Grand Strategy for the World’s Only Superpower

Developing a grand strategy for the United States is not implying that the country has some magnificent design for its future (as some may interpret the word ‘grand’). Rather, in this context, ‘grand’ implies an overarching purpose or a strategy designed to balance the national means of the U.S. to its national objectives. A coherent grand strategy takes into consideration the domestic environment as well as the global environment and recommends the most effective ways to protect U.S. interests in light of that reality (Posen and Ross 5). In other words, a grand strategy seeks to clarify the role the U.S. will play in the global community and how that role is explained. According to Posen and Ross, there are “Four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the U.S. role in the world, that now compete in our public discourse; They may be termed neo-isolationism; selective engagement; cooperative security; and primacy” (5). This paper examines the arguments made in three specific articles for U.S. grand strategy and selects one that is the most persuasive. In addition, this proposed strategy is compared to one of the strategies identified by Posen and Ross (5) and its possible weakness is examined as well.

In several ways, the authors of the three articles reviewed for this paper (Feinstein and Slaughter; Nordlinger; and Rosen) agreed in terms of the position held by the U.S. in the global environment. For example, all acknowledged that the U.S. will remain the dominant world power for the foreseeable future, while also noting the limited options available for unilaterally dictating the consequences of every global outcome. They further agreed that fiscal limitations place specific constraints on the U.S., requiring strategic choices to be made, which is all the more reason why developing a grand strategy is critical.

Nevertheless, each of the authors also views the strategic environment from a different perspective. While the articles are written by Feinstein and Slaughter (136-150), Nordlinger (64-91), and Rosen (51-61) all reach an overall consensus regarding the classification of U.S. national interests, they disagree on the proper way that these interests should be prioritized. One of the authors, Nordlinger (64), proposed a grand strategy featuring limited retrenchment or isolationism of America. His primary reasoning for this strategy was a belief that it is necessary for the U.S. to conserve its economic and military power if it hopes to maintain its position of leadership in the world. In particular, Nordlinger argued against an interventionist policy since, in his opinion, leadership can be maintained without the U.S. continuously needing to control events around the world (87). While global interventionism as a broad strategy is certainly to be avoided, the opposite extreme—isolationism—is similarly a flawed strategy. Nordlinger’s argument is perhaps the least persuasive of the three articles examined.

A second proposed grand strategy, by Rosen (51), suggested pursuing a policy that is diametrically opposed to isolationism. According to this grand strategy, Rosen suggested that U.S. grand strategy should embrace the notion of maintaining and embracing the idea of an American empire (51). To accomplish this goal, the author proposed taking whatever steps are necessary to regain any and all leverage the U.S. may have lost in strategic regions around the world. Another key element of his strategy was to maintain defense spending at a very high level and resist any proposed cutbacks. Rosen’s (51-61) vision of U.S. strategy is based squarely on a strong military presence in combination with heading off the potential for rival nations to gain a standing that could compete with U.S. world dominance. The author further argued that the U.S. should actively intervene anywhere in the world to maintain global stability, even if the vital interests of the U.S. were not threatened. In summary, Rosen claimed that U.S. policy should be to fully embrace the responsibilities of an empire and always take a leading position in global events since interventionist tactics are rarely as detrimental as many suggest (61). While it is necessary for the U.S. to remain engaged in world events, this strategy is also lacking, since touting itself as an ‘empire’ is not an effective strategy the nation can use to maintain global stability.

In contrast to the two preceding authors, the most convincing argument for a practical U.S. grand strategy was proposed by Feinstein and Slaughter (136-150) who maintained that the U.S. needs to guarantee security domestically while also providing assurances of security to allies and others in the global community. This proposal is in stark contrast to those suggested by the previous authors since it does not recommend that the U.S. isolate itself from world affairs, but neither does it imply that America should broadly assert its power worldwide simply to ensure its status as a superpower. Rather, these authors suggest a strategy that recognizes the position of the U.S. as having a moral responsibility as a world power to prevent certain nations, rogue or otherwise, from obtaining weapons that would threaten the security of other nations.

The basic premise of the grand strategy suggested by Feinstein and Slaughter is referred to as “a duty to prevent” (136). This concept was inspired by the earlier doctrine called “The Responsibility to Protect”, established in 2001, and based on the ideal that member nations of the U.N. have a responsibility to intervene in any country or region where the “lives, liberty, and basic human rights of their citizens” are jeopardized (Feinstein and Slaughter 137). However, in addition to the basic moral obligation of the U.S. to intervene in specific cases around the world, it is also in the national interest of America to do so as well. This is especially true when weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are involved, since an escalation in these weapons anywhere in the world constitutes a potential threat to the U.S. The authors clearly made the point that the world of the twenty-first century is far different from that experienced by previous generations of Americans, which was populated by rival sovereign states that postured or fought against one another with conventional forces and conventional weapons.

Feinstein and Slaughter’s strategy most closely resembles Posen and Ross’ grand strategy called “selective engagement” (5). In one way, the strategy of selective engagement is similar to the philosophies espoused by neo-isolationists inasmuch as both strategies realize that the possession of nuclear weapons (or other WMDs) provides nations the ability to protect the existing state of affairs—a balance of power, so to speak. One of the primary differences in the two, however, is that selective engagement appreciates the potential for miscalculations and even the failure of deterrence. Therefore, adopting a grand strategy that is closely related to selective engagement allows the U.S. to intervene whenever and wherever the need arises, recognizing that the duty to protect (Feinstein and Slaughter 136) includes intervening in regions that pose the greatest potential threats (Posen and Ross 18). With the U.S. asserting its role as a leader, but in a controlled and balanced manner, serious threats to U.S. national interests may be averted.

Any strategy contains perceived weaknesses, and that is also the case with the proposal of Feinstein and Slaughter (136-150). For example, a duty to prevent (or selective engagement) will often fail to distinguish between so-called ‘minor’ concerns that should merit a response or intervention by the U.S. and those that do not (Posen and Ross 22). There will always be debates regarding which countries or regions are most likely to be the most problematic, which implies the potential for errors in judgment or miscalculation. However, if these issues are carefully examined and categorized based on threat potential, the likelihood of failure is minimized.

Another weakness, at least from the perspective of neo-isolationists such as Nordlinger (64), is that the U.S. is forced to remain in a position of military preparedness and even make it clear that military options are always available in an attempt to maintain relative peace. Hence, from the isolationist viewpoint, the most effective way to ensure peace is simply to avoid any interference in the affairs of other nations. This argument fails to take into consideration that the U.S. did not start the aggression in the two world wars and only entered them after a great deal of deliberation and weighing of options. Additionally, the policy of the U.S. during the Cold War (one of activism, or selective engagement) likely prevented the expansion of the Soviet Union and possibly a war between the two then-existing superpowers. Consequently, it may be concluded that selective engagement prevented a greater conflict rather than encouraged one.

The logic behind the grand strategy proposed by Feinstein and Slaughter (136-150) is sound and based on the realization that any rogue regime (or group) is capable of pursuing its goals toward obtaining WMDs without raising any alarms in the international community related to treaty violations or other restrictions (Feinstein and Slaughter 137). A grand strategy of selective engagement, or acting on the duty to prevent, allow the U.S. to intervene in the activities of countries that are known to enable (or even actively provide) the means and knowledge required to construct WMDs, including nuclear weapons.

This paper briefly assessed the proposed U.S. strategies contained in three articles (Feinstein and Slaughter 136-150; Nordlinger 64-91; and Rosen 51-61) in comparison to the list of four grand strategies described by Posen and Ross (5-53). The strategy suggested by Feinstein and Slaughter, called “a duty to prevent” (136) was deemed most convincing and closely resembling the grand strategy of selective engagement. Despite the perceived weaknesses of this strategy, it would best address U.S. interests as well as fulfill its responsibilities as the world’s only remaining superpower. Any grand strategy must meet these two requirements and also enable the country to pursue its interests anywhere in the world. While no strategy—grand or otherwise—is perfect, the selected strategy does present a highly coherent vision for the U.S.

Works Cited

Feinstein, Lee and Anne-Marie Slaughter. A Duty to Prevent. Foreign Affairs, 83.1 (2004):136-150.

Nordlinger, Eric E. Isolationism Reconfigured (pp. 64-91). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy. International Security, 21.3 (1996-1997):5-53.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. An Empire, if you can keep it. National Interest, 71 (2003):51-61.