Policy Memorandum on Political Instability in Iraq

Memorandum

The following is a summary of the situational findings and policy recommendations regarding the current sociopolitical and military conditions in Iraq. At the White House’s request, we have prepared a comprehensive briefing on the subject and suggest some possible courses of action.

Overview

The current situation in Iraq remains unstable, though conditions have markedly improved from the chaos of 2005-2009. Terrorist attacks and sectarian violence continue to plague the country, with two major causes: the Sunni-Shiite conflict and threats from terrorist organizations, most notably Al-Qaeda. Also, Iran and Syria continue to meddle in Iraq’s internal affairs. Iraq’s central governments' internal stability remains weak and untrusted by many Iraqis.

It must be kept in mind that Iraq was never a country that formed of its own volition. Rather, it was created by the British Mandate passed by the League of Nations shortly after WWI. As such, it has no real national identity. Perhaps the only commonality of experience that Iraq’s Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds have is having lived under Saddam Hussein. This suggests great obstacles for the American goal of “nation-building”; at best, Iraqis live in uneasy coexistence; at worst, they start killing one another. In 2005, Brinkerhoff and Mayfield noted the difficulty of this task: “Short-term reconstruction timetables increase the risk of relying on existing power structures and on weak newly-created institutions, which lay an insufficient foundation for fundamental governance reform and new state-society relations” (Brinkerhoff and Mayfield 29).

It follows, then, that the task of the United States is to encourage Iraq’s stability through intensive diplomatic and economic efforts. The fundamental, somewhat ironic problem is that the U.S. is far more interested in the concept of Iraq as a country than Iraq itself is. Given a choice, the Kurds would break away, and quite possibly the Sunnis and Shiites would divide themselves socially and geographically as well. This would not be a viable option, however, as none of the three resulting states would be functional. It would also not be in accord with stated U.S. policy to have invaded and occupied Iraq only to see it dissolve into a balkanized version of itself.

The option of military intervention to restore stability in Iraq is off the table. The American public, having been promised complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by 2014, would almost certainly not accept any kind of further military involvement there. It is also doubtful that the Iraqi people would tolerate it. While Prime Minister Maliki has asked for American help in combating terrorism, the U.S.’s hands are tied. American forces in Iraq will have to consist of a small cadre of advisors, so Iraqi forces will have to do the heavy lifting.

One factor that must be considered in stabilizing Iraq is that a democratic state system, which we might take for granted as ideal, is not universally viewed by Iraqis as an inherent good. As Jabar (2009) noted, “Understanding the legacy of Iraqi authoritarianism, as well as the potential of new social forces, is critical to developing policies that will foster a transition toward a stable democracy” (Jabar n.p.). The reign of Saddam Hussein was greatly harmful to Iraq, but at least, think many Iraqis, things were stable. The dissolution of central power that came along with Saddam’s fall has been seen by many Iraqis as no more than an excuse for people to start blowing each other up. In light of this not entirely inaccurate perception, “democracy” has been a hard sell in Iraq, especially since the brand of democracy that currently exists there is weak and ineffective.

Additionally, Iran is a major threat. While there is currently a degree of Iran-Iraq rapprochement, Iran’s motives must be viewed with suspicion. Iran has a stated goal of becoming a regional power, and hegemony over a weakened and divided Iraq would be a major step toward that goal. With that caveat, it should be noted that Iran and Iraq are swiftly normalizing relations. As Al-Monitor reported, “It is obvious that Iranian-Iraqi ties are growing vigorously. The trade volume between the two countries stands at $10.7 billion at present and is expected to reach $12 billion at the end of 2013” (Al-Monitor, n.p.). In invoking the classic truism, “When goods cross borders, armies do not,” policymakers should welcome this development even if Iran is the catalyst for it. After all, if the goal of the U.S. is to foster a stable democracy in Iraq, then a viable trade structure for the country is a necessity.

Options for the U.S. and Policy Recommendations

While military options are extremely few, there exists a wealth of opportunities for moving Iraq toward stability and prosperity. The sectarian conflicts that have so wracked the country in the last decade are not necessarily a permanent condition. After all, in many nations, certainly including the United States, various ethnic and religious groups live peacefully side-by-side; in fact, heterogeny rather than homogeny adds vigor to society and expands its options. The trick, of course, is in getting the Iraqi people to see that. Even if they don’t relish the idea of a united Iraq, though, they should be shown what the alternatives are: either a constant string of violence and near-chaos or even worse, the splitting up of the country into multiple weak states that would eventually be dominated and assimilated by their stronger neighbors. Thus, Iraq can be compared to a lifeboat where the occupants don’t like each other, but nobody will get anywhere unless everybody starts rowing in the same direction.

There are many nonmilitary ways to improve relations with the Iraqi nation; the most obvious is continued and enhanced trade. Iraq holds 9% of the world’s oil reserves. A strong and stable trade partnership with Iraq will provide the U.S. with a strategically important petroleum source and Iraq with a reliable source of hard currency. However, Blanchard (2008) noted that any such steps would be primarily the responsibility of the Iraqi government: “The central importance of oil and gas revenue for the Iraqi economy is widely recognized by Iraqis, and most groups accept the need to create new legal and policy guidelines for the development of the country's oil and natural gas. However, Iraq's Council of Representatives (parliament) has not taken action to consider the proposed legislation to date because of ongoing political disputes” (Blanchard n.p.). Again, political stability is the issue. Petroleum industry players naturally want to feel confident that a deal struck with the current regime will not be abrogated by a successor. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to shore up the current Iraqi regime, politically and diplomatically if not militarily.

America’s goal has always been to make Iraq’s armed forces strong enough to maintain order inside the country and to resist external threats. Iraq and the U.S. also share the goal of suppressing terrorism. There is no reason why the U.S. cannot continue its ongoing policy practice of working closely with Iraqi intelligence services, sharing data, and training counterinsurgency forces. The American public, while sharply divided on the Iraq war and its protracted aftermath, generally supports the war on terrorism. There is a signal benefit to “locally sourced” intelligence gathering. As Jervis (2010) explained, massive U.S. intelligence efforts on the eve of both the Gulf War and the Iraq War turned up flawed data and conclusions: “In both cases…not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations…were also incorrect” (Jervis 6). This suggests that in intelligence-gathering, quality trumps quantity. A strategic U.S.-Iraq regional intelligence partnership could be very beneficial for both nations.

Recommendations

Based on its research referenced above, the Iraq Stability Task Force recommends that the following steps be taken:

1. Intensify efforts to build a strong trade relationship with Iraq

2. Build an intelligence alliance with the Iraqi government

3. Use diplomacy to convince the Iraqi people that theirs is a viable state

4. Continue to offer advice and training to Iraq’s military

5. Reassure Iraq and the world that the U.S. will refrain from military action

6. Use diplomatic and trade pressure to reduce Iranian influence

While the American public may be somewhat wary of Iraq, the country is nevertheless a strategic linchpin and its continued stability remains vital to U.S. interests. We, therefore, recommend the continuing allocation of resources to make that a priority goal. The potential benefits are many and the consequences of withdrawing from this region dire. Also, these benefits and consequences should be made apparent to the American public.

Works Cited

Al-Monitor. (2013). Where are Iran-Iraq relations heading? Al-Monitor.com.

Blanchard, Christopher M. "Iraq: Oil and gas legislation, revenue sharing, and US policy." Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2008.

Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and James B. Mayfield. "Democratic governance in Iraq? Progress and peril in reforming state‐society relations." Public Administration and Development 25.1 (2005): 59-73.

Jabar, Faleh A. "Postconflict Iraq: A race for stability, reconstruction, and legitimacy." (2009).

Jervis, Robert. Why intelligence fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.