrastructure in the Middle East hinders the ability of governments to make progressive reforms that would improve the economic conditions of their citizens.

The concept of legitimacy reveals why conflict has been the inevitable result of a post-colonialist rule in the Middle East. Hossein (1990) defined legitimacy as “a moral basis of authority” (p. 70). Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of government actions based on the perception that those actions reflect popular values (p. 70). As Hossein noted, from the standpoint of legitimacy, it is mistaken to evaluate the desirability of government based upon the government’s promotion of individual freedoms or increased political participation (p. 70). If citizens accept the government’s legitimacy, those factors can often be overlooked (p. 70). As Hossein notes, people in the Middle East derive their conception of legitimacy from religion and nationality (p. 75). Because the region is a center for strong religious and cultural traditions, both religion and nationalism form the center of an individual’s identity and reflects the individual’s self-worth (1990, p. 88). From this standpoint, the establishment of governments that reflected the traditions of the British and French undermined the popular legitimacy of government institutions throughout the region. Thus, the regional acceptance of authoritarian governments that appeal to nationalist or religious legitimacy over Western-supported transitional governments can be viewed as an inevitable response to the institutions that were established under European tutelage.

During the interwar period between World War I and World War II, Britain and France were the primary rulers of the former Ottoman Empire. Changing the political map, the divided this once unified region into several new states with little regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of the states. While the European powers claimed that their intentions were benign and attempted to aid their territories in eventually becoming independent, the self-interest of the powers undermined their efforts to develop stable governments in the region. Following independence from European rule, the tensions created by the colonialism were unleashed as intra- and inter-governmental conflicts spread throughout the region. Nationalism informed the political and economic policies of Iran, Iraq, and Egypt, which often had detrimental effects on the inhabitants of the states. Yet, because colonialism undermined the legitimacy of the states, popular support for destabilizing conflicts became inevitable. As an evaluation of post-colonial states in the Middle East reveal, the perceived benefits of tutelage were significantly outweighed by the conflict and instability that followed liberation from European control.

Works Cited

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Hoskins, Halford L. "Nationalism and the Middle East." World Affairs 115.1 (1952): 4-6. Jstor. Web. 6 Oct. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20668571

Hossein, Razi. “Legitimacy, religion, and nationalism in the Middle East.” The American Political Science Review 84.1 (1990): 69-91. Jstor. Web. 6 Oct. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1965630

Kamrava, Mehran. The modern Middle East a political history since the First World War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Print.

Sahliyeh, E. (2000). The limits of state power in the Middle East. Arab Studies Quarterly 22.4 (2005): 1-29. ProQuest. Web. 5 Oct. 2013. <http://www.proquest.com

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