The Green Movement and the Arab Spring

Introduction

The protests following the 2009 Iran presidential elections were thought by some to have had a very influential role in the uprisings that swept the Arab World during 2011.  The protests have since coalesced into a movement for change known as the green movement.  The uprisings in the Arab World were widely dubbed the Arab Spring.  These uprisings seemed to presage a new era of democratic governance in the Middle and Near East.  This paper will examine what, if any, connections there are between the Iranian green movement and the more widespread Arab Spring of two years later.  It will also explore how the regime response to each movement was similar as well as different.  It is the thesis of this paper that, while the green movement may have had some influence on the Arab uprisings, it was not the main source of inspiration for them.  

After the current introduction, this paper is divided into three main sections.  The first section will focus specifically on the regime in Iran as well as the green movement.  The second section will focus on the regimes of the Arab Middle East affected by the 2011 uprisings for reform. The third section will bring together the research from each social movement into a discussion that compares and contrasts each one. 

1. Section one: The Green Movement

Ahmadinejad and Neo-Principalism

The roots of the 2009 Iranian presidential election crisis appear to have been laid years earlier in the first election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005.  Ahmadinejad was an ex-member of the Basij.  According to Safshekan and Sabet (2010, 543) the Basij Popular Mobilization Force is one of five branches of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and serves as Iran's paramilitary reserve force (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 543).  The other branches of the IRGC are the ground, air, navy and Quds forces.  The Basij mobilized non-professional war volunteers to the front during the Iran-Iraq war. In the post-war period, the Basij performed a number of different tasks in support of the IRGC. These tasks included riot suppression and security and intelligence gathering in places of employment and schools.  

The IRGC was originally established in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  It was directed by the Ayatollah Khomeini to protect the newly established Iranian republic.  But since that time, it has grown from a national defense force into a powerful social, political and economic security network within the Iranian state.  Safshekan and Sabet (2010, 544) argue that the IRGC and Ahmadinejad are advocates of the Neo-Principalist ideology. Neo-Principalism is the political expression of the IRGC leaders who became active in Iranian politics in the 2003 City and Village Council elections.  They consider themselves Developers of Islamic Iran and are thus committed to creating a theocratic state based on a form of Islamism.

The Neo-Principalists advanced a political strategy of attaining power in Iran that is called the Masquerade Coup d'état.  This strategy involves the acquisition of power by means of official electoral and more coercive and less overt methods.  The election of Neo-Principalists to office in the City and Village Council elections (2003), the Parliamentary elections or Majlis (2004), and the 2005 presidential election, has coincided with their assumption of control over the Iranian state's economic and bureaucratic organizations (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 544).  The authors argue that the 2009 Iranian presidential crisis is the culmination of the work of the Masquerade Coup.  In the wake of this crisis, a significant protest movement emerged to attempt to block the results of what was widely seen as a fraudulent election.  This movement is also known as the green movement.  In reaction to the green movement, the Neo-Principalist faction has been forced to further consolidate their hold on the Iranian state in ways that resemble a coup d'état.  

Neo-Principalist political ideology has notable anti-clerical, authoritarian, nationalistic, and pragmatic affinities.  It has been compared with China in that it maintains a staunch authoritarian political culture with an emphasis on capitalist economic development (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 550).  This type of state sponsored capitalism might also be considered fascist in nature.

The agenda of neo-Principalist ideologues prescribes eliminating or neutralizing the political influence of opposition elements and factions.  For instance, after 2005 a purge targeting associates of former President Hashemi-Rafsanjani from the Oil Ministry was undertaken.  Also, Ahmadinejad disbanded the Planning and Budget Commission thereby reserving for himself tremendous freedom in fiscal matters without any other governmental oversight.  IRGC responsibilities overlap considerably with those of another state apparatus: the MoIS.  Since 2005, the senior leaders of crucial security organizations, such as the MoIS, has been replaced with IRGC members in what amounts to a systematic purge.  

Iranian Political System: A Brief Review

Before proceeding to discuss the details leading up to the 2009 presidential crisis it is helpful describe some aspects of how the Iranian political system functions.  Taheri (2009, 291) points out that since the 1979 Revolution, elections in Iran have taken on the character of a political primary in a US election.  Iran is a typical one-party state where genuine political opposition is treated with censorship, imprisonment, murder and exile.  However, it does permit some dissension within that one-party structure.  The vast majority of candidates are disqualified from running by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is a 12-member council of jurists mandated by the Iranian Constitution.  The Council possess wide-ranging powers over the country ("Will Iran See," 2013).  But if it so desires, the Guardian Council can permit some diversity of discussion in political campaigns by allowing candidates with dissenting views to be admitted to the slate. 

Nevertheless, the participation of candidates with views differing from the regime, such as a reformist agenda, may sometimes be allowed to provide some limited representation of the political preferences of the masses of Iranian voters.  But such decisions are generally made at the behest of the Supreme Guide.  The Guide is the political actor who actually decides who runs the country.  Therefore, he is the one individual in whom real power over the Iranian regime is invested not the elected officials.  All Iranian presidents must receive the blessing of the Supreme Guide before being able to take office.  Thus, the Ayatollah can literally make or break presidencies on a whim (Taheri 2009, 291-292).  

Lead up to Electoral Crisis

Ahmadinejad faced serious criticism over the many facets of his political, economic and social program.  The introduction of gas rationing in June 2007 led to a high degree of discontent among large segments of the population (Sanandaji 2009, 621).  It was notable that dissatisfaction had become widespread enough to affect members of the political elite. This prompted both reformist and conservative opposition to Ahmadinejad in the run up to the Eighth Majles Election. However, reformist candidates were not allowed much voice in the election campaign.  This left the main opposition view to come from within the conservative ranks itself.    

The conservative split was between moderate and more extremist wings.  The former was led by Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf and Ali Larijani.  The latter was aligned with Ahmadinejad himself and seemed to presage a more moderating influence in Iranian politics.  The Guardian Council's screening process ensured that a significant reformist presence was absent in the election.  Still Ahmadinejad's United Principalist Front still managed to take barely one-quarter of the Majles seats.  His opposition took 55 percent of the seats and included the Grand Principalist Coalition as the significant opposition.  This seemed to validate the argument that a consensus for Ahmadinejad's radical agenda didn't exist and that more moderation was needed.  This seemed augur ill for Ahmadinejad's support heading into the 2009 presidential elections.  

Mousavi and the Green Movement

Mousavi, more formally known as Mir-Hossein Mousavi Khamenehi, was born in the Iranian town of Shabestar into a family of Azerbaijani origin in 1941.  His family claims descent from the seventh imam of duodecimal Shiism named Musa bin Jaafar (Taheri 2009, 295).  Thus, Mousavi sometimes uses the honorific sayyid to highlight his illustrious ancestry.  He chose to use the color green as his own campaign color during the 2009 Presidential election because it was the color of the Bani-Hashem.  The Bani-Hashem were an offshoot of the Quraish tribe which is said to be the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad (Taheri 2009, 295).  This claim of direct descent from such a hallowed lineage was an attempt to legitimize Mousavi's campaign against Ahmadinejad, who has a much more modest heritage.  

Mousavi's ideology switched from Marxism to Islamism as the organizing principle for an Islamic state once the Pahlavi dynasty was removed.  After the 1979 Revolution he enjoyed a fast rise in political life becoming foreign minister in 1980.  At the time he advocated a militant anti-Western ideology.  A year later he became prime minister.  He occupied that post for nearly eight years before moving on to become premier.  During 1985 he opened secret channel negotiations with the Reagan Administration in an effort to normalize diplomatic relations between the US and Iran.  But fell into a conflict between him and another Iranian leader, Rafsanjani.  Rafsanjani was also undertaking secret negotiations with the US.  When Mousavi was dropped by the US in favor of Rafsanjani, he decided to expose all the secret talks.  The resulting Irangate scandal led to the termination of all diplomatic communication between Iran and the US.  

This move led to Rafsanjani to strike back at Mousavi by abolishing the office of prime minister via a constitutional amendment.  Thus, terminating Mousavi's participation in political life for the next two decades. In a validation of the phrase "politics makes strange bedfellows," Rafsanjani supported Mousavi in 2009 as the better option to lead Iran than Ahmadinejad.  Unfortunately, no one knows what kind of president Mousavi would even have made. 

Green Movement and Electoral Crisis

That the 2009 presidential election is considered fraudulent is suspected by many sources and observers.  The only critics of the green movement are the members of the Ahmadinejad presidency and its various institutional allies, including the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenehi.  The reelection of Ahmadinejad was thought to be deeply in doubt as recently as a year earlier.  Iran had experienced a deep economic recession brought on by the world financial crisis combined with domestic economic policies that did little to relieve unemployment for the urban middle class.  

When the 2009 election was complete Ahmadinejad had won 62% of the vote. Mousavi, his strongest competitor, got only 38%.  Voter turnout estimates prior to the vote were thought to be around 60% of eligible voters.  But according to the election returns, some districts returned voter participation rates of 100%.  In fact, this margin of difference appeared to be completely fictitious. The vast majority of voters, and even some members of the political and economic elite, were incredulous. It's notable that a recount was ordered amounting to about 10% of the total votes cast. Even more incredulously the margin of Ahmadinejad's victory actually increased following the recount.  

Following the June 2009 election Iran was struck with massive protests in Tehran and other cities.  The government's response was one of immediate and brutal repression.  Security forces attacked peaceful demonstrators and many observers view this uprising as the first such in the nation's history to be on par with the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010, 78; Khosronejad 2011, 396).   Thousands of protestors were arrested and hundreds of them were tortured.  It is thought over 70 people were killed.  The IRGC executed what can be called a kind of terrorism by attacking private shops, vehicles and private homes.  Protestors are being tried and sentenced in what can be described as show trials.  The regime is using these trials to discredit opposition views.  Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony was attended by thousands of security staff who seemed to signal that martial law had been established. 

The green movement had effectively been crushed.  Tahmasebi-Birgani (2010, 81), in her work on the role of women in the movement, says that the only daily resistance to the Iranian state has been that of women meeting in rallies.  These women observe the Gandhian principle of non-violence and meet to protest the imprisonment of their husbands, fathers and sons.  When security forces confront them, the women respond by giving them flowers.  They also observe the principle of silence in their protests.  They disregard any insults that security personnel may hurl at them during rallies.  This method is used to shame security staff, enforcing the policies of an oppressive government, into leaving them alone.  

In recent years, the Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenehi's support has swung from taking an oppositional stance on Ahmadinejad's reelection to a much more supportive one.  Khamanehi has stood with Ahmadinejad in spite of the numerous protests in the wake of the election crisis (Taheri 2009, 297).  Khamanehi is reported to have described the election of Ahmadinejad as both a miracle and a triumph for Islam.  His comments are notable for being the first time he has ever publicly commented on the results of an election. Interestingly Ahmadinejad has experienced a diminished public role since his reelection.  For a week after the election Ahmadinejad was not seen or heard from on either broadcast television or radio.  Many observers believe the Islamic Republic of Iran has been replaced with the Islamic Emirate with Khamenehi it's true sole authority.  Many members of the opposition boycotted the Friday gathering after the election. Almost half of the Islamic Majlis did not attend, nor most of the Assembly of Experts.  The Assembly is a group of 92 mullahs who supervise the work of the Supreme Guide (Taheri 2009, 297).  

2. Section two: Arab Spring

This section will discuss the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa known as the Arab Spring.  According to Delacoura (2012, 63) the Arab Spring has been compared to the end of Communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  That is, as a time of optimism regarding a shift from an authoritarian political order to an era of consolidated democratic governance.  While that post-communist transition to democracy has also hit some speed bumps, particularly in Russia, it is generally thought to be a success.  In the two years since the Arab Spring this same optimism has waned in the Middle East.  In 2011 the Arab Spring was considered to be revolutionary.  However, now it is considered to be more an uprising or a crisis than a dramatic shift towards modernity in a political and cultural paradigm.  What follows below is a country by country overview of the major events of the Arab Spring.  There will be six country case studies below.  The cases are for Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. These cases will flesh out the details needed to answer questions posed in the final section of the paper. 

Tunisia

The Arab Spring can be said to have begun in Tunisia in December 2010 with the death of Muhammad Buazizi.  Buazizi, a father of eight, was not particularly well educated.  But he did earn a decent income selling vegetables from his cart.  It was work the 26-year-old had engaged in for several years.  His vegetable cart was unlicensed, and this meant that police would periodically confiscate it.  However, he could always have it returned with the payment of a fine equivalent to about a day's earnings.  On the fateful day he died, the police officer wasn't content with payment of the fine. Instead she humiliated Buazizi by slapping him, spitting in his face and insulting his family.  Buazizi tried to see local officials to log a complaint.  But they refused to see him.  So less than an hour after the confrontation on December 17th, he poured gasoline over himself and set it on fire.  He died from his injuries a few weeks later (Abouzeid 2011). 

The incident caused so much outrage that even Tunisia's authoritarian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, visited Buazizi in the hospital about two weeks after the self-immolation. But it was not enough.  Demonstrations spread to neighboring cities and the Ben Ali regime responded with repression.  According to Delacoura (2012, 64) popular mobilization was mostly spontaneous.  But the country's main trade union and members of several professional associations soon joined in the organizing.  The repression increased in response.  But about a week after Buazizi died it suddenly subsided.  The army indicated that it would no longer take action against the protestors.  By January 14th, 2011 a general strike was launched, and Ben Ali left the country for Saudi Arabia.  

A national unity government and interim president were appointed not long after with incumbent Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi in charge.  His ties to the regime of Ben Ali meant he couldn't last long, and he resigned in late February.  His replacement in the national unity government was Beji Caid Essebsi, a completely new face on the national political scene.  A transitional government was put in place by early April that included representatives from virtually all of the country's political and social organizations and factions.  Finally, in October elections to a Constituent Assembly were held with the largest share of seats going to the previously banned Al-Nahdi party, an Islamist group.  A new constitution was written. Tunisia is a work in progress.  But in its movement to remove a dictator is so far a success.  

Egypt

In Egypt, seeing a dictator like Ben Ali so swiftly deposed was received as an encouraging sign.  It in fact energized political action within Egypt.  Cairo demonstrations in late January were attended by tens of thousands of protestors.  Protests soon spread throughout the capital and the country gaining momentum heading into a "day of rage" on January 28.  The next day Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak announced he was forming a new government.  As there were concerns that he was grooming his son as his dynastic successor, Mubarak named a figure from the General Intelligence Service. But it was too little too late.  The protestors were now openly calling for Mubarak to resign.   At the same time, civilian police withdrew from the protests and were replaced by the army.  This was taken as a signal that the military was now Egypt's effective authority and it was welcomed by the protestors ("Popular protest" 2011, 5).

In response Mubarak organized counterdemonstrations as a show to protestors that many Egyptians were still loyal to his regime. He also announced he would not stand for re-election when his term officially ended in September 2011. This only led to a temporary abatement in the protests.  Demonstrations continued and protestors permanently moved into Tahrir Square.  Wildcat strikes were also organized.  Mubarak's last speech came in February and shortly after it, Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), usually convened only during wartime, announced that it supported the protestors demands.   On February 11 the transfer of power became official and six months after Mubarak, his sons and key regime figures all stood trial.  

But the transition to democracy would be a halting one.  The military seemed as if it might turn back on its promises to allow free elections.  But ultimately elections were held.  The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization, gained the largest share of seats and its leader, Muhammad Morsi was elected president.  Unfortunately, Morsi began a number of authoritarian reforms himself.  After about a year in power calls for his resignation were resoundingly heard.  When Morsi refused to resign the protestors staged a repeat of the Mubarak strategy of national protest.  Morsi was forced out of office and at the time of this writing is in hiding.  Egypt remains a nation in transition. At the moment it stands on a shaky precipice of progress or failure with an uncertain outcome.  However, its short-term goal of regime change was successful.  

Libya

The swift departures of two dictators sent shockwaves throughout the Middle and Near East.  Suddenly authoritarian rulers in numerous states were fearful of their futures.  Just a few days after Mubarak was deposed, protests erupted in Egypt's neighbor Libya.  The protests against Muammar Qadhafi began in the country's second largest city, Benghazi and spread virtually everywhere except for the capital city of Tripoli.  The spearhead of the protests was a group known as the National Transition Council (NTC).  

The turning point for the regime was the involvement of external forces particularly led by NATO after a UN Security Council vote of confidence.  As of this writing it is the only Arab state in which foreign military intervention played a direct role in regime change.  The difference of Libya from most of the other Middle and Near Eastern states was its long history of supporting terrorism against the West.  This likely meant Qadhafi was not going to receive much sympathy if foreign forces assisted with local militias in removing him.  Nevertheless, the conflict was a difficult one and has claimed a still indeterminate number of lives (Delacoura 2012, 65).   Qadhafi was eventually tortured and murdered in mid-late October by resistance forces.  Even with Qadhafi gone, Libya remains in a precarious position as it is unclear whether the transitional government will develop into another Islamist autocracy.  The country was plunged into a civil war during the conflict.  Even with the departure of Qadhafi, factions loyal to him remain an active threat in Tripoli.  

Bahrain

The core conflict in Bahrain is between the nation's oppressed Shiite majority and an authoritarian, minority dominated, Sunni monarchy.  Protests took hold in mid-February and in a fashion similar to Egypt, led to the occupation of the capital city's Manama Square.  The regime responded with violent repression that included several horrendous killings (Delacoura 2012, 65). Protestors resumed their demonstrations a week later and were met with large pro-government demonstrations.  As in Egypt and Tunisia, the protestors demanded a republican form of government.  Hostilities came to a head in mid-March when protestors marched on the royal palace.  Bahrain is similar to Libya in that foreign military intervention was a factor in the outcome.  In this case, King Hamad got military assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  GCC forces, led by Saudi Arabia, entered Bahrain and helped the regime suppress the resistance.   A state of emergency was also declared in the country.  

Yemen

Tunisia was also a touchstone for Yemen.  A nascent protest movement took shape there almost immediately following Ben Ali's exile in January 2011.  The protestors were led by a combination of youth activists and members of civil society organizations (Delacoura 2012, 65).  As in the other Arab states, the objective of the demonstrations was to remove a sitting authoritarian ruler, in this case President Ali Saleh. The protest movement began to mature with the removal of Mubarak from Egypt the next month.   The protestors acted in contradistinction to Yemen's official reformist opposition parties.  These parties were known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and included the Islamist Islah party and the Yemeni Socialist Party.  The JMP had wanted to work with the regime to bring about change instead of deposing it and starting over. Yet the JMP had begun to demonstrate some sympathy for the protestors.  

A key turning point of events occurred on March 18 when snipers killed 60 protestors at a demonstration. This proved to alienate quite a large number of Yemenis from the Saleh regime.  Saleh employed a number of, by now, commonly used tactics to retain power or co-opt the opposition.  These tactics included violent repression, counterdemonstrations, bribes, and some superficial capitulation on reforms.  But he was forced to flee the country for several months after an injury.  When he returned, he capitulated to the protestors by handing over power to a new government.  As with Libya, Yemen remains a precarious case. Saleh's family retains considerable influence in the Yemeni military and security apparatus and so he is still not entirely without influence.  Yemen could also still dissolve into a civil conflict on the mold of Syria (Delacoura 2012, 66).  

Syria

Syria entered the Arab Spring in March 2011.  It was precipitated by an uprising in the city of Deraa. Syria experienced a now familiar protest pattern against one of the most unpopular Arab regimes: that of Bashar Al-Assad. Assad's response to the protests was vicious yet confusing.  He initiated a cycle of repression and counterdemonstration (Delacoura 2012, 66).   But this failed to quell the revolt and millions of Syrians fled.  It is notable that he too attempted to make political concessions to gain support to prop up his regime.  But as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia the protestors were unimpressed with the concessions.  Al-Assad also began a pattern of alternating brutal repression with more conciliatory gestures.  This methodology seemed to suggest to the protestors that there was incompetence and disunity inside the regime.  Casualties due to state repression only further decreased the regime's support.  But it is notable that 2 years later the conflict in Syria is still ongoing and has deteriorated into a full-scale civil war ("The Syrian Civil War" 2013).  The regime remains quite obdurate and foreign observers are still determining whether military intervention again from NATO would be needed.  Syria is not Libya, however as it remains a powerful regional ally for Russia.  Any foreign military intervention in Syria would need Russian approval to avoid a wider escalation of conflict.  To date this approval has not be forthcoming (Parfitt 2013).  

Other cases

While the focus on the case studies is on the six key states of the Arab Spring, this doesn't mean other areas of the Middle and Near East didn't experience similar movements.  In the interests of thoroughness, a brief overview of these other countries follows.  Morocco and Jordan both also saw similar protest movements but were able to diffuse them with the usual reform measures. It's notable that in Jordan, King Abdullah periodically announces reform measures but follows through with only superficial implementation until the next crisis.  The member states of the GCC, other than Bahrain, saw some limited protests.  Saudi Arabia's protests were mainly in the eastern portion of the country and the larger cities.  But the ruling regime snuffed the threat with a combination of social welfare spending and repression (Delacoura 2012, 66).  Algeria has been no stranger to civil unrest, having had its own episode back in the 1990s.  But a renewed attempt at regime change inspired by nearby Tunisia did not result in the formation of movement.  Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine are clearly special and extreme cases that are beyond the scope of this paper to adequately discuss.  

Section 3. The Green Movement and the Arab Spring: A Comparative Review

The next questions under consideration include: why was the Iranian regime able to survive while some of the later Arab regimes were deposed? What was the Iranian regime's response to the protests? Why was the Iranian regime able to survive? How were the green movement protests different from the one's that saw the toppling of long-standing regimes? Finally, what connection, if any, is there between the green movement and the Arab Spring?

 In assessing these questions it is important to note two key issues. The first issue is that uprisings in both contexts, the Arab Spring and in Iran's green movement, suggest works in progress that may take years to fully form.  It maybe that the survival of any regime under a widespread climate of protest will be viewed by history as a short-term respite.  The second issue is that most writers are unclear on what caused the uprisings in the first place. The Middle East has had authoritarian governments of one type or another for centuries and no real tradition of sustained democratic governance outside the state of Israel.  Yet uprisings of the kind witnessed both in Iran in 2009, and throughout the Arab world in 2011, are still relatively rare. So, with this in mind, the current section will attempt to assess the factors at play in countries that achieved relative success versus those that clearly didn't.  

What was the regime's response to the protests? As was seen above, the Iranian regime's response to the protests was one of brutal repression.  Two years after the green movement many protestors remain either jailed or under house arrest ("Will Iran Remain," 2013).  The regime's response to the protest was quite brutal and violent.  However, this is often not enough to stop a movement's momentum as has been seen in Egypt, Libya and Syria.  When attempting to stop a resistance movement, a regime's initial approaches have often followed a predictable pattern.  First, the regime begins with attempts to placate the protest with promises of regime change or moderation.  When this doesn't stop the protest, violent repression inevitably follows.  From here a protest can take one of two directions.  One direction could be submitting to the violent protest and accepting the status quo.  The second direction is to meet the repression with like force until the regime is either exhausted or obliterated.  The latter can lead to either civil war (Syria) or the ultimate peaceful removal of the regime in power (Egypt).  It may depend very much on the resolve of the resistance.  It may also depend on the support the uprising has from the public and from key institutions or factions in society.  The overall unpopularity of the regime in power is also a crucial factor in the chances for success of any resistance. 

Why was the Iranian regime able to survive? While it is true that Iran's political culture has been historically authoritarian this actually doesn't explain why the green movement failed, at least in the view of some writers.  For some lack of experience with democracy isn't crucial.  Rather it's a lacking in the traits and attributes that make a democracy work that leads to failure.  This is an unfortunate view of Iran as it appears to contradict evidence that Iran actually has many attributes that would make a democratic system function.  Kohnloo (2012) reports research from an international study that indexed the liberal views of residents of 62 different countries.  According to the results, Iran placed higher on the index than countries like South Korea and India, both of which have established democracies.  

Another reason for failure is that after the 1979 Islamic Revolution Iranian people lacked the fortitude to endure another revolution.  This has to do with the view that 1979 ushered in a more brutal dictatorship than the one that it replaced.  Instead Iranians are willing to tolerate the current regime and seek change by means of gradual reforms and incremental shifts. However, if this is true it has all led to failure.  Iran had attempted a policy of moderation before under the President Khatami, Ahmadinejad's immediate predecessor. But his attempt to push moderate reforms through was repeatedly blocked by the Guardian Council (Kohanloo, 2012).  

There is also the view that the failure of the green movement is a political failure.  That is, the leadership of the movement lacked a coherent and decisive mission for the country's transformation (Kohanloo, 2012).  The Iranian opposition included a mix of conservative and moderate factions that don't usually cooperate toward achieving goals.  It may also be many Iranian people didn't support the green movement because, in light of the country's experience since 1979, it was still unclear what the greens would replace the current regime with.  

For Kohanloo (2012) the turning point for the green movement occurred in the wake of an ultimatum to the protestors announced by Khamenehi on June 20, 2009 or 11 days after the contested election.  Prior to that ultimatum the green movement still entertained some hope that an acceptable result would accrue from the rigged election.  But after that decree was issued the rank and file members of the green movement chose to defy the Supreme Leader's issuance and protest in the streets. The leadership took a much different approach.  Mousavi, who had been the green movement's symbolic and spiritual inspiration, issued what has been called his fifth proclamation.  In this statement he announced his allegiance to the regime in no uncertain terms. Mousavi's statement deflated most of the protest's energy.  The protestors were left disillusioned to see their own leadership publicly disavowing the movement.  

Another factor is the lack of international support for the green movement. Iran appears to be a mainly isolated player on the world stage. Its key foreign allies are Russia and China, neither of which are supportive of democratic protest movements.  The regime's support for terrorism, pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and hostilities with key regional Western ally, Israel, would normally make it a prime target for removal by Western allies. However, Kohanloo (2012) argues, there isn't any evidence the green movement ever sought out Western support.  In a 2011 interview Ardeshir Amir Arjomand, senior advisor to Mousavi, claimed the green movement didn't need outside help.  Some observers feel there is little to indicate US involvement would even have been beneficial (Kohanloo 2012; Economist 2011). 

How were the green movement protests different from the one's that saw the toppling of long-standing regimes? The first difference, particularly between Egypt and Iran is the role of the international community.  This role can't be discounted in the toppling of regimes in Egypt and Libya.   In these countries, the removal of Mubarak and Qadhafi clearly happened with varying degrees of US involvement and blessing.  The Mubarak regime was long sponsored by the US.  But when the protest gained considerable power and urgency, it behooved the US to not be viewed as opposed to a movement for democracy.  It has become clear that Mubarak had become a liability to the US and should step down to allow the country to move forward.  In Libya's case, the regime was tied to international terrorism and its leadership considered pariah state by the US.  The role of the international community in removing him was also decisive.  This will likely be the case again in Syria if the Assad regime is to be finally removed as well.  Iran does not benefit from such associations.  Its key international partnerships are with equally repressive authoritarian regimes that are not particularly interested in regime change or democracy.  

The Tunisian case presents a different example by comparison.  Direct foreign involvement in Tunisia was not as instrumental to regime change as in Egypt, Libya or Bahrain.  Also, Tunisia's regime change had not the level of bloodshed that similar events produced elsewhere.  Also unlike in Egypt, Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" didn't have the benefit of much foreign intervention. Western media mostly ignored events in the relatively small North African country (Vaez 2011).  

However, a major difference, relative to Iran, is the tremendous unity and support the Tunisian people showed in bringing down Ben Ali's regime.  Vaez (2011) agrees with Kohanloo (2011) that the Iranian protestors lacked a cohesive unity.  Some opposition elements were working for regime change and others were seeking to work within the existing political structure.  By all accounts Iran simply missed a big historical opportunity in 2009.

Iranian inspiration for the Arab Spring?

After having considered why the Iranian regime survived while later Arab governments failed it is interesting to consider one last question: that of the purported influence of the green movement on the Arab Spring.  This is an interesting question to consider since the failure of the green movement might be seen as a warning to Arab reformers and not a source of encouragement.  The one party who seemed most connected with the idea that the Iranian green movement was the inspiration for the Arab Spring uprising was Mousavi, the green movement's celebrated candidate.  He observed in 2011 that, 

The starting point of what we are now witnessing on the streets of Tunis, Sanaa, Cairo, Alexandria and Suez can be undoubtedly traced back to days of 15th, 18th and 20th June 2009 when people took to the streets of Tehran in millions shouting “Where is my vote?” and peacefully demanded to get back their denied rights (Kurzman 2012, 162).

Indeed, when Wael Ghonim, the Google employee and Egyptian activist, was seen wearing a green wristband during protest rallies, it was immediately linked to Iran's 2009 protests.  But Ghonim demurred that it was only a coincidence that he happened to be wearing the same color as Mousavi. 

Kurzman (2012, 162) reports research that there were over 40,000 Twitter posts or tweets during the two weeks following January 25, 2011 with the official hashtag #Jan25.  Of those tweets only 69 referenced Iran and only 3 of those were in Arabic. Most of those tweets were posted by Iranians and none gave any credit to Iran's green movement. Nor is the Iranian regime held in much esteem by Egyptian activists.  A poll taken in the cities of Alexandria and Cairo just a week before Mubarak was deposed found that 47 percent of respondents opposed Ahmadinejad's regime and only 18 percent approved (Pechterpolls 2011).   

Perhaps more galling was the pronouncement from Supreme Guide Khamenehi that the Arab Spring is "...the same as 'Islamic Awakening,' which was the result of the big victory of the Revolution of the Iranian nation (Kurzman 2012, 162)." Such a pronouncement is a major misreading of the events of the Arab Spring.  The later uprisings almost universally sought to achieve a secular democratic government, and this was the case even in countries where Muslim fundamentalists were empowered by the uprisings.   

In contrast, Iran's Islamic Revolution empowered many Islamists who wanted to establish a conservative religious theocracy. One protestor in Tahrir Square responded to Khamenehi by saying, "Egypt will not be another Iran.  We will not be governed by religious dictatorship... (Kurzman 2012, 162-163)." Some Egyptian activists issued a statement that condemned Khamenehi for attempting to alienate Coptic Christians from the Arab Spring by insinuating ideas about Islamic Revolution.   Finally, Kemal El-Helbawy, a Muslim Brotherhood leader living abroad in London chimed in by declaring the Egyptian revolution was not an Islamic Revolution.  

Nevertheless, one Egyptian activist included the green revolution in his list of grand social movements. But he only did so in a very general way.  Sayyid Yosif also listed many far-flung resistance movements as precedents including India's Salt March, Poland's Solidarity and Cuba's July 26 Movement, to name a few. 

Social Media Connection

To say that the Arab Spring didn't take any ideological models from Iran is not to say it didn't take some tactics.  Indeed, the use of social media is often linked to the success of the uprising in Egypt.  But very similar tactics were employed by protestors in Iran.  Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri (2010, 24) report research that in the wake of the protests following the 2009 election, the Iranian regime banned or censured independent and foreign-based media.  This move was similarly done for a brief time in Egypt as well when the Mubarak regime banned access to the Internet.  In Iran protestors used mobile phones to take photographs and video of the atrocities committed by the regime's security forces.  They then posted this footage directly to the internet.  So, two years before the Arab uprisings, the Iranian protests seemed to show that modern technology had made the ability of authoritarian regimes to totally block out access to information more difficult.  

Some observers refer to the Iranian uprising as the Twitter Revolution, rather than the green movement, in reference to the role that social media sites have played in organizing protest and disseminating unbiased information (Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri 2010, 25). According to Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri (2010, 25) Iran had some 50 million mobile phones and nearly 26 million internet users in 2009.  Also, as much as two-thirds of Iran's population used mobile phones in 2009.  This indicates that Iran has invested in a considerable build up of the nation's information and telecommunications infrastructure over the past two decades. However, this development had attracted the concern of the regime long before it was put to use in 2009 (Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri (2010, 24). Iran's Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution has expressed concerns that new technologies could undermine the regime's Islamist values. As it stands the use of technology was not really that decisive in Iran considering the green movement failed to remove the existing regime.  

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