Fathers of Two Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Ataturk and Reza Shah

Introduction

George Washington is a household name throughout the United States. David Ben-Gurion, years after his death, remains a national hero in Israel. Germans even still look to Charlemagne as an iconic figure in the creation of their state. All of this points to one of the most interesting – and telling – aspects of any nation’s history: that of its origin. How a nation-state began – the mythos, structures, and ideals upon which it is founded – often have a bearing on the nature of the state for years to come. Of course, some countries move away from their foundations, or are transformed again by renewed structural reforms (or, in the case of Iran, revolution). However, it is remarkable to note that the founding fathers of any nation often determine a great deal of that nation’s course trajectory. Reza Shah of Pahlavian Iran and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey are just two examples of this narrative. This paper is a comparative analysis of these two political figures, deeming them both the ‘fathers’ of their respective nations.

The paper finds three areas in particular that serve as a basis of comparison between the two leaders: centralization, modernization and secularization, and nationalism. Ataturk and Reza Shah may have differed widely during the course of their respective political careers, but it is on these three points that the comparison between the two leaders’ and nations’ experiences is made the clearest. Ultimately, the paper argues that because Ataturk and Reza Shah had similar obstacles to overcome and ideologies to establish, their lasting impact is too similar to be denied as comparative.

To establish a background for this thesis statement, the paper is organized into three generalized parts that build upon each other. First, the paper addresses the basic, need-to-know biographies of both Reza Shah and Ataturk – essentially their background and rise to political power. This is placed within the historical context of Iran and Turkey. Doing this will establish why these two leaders are good candidates for a comparison piece. As Ahmad Naghibzadeh states, “perhaps it is next to impossible to find two cases in the world as similar as Iran and Turkey in terms of cultural, historical and social commonalties.” These commonalties are the crux of the paper.

The paper then turns to the key areas of common objectives between the two leaders. As mentioned above, these are centralization, modernization and secularization, and nationalism. The combination of these gives the fullest possible comparative picture of the two leaders and the impact that they had on their respective nations. For clarity, these common objectives will be discussed point by point, with both Reza Shah and Ataturk discussed side by side. The majority of the paper will be spent discussing these points, as they bring to bear the most insight into the thesis statement.

Finally, the paper briefly addresses the legacies that the leaders have left behind. This also includes a discussion of how these legacies have impacted the Turkey and Iran of today, which shows the bearing that the thesis statement has on the modern political structures of the two countries. The legacy of each leader and their effect on the modern-day country they left behind is perhaps the most important part of the paper, as it bears the most influence on the political realities of today’s world – as well as on the future. Each of these sections builds upon the other – the contextualization of the leaders, their similarities, and finally their influence on the countries they created. This creates a narrative that both informs and argues for a unique comparison of the two leaders.

A Biographical Account

Before making a point-by-point comparison between Reza Shah and Ataturk, the paper must first contextualize the two leaders. Much like with any comparative analysis, conducting a preliminary look into the background and biography of Reza Shah and Ataturk will be beneficial for an overall understanding. The two leaders may have led the nationalization, modernization, centralization and secularization of two prominent Islamic countries, but their stories remain unique and separate. The goal of this is not to establish a full biography of each leader, but to provide context. As Dr. Ali Ansari says of Reza Khan, “The context of the emergence of Reza Khan is extremely important and too often people judge his rise and impact on Iranian state and society in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight and pay little or no attention to historical context. The fact that he was an outsider in every sense of the term had an important impact on his attitude towards the ruling elites of the day and vice versa.” While the biography of Ataturk may look different, the reasoning behind considering it is the same, and shall become clear throughout the discussion. By looking first to a preliminary, yet discursive, biography of each leader, the paper establishes a foundation on which an adequate comparative analysis is subsequently built.

First, Ataturk (whose real name was Mustafa Kemal) is known as being the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey. He served as Prime Minister and then President of Turkey from 1920 until his death in 1938. His surname for which he is now known was not granted to him until just four years before his death – as it literally means “Father of the Turks”. While Ataturk joined the military in the early 20th century, he had his real beginning as a military officer and leader during and in the aftermath of the First World War. After the Ottoman Empire was defeated, Ataturk was a major leader in the Turkish national movement, which found its main expression in the Turkish War of Independence. This was fought against the occupying Allies following World War I, and it was largely Ataturk’s military campaigns that lead to the victory over the Allies.

Following the establishment of Turkey as an independent state, Ataturk created a provisional government and began his work as a political figure. He “embarked upon a program of political, economic, and cultural reforms, seeking to transform the former Ottoman Empire into a modern, secular, and democratic nation-state.” These transformations and reformations were made under a specific set of principles, known as Kemalism. To this day, these principles are what modern Turkey is founded on. Kemalism was designed to “set the boundaries of the social process” in the face of the multi-faceted changes that had to occur for Turkey to be transformed into a modern, secular, democratic nation-state.

Among other things, Kemalism espoused a new kind of populism. As Ataturk himself is famous for saying, “Unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty belongs to the people.” It is this ideology that has continued to form Turkey’s national identity for years after the political leader’s death. The fundamentals of Kemalism are republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, and reformism. As this paper will show, three of these are in common with the reforms of Iran around the same time, and all of them remain relevant to Turkish politics to this day.

Reza Shah (born Reza Khan) served as the Shah of the Imperial State of Iran from 1925 until 1941, when he was forced to abdicate his seat. Reza Shah gained power by deposing the last Shah of the Oajar dynasty, Ahmad Shah Oajar and founded his own, Pahlavi dynasty. Much like Ataturk, Reza Shah’s major goal was to establish a more democratic entity in Iran. The constitutional monarchy that he established lasted until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. In this establishment, Reza Shah “introduced many social, economic, and political reforms during his reign, ultimately laying the foundation of the modern Iranian state.” Despite the fundamentalism associated with the Iranian Revolution, many of Reza Shah’s changes still maintain their influence today.

Unlike Ataturk, Reza Shah did not leave behind a major ideology, political thesis or framework. However, as Ervand Abrahamian says, he did espouse an Iran that would be “free of clerical influence, nomadic uprisings, and ethnic differences, containing European-style educational institutions, Westernized women active outside the home, and modern economic structures with state factories, communication networks, investment banks, and department stores.” These are the changes that left a lasting impact on the modern state of Iran, and are remarkably similar to the changes enacted in neighboring Turkey around the same time. But this is to be discussed later. Finally, Reza Shah was even more populist in his beginnings and initial rule. He is famously quoted as saying that “every country has its own ruling system and ours is a one-man system.” This shows that while he wanted to modernize Iran, his ultimate goal was not democratization.

Even this initial look into the beginnings and ideologies of Ataturk and Reza Shah shows that there is a clear basis for a comparative analysis. The timing, national context, and ideological aims of the two men and two situations all make a prime case for comparison in this paper. First, both reformative leaders rose to power and established their systems and changes between World War I and World War II. Second, both Turkey and Iran were Islamic populations under decentralized control, poised the Middle East for modernization and centralization. Finally, both leaders aimed to establish a lasting system outside of themselves – Ataturk established a Republic in Turkey and Reza Shah established a constitutional monarchy in Iran. All three of these establish a basis for comparison of centralization, modernization and secularization, and nationalism within the two countries for the remainder of the paper. This comparison is established in the following section.

Key Areas of Common Objective

The crux of this comparative analysis is to compare the key areas of common objective between Ataturk and Reza Shah. There are many comparisons to be made between Iran and Turkey in terms of history, culture, society, religion, and nation-states. In the same way, Reza Shah and Ataturk have many similarities for political scientists and academics to consider. However, in order to be effective, this paper focuses on just three aspects of Ataturk and Reza Shah’s common objectives: centralization, modernization and secularization, and nationalization. Despite the differences of these two leaders and their nations, these three common objectives serve as the best point of comparison. For clarity, each of these points of comparison will be discussed in turn, with Ataturk and Reza Shah placed side by side. It is this comparison that leads to the conclusion reflected in the thesis statement above. The three common objectives also mean similar legacies in the long term – legacies that are defined by the centralization, modernization and nationalization that the two political leaders created. This will, however, be addressed only after the comparison of common objectives mentioned above and discussed below.

Centralization

The first, and perhaps most important, aspect that the leadership of Ataturk and Reza Shah have in common is their emphasis on centralization. This is the first because it was necessary for any of the subsequent modernization, secularization, and nationalization reforms to take place. Because of the nature of these reforms, a centralized leadership and government was necessary for any changes to not only take effect, but to transition from an initial institutional change to a lasting, if not permanent, societal transformation. The process of centralization looked different for Ataturk and Reza Shah respectively, of course. However, they nevertheless went about the same process in order to provide the foundation of their respective institutions and governments.

Keyman and Suhnaz discuss why centralization of government and leadership was so important to subsequent changes, specifically in Turkey. They say that because a project of modernity involved conceptualizing the Turkish Republic as a nation-state, it required a set of transitions, all relevant to the common objectives discussed here, but finding their origination with centralization. The list given by the authors, made up of interconnected parts, is worth quoting at length:

(i) the transition of political authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations, that is, the rule of law; (ii) the shift from divine law as the explanation for the order of the universe to positivist and rational thinking; (iii) the shift from a community founded upon the 'elite-people cleavage' to a political community; and (iv) the transition from a religious community to a nation-state.

While these may seemingly reflect other comparisons made in this paper (such as nationalization and secularization), the major point is that they are a prerequisite for these other changes to take place. As the authors go on to conclude, “These transitions were regarded by Mustafa Kemal as the precondition for Turkey living as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization.” Ataturk (or, Kemal) recognized that in order for any of his proposed ideological reforms to take place, there had to be a centralization of government and governmental leadership. First, in a society that had been defined by personalized governance, Turkey had to turn to the rule of law. Second, this centralization required a secularization of decision-making. Third, the centralization also required a populist system – a republic, ostensibly. This is the transition to the political community from the ‘elite-people’ cleave discussed by the authors above. Finally, the centralization meant moving from a community based on loose standards to one based on a constitutional establishment of the nation-state. All of these show the importance of centralization to Ataturk in his creation of a modern and nationalized Turkey.

Very similarly to Ataturk, Reza Shah established a highly centralized form of government in his Phalavi Dynasty. The ‘one-man system’ sentiment of Reza Shah’s quoted above reflects this insistence on centralized government. Much like Ataturk’s emphasis on centralization also reflected nationalization, Reza Shah’s emphasis on centralized reflected his bent for modernization. This is seen in the state-centered endeavors undertaken under Reza Sha’s governance. As Ahmad Naghibzadeh reflects, these plans “included developing large-scale industries, implementing major infrastructure projects, building a cross-country railroad system, establishing a national public education system, reforming the judiciary, and improving health care.” This may seem most relevant to modernization, rather than centralization. However, it was the emphasis on the role of an educated polity in achieving these goals that shows Reza Shah’s insistence on a centralized government. Naghibzadeh goes on to conclude that the political leader “believed a strong, centralized government managed by educated personnel could carry out his plans.” This, more than anything, reflects the centralization shared by Reza Shah with his militaristic counterpart, Turkey’s Ataturk.

Centralization did not always mean positive change in Iran and Turkey, however. Keyman and Suhnaz also reflect on the similarities of Turkey and Iran in this regard by emphasizing the negative aspects of over-centralization in their political systems under Ataturk and Reza Shah. They say “both Turkey and Iran represent republican political formations where the state-centric constitution of modernity through nationalism has not involved democratic peace, and as a result the 'democracy deficit' has remained one of the main characteristics and problem areas of the modernization process in these countries.” While the change that was aimed for was centralization, it also meant a centralized populism that often left the democratic aspect of the respective republics wanting. In Iran especially, Reza Shah’s centralized leadership did not always mean favor among the masses. Despite his changes leading to progress and the creation of new classes, it was not long before his “rule caused dissatisfaction in Iran, particularly among religious and intellectual elites.” In this, academics see the root of the Iranian Revolution decades later. Perhaps it was Ataturk’s emphasis on populism and his status as a national hero that saved Turkey from a similar fate, but the initial similarities are sufficient for the comparison to be made.

Ultimately, the similarities that are seen between Reza Shah and Ataturk in terms of leadership and leadership style are perhaps most clear in their emphasis on centralization. Even though Reza Shah established Iran as a constitutional monarchy, he essentially acted as a slightly democratic dictator for the duration of his political career. In much the same way, Ataturk created the modern state of Turkey and then proceeded to centralize its power to ensure its development and progress along the ideological lines he had established. Whether this was smart politicking or ideological utilitarianism is another question altogether. For now, it is sufficient to note that the similarities between Reza Shah and Ataturk in this regard are too great to ignore completely.

Modernization & Secularization

While centralization may have been the most important similarity in the comparison of the leadership of Reza Shah and Ataturk, it is their shared emphasis on modernization and secularization that is the most remarkable. Both newly founded nation-states had many obstacles to overcome if they were to be truly successful and to establish themselves in the international arena. In response to these obstacles, both Reza Shah and Ataturk rested on the notion that their society had to distance itself from its religious, fundamental, and historical legacies. Keyman and Suhnaz point to this emphasis on modernization in an attempt to create a new nationalism, and their discussion is worth quoting at length:

In both countries, the modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization have constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideology status and its transformative power. Moreover, both countries represent a case for alternative modernity, since while these countries have accepted the norms and institutions of Western societal modernization; they also had to confront the challenge of establishing them in predominantly Muslim societies.

Keyman and Suhnaz make two salient points here, especially in reference to modernization and secularization. First, they stipulate that modernization was an important first step for the establishment of a new nationalism – just as centralization was a crucial precursor to the process of modernization. Second, the authors recognize that both newly founded nation-states had a unique challenge to address – the establishment of modern Western norms in Muslim society. This is why modernization in Turkey and Iran under Ataturk and Reza Shah’s governance is the most remarkable of the two countries shared characteristics. Instead of maximizing on the existing fundamentalism within their countries, the two leaders recognized that in order for their people to become (or remain) internationally relevant, a fundamental shift had to take place at the societal and cultural level. This is the shift that both leaders strove for, despite their country’s historical differences.

This process took on more or less similarity between Turkey and Iran under Ataturk and Reza Shah. Sometimes the process of modernization and political development meant a similar course of events across the countries in terms of nationalization and centralization. However, in terms of an actual ideological shift, the two cases take on different identifying factors in the process of modernization and secularization. Naghibzadeh summarizes this well by maintaining that the “that inclination to secularism in Turkey results form the Turks’ objective outlook to the world, while Iranians have insistently viewed the world from a metaphysical and mystical perspective.” Despite this difference, the author admits “The proximity of the two countries has caused them to affect each other in the process of modernization under Reza Shah and Ataturk.” This is, admittedly, a vague inference with very little verifiability about it. However, the fact that both Islamic societies modernized along the same lines, within the same timeline, shows credence to the author’s claims, making it more than believable that each leader influenced the other.

Furthermore, Naghibzadeh is not the only one who makes the claim that both countries sought modernization primarily as a response to religion. Samih Varner also says “secular regimes in Iran and Turkey shared many traits,” including “modernization from above” and the view of “Islam as the source of backwardness.” This not only reflects the centralization discussed above (which is inherently tied to modernization and secularization) but also the insistence that the newly founded nation-states had to remove themselves from historical and religious restrictions – the ‘source’ of their ‘backwardness’. Contrasted with this source was the promise of political, institutional, industrial, cultural and international development within the two countries.

Keyman and Suhnaz also recognized religion as a barrier to development in both Iran specifically, noting that the “republican elite sought to create a state distinct from the person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of individual faith. For them, the state had to involve commitment to political modernity, meaning that the link between the modernization of the polity and that of society had to be established by the state.” In other words, it was the role of the newly established Imperial State of Iran. The state could not wait for culture and society to walk down its own path – instead, it had to speed things up a bit. This was, it is worth noting, only possible through the centralized system established by Reza Shah in the first place. Finally, Dr. Ali Ansari also notes this view in Reza Shah, saying that he fell into line with enlightenment philosophy with the view that “irrational religion was contradictory to progress.” In other words, in order to be successful, a secular state had to distance itself from official religion. Reza Shah definitely fulfilled his words with actions – under his leadership, women studied law and medicine, doctors were able to dissect human bodies, and public places were heavily fined if they did not allow both sexes to enter. The secularization (or, modernization) sought by Reza Shah was not only relevant in terms of domestic policy. It also brought to bear in international policy making – which was, ostensibly, one of the major points of modernization.

If the reader needed any further confirmation of the similarities in the pursuit of modernization between Reza Shah and Ataturk, this was it. Both leaders fundamentally saw Islam as a barrier to the true progress they sought within their nation-states. While the cultures and the societies found with Turkey and Iran may have differed (albeit not by much, given the shared Islamic faith among the populations), it is the leaders that primarily shared interests, pursuits, and methods. This is where the comparison is made: on Reza Shah and Ataturk’s emphasis on the absolute need for modernization. This was one of the steps toward success for both leaders.

Of course, there are many more instances of modernization that may be relevant to the discussion – that is, how each leader sought to bring about this desired modernization. However, for the sake of this paper’s thesis and the comparative analysis, it is more than sufficient to say that both leaders thought of modernization as a prerequisite for the success of their polity. As their legacies show, both leaders largely succeeded in their campaigns for modernization. There is not space to note the particulars of this success in this paper, but the bearing that modernization had on the legacies of Reza Shah and Ataturk will be noted in the final section of the paper. Before these legacies are discussed, however, there is one final point of comparison to take into consideration.

Nationalism

The final point of comparison between Reza Shah of Iran and Ataturk of Turkey is perhaps the most obvious, given the fact that both leaders established brand-new political systems within newly declared independent states. As Keyman and Suhnaz note, “Nationalism had operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to modernity in both Turkey and Iran” and the two countries “constitute one of the important and interesting cases in demonstrating how nationalism has been able to maintain its presence both ideologically and politically in modern times, and to understand its system-defining and system-transforming power even today.” The key point by these authors is nationalism in Turkey and Iran as both system-defining and system-transforming. In a conundrum-like sequence of events, it was both the centralization and modernization of the systems in Iran and Turkey that allowed a national identity to be formed and the shift toward nationalism itself that allowed for centralization and modernization to take place. This may seem contradictory, but only goes to show that the three common objects that are analyzed in this comparison are, without a doubt, completely interlinked. As with the preceding two points, this is true of both Turkey under Ataturk and Iran under Reza Shah.

In the case of Turkey and the leadership of Ataturk, centralization and modernization only served to culminate in the ideal of a new nationalism. Before even Ataturk took power as a national political figure, the Young Turk movement expressed the ideal of modernization as the saving grace of the Ottoman state. This is what Ataturk built his ideology upon from the very beginning. As Keyman and Suhnaz state, “The making of modern Turkey brought about a rupture with the Ottoman past, with the emergence of the nation-state, and in that context nationalism was situated in the process of making in direct relation to the process of state building.” In other words, nationalism was not a natural product but a conscious and concerted campaign initiated by a centralized, modernized state. Ataturk sought to reestablish Turkey’s national pride by rooting it in modern developments and secular values – essentially divorcing nationalism from both unsavory historical roots and unsustainable religious mores. This was, for all intents and purposes, the final ‘step’ in establishing the Republic of Turkey as a contender on the world stage. This form of nationalism, based on Turkish pride, has remained salient to this day.

Reza Shah also relied on the process and ideal of secularism to shape Iranian nationalism in his time – with the stated goal undeniably to weaken the amount of influence that Islam had on Iran. Under Reza Shah, nationalism in Iran took on a distinctly secular tone from early 20th century onward. One distinct example of this is Reza Shah’s initiative to change the names of cities and towns, which often bore religious names. The leader changed the names of these places to reflect Iran’s pre-Islamic history, to bear names that honored Persian mythological heroes and real-life kings. This effort essentially reduced the influence of local mullahs by modernizing Iran at the local level. As Keyman & Suhnaz state, this process by the Pahlavi dynasty set Iran “irrevocably down the road towards infusing the country with a form of secular nationalism.” The momentum down this road lasted well after Reza Shah was no longer in power. A decade later, in 1951, Iran reconfirmed its nationalism with the nationalization of the oil resources in the country. The reemphasis on pre-Islamic, romantic nationalism remained engrained in the Islamic Republic until the resentment grew into the Iranian Revolution fifty years later. This, much like with the centralization and modernization, is one difference found between the two leaders in the long run. However, the similarities are too clear to be completely ignored.

Dr. Ali Ansari, an Iranian expert, admits that there is a comparison to be made between Reza Shah’s nationalism and Ataturk’s. He is careful to note, however, that the comparison must be made carefully. When asked about the significance of Reza Shah’s visit to Turkey to meet Ataturk in 1934, Ansari simply says “I think they saw each other as kindred spirits but it is wrong to assume too much imitation.” There are, of course, differences in the two leaders’ emphasis on and encouragement of nationalism that distinguished them as leaders of their respective countries. However, the similarities here (just as with the common objectives of centralization and modernization) are too great to be denied in the grand scheme of things. The fact that Ataturk and Reza Shah initiated many of the same reforms under much of the same ideology shows that they were, indeed, ‘kindred spirits’ in the true sense of the phrase. The comparison here is one of necessity – both Reza Shah and Ataturk introduced a new, or at the very least revitalized, nationalism in their respective countries. This, in no small part, comes to bear on their legacies. The legacies of Reza Shah and Ataturk are the final part of this paper’s comparative analysis.

The Legacy of the Leaders

The legacy of Reza Shah and Ataturk is another question altogether, but one that must be asked if this comparative analysis is to be made complete. While the comparison between the two leaders in terms of their common objectives may show that the leaders had more similarity than not, a comparison of their lasting legacy shows many differences. Ultimately, it is quite clear that Ataturk left a more lasting legacy, one that established him as a national hero – the national hero of Turkey. In contrast, Reza Shah’s centralized secularization was too much for a country enmeshed in Islamism. While the nationalism that he created lasted after his rule, it was Reza Shah’s insistence on centralized rule embodied in his person (rather than in rule of law, as in Turkey) that ultimately led to the backlash of the Iranian Revolution in the 1970s. There are, however, important comparisons to make in terms of the leaders’ legacies in modern Turkey and Iran.

The comparison is made on what the leaders left, rather than on the men themselves. Ahmad Naghibzadeh makes this comparison in terms of the two countries’ political development. His analysis, which is the conclusion of his comparisons, is worth quoting at length:

The history of political development in Iran and Turkey reveals that these two societies have been seriously involved in the phenomenon of Western modernity and have attempted differing ways to adopt the Western civilization. The strategies adopted by the two countries have been, at times, convergent and at times divergent, but the final result has been more or less the same. This progress in Iran and Turkey can pave the way for the enhancement of political development in the future.

Simply put, both Ataturk and Reza Shah established the normalization of political development along modernized lines. Without these two leaders, it is impossible to tell where Turkey and Iran would stand in relationship to the rest of the Western world. Even Iran, which has returned to Islamic rule and mores after the Iranian Revolution, remains impacted by the modernization (and even secularization) established by Reza Shah. As Dr. Ali Ansari says of Reza Shah’s legacy, he “provided the political will and the muscle, but many of the ideas came from elsewhere. He was in many ways the enabler.” This is the legacy that Reza Shah has left on Iran – an enabler of political development, but an enablement that went away with his reign. In contrast, the legacy of Ataturk was one that lasted outside of his own personhood. He established a centralized and constitutional power that still remains (for better or for worse) to this day.

Outside of the legacies left by Reza Shah and Ataturk, the question remains of how these two leaders impacted their respective countries in the modern day. Naghibzadeh gives some great insight into this, saying that the result of the two leaders’ rules “would be the rationality of the bureaucratic apparatus and increased efficiency of the political system and state in Turkey and the populist nature of and strengthened authority of the political system in Iran.” For all their similarities in leadership styles and ideologies, the two leaders left behind some very different institutions. Reza Shah ultimately served to strengthen the authority of the political system as a whole in Iran, while Ataturk created a bureaucratic system that Turkey had never seen before. Whether these influences on the modern-day Turkey and Iran were something that Ataturk and Reza Shah envisioned in their reforms is another question - they are both still war-torn countries with Turney having experienced a bombing in Istanbul. However, it is clear that without these two leaders’ emphasis on centralization, modernization and secularization, and nationalism, Turkey and Iran would look very different than the two nation-states that we see today.

Conclusion

This paper began with the stipulation that how a nation-state begins, how its mythos, structures, and ideals are created, often have a bearing on the nature of the state in the long run. Through this comparative analysis of the leadership of Ataturk and Reza Shah in the beginnings of Turkey and Iran, this stipulation has been more than verified. The comparison has been made in terms of their emphasis on centralization, their insistence on modernization and secularization, and their creation of a new nationalism in their home countries. Ultimately, the paper finds that on each point, the leaders have more similarities than they do differences. In the same way, a comparison of the two leaders’ legacies shows that the two held much in common and continue to hold much in common years after their death. Both are looked to as national heroes or, at the very least, influential in the current state of affairs, almost a century later. It is for this reason that both Ataturk and Reza Shah can be accurately deemed the ‘fathers’ of their respective nations, Turkey and Iran. These fathers have, for better or for worse, largely determined the course that these two Middle Eastern, quasi-modernized, quasi-religious nation-states have taken. And it is their greatest accomplishment.

Bibliography

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