Briefing Paper: Moving NCTC into DHS

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in August of 2004 by then-President George W. Bush, in order to implement a key provision of the 9/11 Commission, namely, to combine joint operational planning and joint intelligence work. To do this, its mandate allows the organization to staff with personnel from various governmental agencies.

The Director of NCTC reports to the President, on executive-level planning on counterterrorism initiatives, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), on matters of intelligence. After a briefing is concluded, the NCTC carries out the policy directives of the President, as well as those of the National and Homeland Security Councils.

NCTC analyzes all intelligence regarding counterterrorism, except information that pertains to domestic terrorism. To do this, it integrates foreign and domestic information from all areas of the Intelligence Community (IC) and prepares a President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB).

The NCTC also has several key groups, including the Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group, and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Group, both of which effectively break down credible threats into workable threat segments. Lastly, NCTC "evaluates the quality of CT analytic production, the training of analysts working CT, and the strengths and weaknesses of the CT analytic workforce," according to its website (NCTC, 2014).

As part of its efforts, the NCTC also seeks to reduce redundancy across various counterterrorism analytic components. NCTC shares information among more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement, and homeland security networks in order to fulfill its mission and operates the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which maintains a repository of information on international terrorist groups and oversees the Terrorist Screening Center database and the Terrorist Watchlist (NCTD, 2014).

In summation, the NCTC seeks to integrate and analyze all intelligence on foreign terrorism, serve as a central, shared knowledge bank of information, provide support and analysis on terrorist activities to various governmental agencies, and handle the information technology (IT) systems within the organization. In short, it seeks to be the primary office on strategic operational planning for counterterrorism.

By contrast, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed on September 22, 2001, eleven days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to integrate all or part of 22 federal departments and agencies. It is tasked with a more far-ranging set of objectives, including combatting terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, ensuring resilience to disasters, and maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise (DHS, 2014).

The two main issues with DHS are its inability to retain top employees and its inflated budget. A July 2013 MSN article noted that there were then "15 vacant positions at the highest levels of the department," and that the agency's budget is currently $60 billion per year and noted that "spending is out of control" (Peterson, 2014). Additionally, U.S. media have been quick to point out that DHS has not stopped many large terrorist attacks and has instead eroded civil liberties at home, including random searches and full-body scanners at airports, without much justification for these moves. Finally, media criticism has pointed out that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which does not have the greatest reputation post-Katrina, is currently under DHS's wing.

A move to transfer the NCTC to DHS would be a good idea, for several reasons. Firstly, DHS is spread very thin, as it tries to efficiently service all aspects of its mission. Though the first item on its Core Missions list is preventing terrorism and enhancing security, none of the organizations that joined DHS upon its formation, except perhaps a small percentage of the Secret Service's mission, is equipped to seriously gather information on terrorism, analyze the data, and advise on matters of international counterterrorism or act as an organized hub for this type of information.

Additionally, DHS is under-prepared to act strategically to ensure the nation's safety from terrorism. The NCTC already operates in partnership with several agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, as well as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. Capitol Police. Under the DHS umbrella, it would alleviate one step in its own mission, to help alleviate redundancy, since it would have one less agency with which to share its findings.

Furthermore, the NCTC is in McLean, Virginia while DHS is in an already existing Nebraska Avenue Complex in Washington, D.C. Combining the two agencies would reduce waste, which has dogged DHS since its inception. A House of Representatives subcommittee estimated that as of September 2008, DHS has wasted approximately $15 billion in sub-par, underperforming contracts. This move would also centralize operations, particularly on sensitive issues of terrorism and counterterrorism, and create a more favorable image of DHS in the media and with the American public.

In order to facilitate this merging, the NCTC's personnel should move to DHS's headquarters in Washington, where it will be closer to both the President, whom it already reports to, and other key government agencies. There, DHS can absorb NCTC's budget, and deploy its personnel across a wide array of initiatives. For example, NCTC's action plans on terrorist use of the Internet can be integrated with DHS's Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, while NCTC's National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP) and action plans for countering violent extremism and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction would work well with DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection as well as its U.S. Secret Service.

Given the problems plaguing DHS (vs. the high opinion of NCTC) and DHS's mission to prevent terrorism and enhance security, the two agencies fit together well. During a tough economic time, when budgets are being slashed yearly, it's incumbent on the federal government to find ways to save money without sacrificing quality, particularly when the safety of the nation and the American people are at stake. Only by combining the NCTC with DHS can the smaller agency continue to operate at the highest level (its budget has either been cut, or threatened to be cut, nearly every year since its inception, while DHS's continues to rise), provide the President with the very best information on international counterterrorism efforts around the world, and analyze potential threats against America. Those duties, along with acting as a centralized hub of information on terrorist activities for other agencies, oversight of various counterterrorism groups, and striving to eradicate redundancy across its analytic components, should make it a welcome addition to DHS. Finally, DHS would then oversee the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the Terrorist Screening Center database, and the Terrorist Watchlist, three crucial aspects of national security.

References

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2014) Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from www.dhs.gov

Peterson, K. (2014). 6 reasons to close the Homeland Security Office. MSNMoney. Retrieved from http://money.msn.com/now/post--6-reasons-to-close-the-homeland-security-office

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). (2014). National Counterterrorism Center. Retrieved from http://www.nctc.gov