The Role of External Actors in Democratization and Development

The role of external actors in the democratization of developing countries is a key issue in development politics. Over the last 30 years, the democratization of developing countries has accelerated at an increasing pace. Contemporary scholars seek to understand the role of external actors – whether governmental or institutional – in producing this trend towards democratization. Explanations that focus on the role of international institutions and external governments neglect the role of domestic actors in transforming their political systems. Portraying domestic actors as passive receivers of external aid causes scholars to overlook the significant social movements and agitators of internal reform. In this paper, I argue that meaningful democratic reform must come from within states and cannot be foisted upon them. To do so, I’ll begin by defining “democracy” and the methods used to achieve it in developing countries. I’ll then demonstrate (1) that external efforts to democratize cause more harm than good, (2) that externally instituted democracies are rarely a meaningfully democratic form of government, and (3) that internally motivated reform is necessary for democracy to be meaningful or successful.

External Methods of Achieving Democracy

Historically, theories of democracy have emphasized the dual themes of equality and justice. Traditional theories of democracy emphasize the achievement of social and economic justice by equalizing the political playing field. Contemporary theories of democracy take a narrower focus, emphasizing universal political participation in events such as elections. Robert Dahl characterizes the United States is what he calls a “polyarchy” – a form of government in which power is vested in three or more persons. In the sense that his understanding is procedural, rather than substantive, he defines democracy in terms of the means used rather than ends achieved. His influential theory of democracy dictates that each citizen has an equal “vote,” or equal say in the outcome of the decisive stage (Dahl, 1989). This contemporary change in focus has both positive and negative repercussions. A narrower, more concise definition of democracy is easier to quantify, and consequently, easier to study rigorously and methodologically. Quantifying measures of democracy allows political scientists to more carefully compare political situations and recommend areas for improvement. On the other hand, the narrower contemporary definition of democracy may focus too much on political actions (voting, electoral participation, etc.) at the expense of political sentiment (public support for the method of government, etc.). In this paper, I’ll define democracy in the broader sense that has been used historically, emphasizing political sentiment along with political action. This will allow me to demonstrate that externally motivated democratization isn’t meaningful to the individuals of the countries involved. These countries may achieve the appearance of democracy – they may act in appropriately democratic ways – but lack the public support or social impetus necessary to ensure the regime’s survival or efficacy.

Efforts to democratize developing countries have been undertaken by both international institutions and individual countries that wield enough international power. The United States, for example, explicitly encourages – ideologically, financially, and often militarily – the democratization of developing countries. The United States has long claimed that the democratization of other countries serves its national security interests, as decades of experience have demonstrated that democracies with free-market countries are far less likely to go to war with one another. For this reason, other well-developed countries such as Germany, France, and the U.K. encourage democratization as well. To speak of “encouraging” democratization, in this context, is somewhat euphemistic. In many cases, developed countries interfere in the politics of developing countries militarily to produce a democratic outcome.

When international institutions seek to democratize developing countries, they often use different methods. International monetary institutions such as the World Bank and IMF control the flow of finances for development projects and wield a great deal of control over the economy of developing countries. Using this power, these institutions “encourage” democratization by financially incentivizing democratic regimes and political parties at the expense of other alternatives. The United Nations, as an international political institution, has the additional ability to sanction countries that fail to live up to its established democratic principles. Both individual countries and international institutions utilize external incentives to produce democratization in developing countries.

Unintended Consequences of External Democratization

However well-intentioned external actors may be, their efforts to democratize developing countries often cause more harm than good. Attempts at the democratization of developing countries have been largely self-interested, focused on promoting useful political outcomes rather than achieving meaningful political reform. The Clinton administration’s 1994 publication of the National Security Strategy argued that ‘democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development” (Clinton, 1994). Because the United States has been focused on democratization as an element of its national security, it has failed to account for unique political circumstances in other countries that are often not conducive to American-style democracy. Utilizing a “one-size-fits-all” strategy for democratization fails to make democracy meaningful to the people it is foisted upon.

In Iraq, the United States has justified political intervention on the basis that establishing democracy – and thereby stabilizing the region – is in our national interests (Liotta & Miskel, 2004). Instead of stabilizing the region, U.S. intervention has intensified ethnic and sectarian conflict, despite the presence of “democracy.” Though the government functions as a democracy in the narrow, contemporary sense of the term, the political system lacks broad social support. Corruption is rampant, even at the highest levels of government, and cabinet ministers routinely boycott parliamentary sessions (Liotta & Miskel, 2004). Though Iraqis turn out to vote in presidential elections, the system is largely dysfunctional. The creation of formal democracy – with elections, checks and balances, and a limited-term leader – has failed to ensure substantive democracy. For democracy to be efficient in the short-term or successful in the long run, it must come from within.

In Malawi, democratization was financially encouraged by external actors. In 1995, the country voted for multiparty democracy, ushering in significant international funding for democratizing reforms. During this transition, the general public had very little influence on the formation of new political institutions. Dissatisfied with the system, many key political figures withdrew from the governing process, leaving the construction of a new legal and institutional framework in the hands of an elite national group that was not representative of the Malawian population (Kendall, 2003, p. 261). The political reforms undertaken by this group failed to tackle the highly unequal economic, political, and social systems that had been established during the country’s colonial era. Today, Malawians have less food security, have poorer health, and live shorter lives than they did before Malawi became a democracy. The reforms did not benefit the general public, were not publicly supported, and today, are largely ineffective. Because Malawians themselves were not instrumental in the development of their democratization, their government has been largely inefficient and unsuccessful.

Meaningful Democracy in Developing Countries

Because externally instituted democracies often lack broad public support or participation, they are rarely meaningfully “democratic.” Though many citizens may vote in presidential elections, they are rarely involved in more substantial decision-making processes. Though many contemporary theorists may quantify democracy in terms of electoral participation, other elements are necessary for substantive democracy. Citizens must not only be able to choose between predetermined alternatives but must collectively deliberate in such a way as to make electoral choices meaningful. The general public must be actively engaged in political activity and organizing, and this activity must meaningfully determine the choices that appear in the ballot box. For democracy to be meaningful, it must come from within.

In Tunisia, external forces played a large role in the development of democracy in the early 2000s. During this time, the European Union promoted democracy through its relationship with President Zine el Abidine Bin Ali. In doing so, the European Union expressed support for substantive democracy, espousing the traditional rhetoric of equality, justice, and freedom of political speech. In practice, however, the European Union discouraged political freedom by suppressing political actors who advocated alternative political systems, invoking the need for regime stability in the region (Powel, 2009). The actions of the European Union in Tunisia reveal a preference for stability – something which benefits the security interests of developed countries – over substantive democracy for the people.

The Necessity of Internal Reform

In developing countries, internally motivated reform is necessary for democracy to be meaningful or successful. In Ukraine in 2004, the Orange Revolution was driven by domestic actors with personal reasons for political reform. The presence of a strong internal coalition driving the process of democratization played a large role in the Orange Revolution’s significance in Ukrainian politics. Though external actors did come to support the opposition movement, the movement originated on a grassroots level from within the country itself. In keeping with Unsworth’s theory of development, the movement was broadly successful because it depended upon informal domestic institutions and relationships (2010). Rather than intervening militarily or providing financial incentives, external actors utilized their financial resources and access to technology to expose fraud and increase transparency. Statements issued by the United Nations condemned electoral fraud and played a role in the mobilization of grassroots protesters. Other external actors – including governments like the United States – provided consultative support and training for Ukrainians to mobilize effective protests and build an effective opposition party (McFaul, 2007). The supportive role played by external actors enhanced the voice of the domestic opposition group without intervening heavy-handedly or coercive, much the New Form Revolution in subsequent years. The situation in Ukraine demonstrated that external actors can play a role in the democratization process, but that their role must be primarily supportive rather than coercive. Existing domestic groups must determine their political future and may seek help from international organizations and developed countries in the process.

Concluding Thoughts

The role of external actors in the democratization of developing countries is an important issue in development politics which deserves further attention and additional research. In this paper, I’ve argued that meaningful democratic reform must come from within states and cannot be foisted upon them. Democracy must be understood in a broad sense, accounting for the political sentiments and unique needs of individual countries. A one-size-fits-all approach that focuses on elections and voting behaviors will be ineffective. In the past, international institutions and individual developed countries have involved themselves in the democratization of developing countries, intervening heavy-handedly with financial incentives, military intervention, and ideological coercion. These types of external attempts at democratization have caused more harm than good and haven’t produced meaningfully democratic democracies. In Iraq and Malawi, heavy-handed interventions disillusioned the public and decreased faith in the efficacy of the democratic process. In Tunisia, the European Union revealed a prioritization of security for developed countries over substantive political freedom of expression for Tunisians. In developing countries, internally motivated reform is necessary for democracy to be meaningful or successful. In Ukraine in 2004, the Orange Revolution was driven by domestic actors with personal reasons for political reform, contributing to the movement’s significance in transforming Ukraine’s political landscape. In each of these countries, meaningful democratic change must come from within a country to be successful. It cannot be artificially imposed by external actors.

References

Clinton, B. (1995). A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Dahl. R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kendall, N. (2003). Localizing democracy and good governance. Peace Review, 15(3): 259-266.

Liotta, P. H. & Miskel, J. F. (2004). Dangerous democracy? American internationalism and the greater Near East. Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 48(3): 437-449.

McFaul, M. (2007). Ukraine imports democracy: External influences on the Orange Revolution. International Security 32(2): 45-83.

Powel, B. T. (2009). A clash of norms: Normative power and EU democracy promotion in Tunisia. Democratization, (16): 193-214.

Unsworth, S. (2010). An Upside Down View of Governance. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.