Throwing a Curveball: The Robb-Silberman Report and Intelligence Management

The United States’ position as a superpower has rarely been questioned. When it is, military and cultural strength are usually not on the chopping block. One aspect of United States power that has been at the center of scrutiny and controversy time and again is that of intelligence capabilities. Ever since the intelligence failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence Community has come under fire; its’ capabilities have been questioned, its’ methods have been scrutinized, and its’ future has been doubted. For better or for worse, US intelligence capabilities have again and again been dragged from the shadows into the international spotlight.

One of the best examples of this self-examination is the Robb-Silberman report from 2005. This paper examines this report and its’ recommendations as deeply as possible, laying out the implications for the future of the Intelligence Community. Ultimately, this paper shows that while the recommendations of the report were well-intentioned, they held little effect for the subsequent decade.

Background

The Robb-Silberman report, produced by what is formally known as the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, is an example of politically moderated self-examination. The report is the end result of a panel of appointees created by Executive Order 13328 under the administration of President George W. Bush in February 2004. The order was spurred in response to public acknowledgment that the Intelligence Community (IC) made a mistake (or, a series of mistakes) in reporting that Iraq had been developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the US invasion in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

While Bush formed the commission in response to this public turn of events, he mandated it with a broad instruction to not only examine intelligence regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya but also to inspect the intelligence capabilities of the United States’ IC in regards to WMD and “related threats” (Miller & Drogin, 2005). More specifically, as the Executive Order itself states,

The Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts as the world's only superpower in their duty to prevent and respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals. (Executive Order 13328, 2004)

After over a year of “intense study” of the American IC, the commission released its report to Bush on March 31, 2005. It is now widely referred to as the Robb-Silberman Report (Miller & Drogin, 2005). This is because of two of the major members of the Committee.

The members of the Commission, according to a Washington Post summary, are Laurence Silberman (a retired US Court of Appeals Judge and Deputy Attorney General), Charles Robb (Virginia’s Governor at the time), John McCain (a US Senator from Arizona, sitting on the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee), Lloyd Cutler (former White House counsel), Patricia Wald (retired judge of the Washington DC Court of Appeals), Rick Levin (who was serving as President of Yale University), Admiral Bill Studeman (Director of the NSA), Charles Vest (a former President of MIT), and Henry Rowen (Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and President of RAND) (Dan Froomkin, 2005).

This elite group utilized a great many sources and resources – “hundreds of experts” and “thousands of documents” to piece together the 600-page tome (Commission Report, 2005, p. 5). The result, it seems in the long run, is not a touchstone for intelligence reform, but a political document with some middling effect on the subsequent decade.

The Recommendations

In all, the Commission Report offers a total of 74 recommendations for improving the US Intelligence Community; as stated previously, the Commission proudly reported that almost all of these can be implemented without explicit policy change. The Commission made their recommendations based on the view that “on a matter of this importance, we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude” (Commission Report, 2005, p. 3). As a summary of their recommendations, the Commission states: “We need an Intelligence Community that is truly integrated, far more imaginative and willing to run risks, open to a new generation of Americans, and receptive to new technologies” (Commission Report, 2005, p. 8). The highlighted recommendations include giving the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) powers – and backing – to match his responsibilities, bringing the FBI fully into the IC, demanding more of the IC, and rethinking the process and ethos behind the President’s Daily Brief.

The Report is organized into two parts: part one is “looking back” and part two is “looking forward”. Looking back involves analyzing, post-mortem, the intelligence capabilities, successes, and errors in regards to WMD capabilities in Iraq, Libya, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. Looking forward means to honestly assess the IC’s capabilities in regards to leadership, management, collection, analysis, sharing, covert action, and counterintelligence most specifically. This examination makes it clear that the IC had, in fact, failed. As Gentry (2008) states in his reassessment of intelligence failure, “Intelligence fails if a state does not adequately collect and interpret intelligence information, make sound policy based on the intelligence (and other factors), and effectively act” (p. 247). The actions (or lack thereof) of the IC in the US clearly fit these criteria of failure.

The question is, what was the root cause of these failures? This paper addresses these failures from a management and oversight perspective. Even the Commission Report (2005) itself recognizes that, beyond anything, the IC’s failure was one of management and oversight. “Above all, we found an Intelligence Community that was too disorganized and fragmented to use its many talented people and sophisticated tools effectively”, the Commission wrote, concluding, “there are not enough coordinated and sustained Community-wide efforts to perform critical intelligence functions” (Commission Report, 2005, p. 309). It is this sort of failure that this paper seeks to address.

There are three recommendations in particular that this paper is concerned with. These are, ostensibly, most relevant to IC management and oversight. The paper discusses the issues and problems they were intended to address, the alternatives that were considered, and the support and opposition to such recommendations at the time, from various actors. Furthermore, the paper examines the immediate and long-term impact of the recommendations, evaluating whether or not they accomplished the goals they set out to achieve. This analysis involves a critical examination of the Commission Report (2005) itself, several relevant academic sources, and public policy debate in the last decade. To assess the management and oversight aspects of IC, these three recommendations are generalized from the Report’s specifics. They are as follows:

1) Stronger, more centralized leadership in the IC

2) Information sharing between IC actors

3) Explicit self-examination within the IC

The specifics of these three recommendations will become clear throughout the paper. Furthermore, potential criticisms and problems associated with the implementation of these recommendations will be addressed. Ultimately, the paper finds that, while these recommendations are well intended, they have failed to provide an adequate impetus for change within the United States’ Intelligence Community.

Recommendation 1: Strong Leadership

One of the biggest weaknesses in pre-Iraq War intelligence was, according to the Report, an absence of strong leadership. This was (and is) one of the biggest challenges facing the IC, for several reasons. First, the lack of a strong leader within the IC means a break down in relations between individual IC actors. The Report highlights a telling case study of the “turf battle” between two CIA subsidiary actors – the Counterterrorist Center and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (Commission Report, 2005, p. 17). According to the report, these two separate organizations fought over “roles, responsibilities, and resources”, and the leadership of IC was ill-equipped to resolve the issue (Commission Report, 2005, p. 17). This is not a window into a specific problem in a specific situation, but rather a reflection of the state of affairs in the bigger picture.

The Committee very strongly stated that this story “reflects a larger, more pervasive problem within the IC: the difficulty of making a decision and imposing the consequences on all agencies throughout the Community…because no one in the Community has been able to make a decision and then make it stick” (p. 17). The Commission was hopeful, although not necessarily confident, that the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would help to solve this issue. Whether the position has, in fact, helped the issue is another question altogether. Jervis (2006) gives a rather pessimistic conjecture on this front, saying that though “political entrepreneurs imply that their remedies, such as the establishment of a DNI, will cure the disease”, intelligence reforms “are not likely to bring great improvement” (p. 12). One need only look at the recent developments and news regarding the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency to inform this view. Given the continued failures of the past decade, one is tempted to agree with him.

Of course, this pessimist-cum-realist perspective did not affect the Commission’s hopeful recommendations. More specifically, the Commission recommended that the DNI bring a mission-centric perspective to the management of IC resources, create a structure of leadership that encourages collaboration, and make changes to IC personnel policies that create performance incentives (Commission Report, 2005, p. 311). These changes, they hoped would solve the issue that “today’s IC is not truly a community at all, but rather a loose confederation of 15 separate entities” (Commission Report, 2005, p. 312). Whether the position of DNI can overcome these cleavages is a question that only more time will answer, but the record so far does not look too promising.

The second way in which stronger leadership will aid in IC capabilities is in overcoming the politicization of intelligence gathering and analysis. This is an oft-posited critique of the IC as a whole. As Jervis (2006) states, it is possible that the intelligence preceding the war was “illegitimately influenced by the IC’s knowledge of the answers the policy-makers wanted to hear” (p. 6). Even more accusatory than this is Paul Pillar’s (2006) statement that “The Bush administration deviated from the professional standard not only in using policy to drive intelligence but also in aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war” (Foreign Affairs). This accusation was followed by an end judgment that the Administration used the data they wished to use, without fully considering the IC’s analytic judgments.

Having a strong, central leader of the IC can help to avoid this politicization by having a clear head that can be held accountable for actions. Even more, it could provide a clear spokesman for the IC’s views and aims. As Shelton (2011) states in her analysis of the roots of IC failures, “management within the Intelligence Community often fosters a mindset of political biases, and thus a policy of ‘group think’ prevails” (p. 637). Shelton (2011) argues that the CIA is, by its’ very nature, flawed. She argues that it is a “policy-implementing agency” that makes the dissemination of “unbiased intelligence very difficult” (p. 638). While this may be an extreme view, it reflects the need for a strong, centralized managerial leadership within the IC. Without this strong leadership, one of the biggest potential failures is the “inability to change the mindset or culture of an organization” (Shelton, 2011, p. 637). The institution and empowerment of strong leadership would help to cut through the levels of bureaucracy in the IC, making its’ priorities and aims clearer and more attainable. As Shelton highlights, many intelligence analysts opposed going to war based on the available intelligence, but their voices were lost to policy priorities. Instead of being a policy-implementing entity, the IC must strive to be an objective policy-informing institution, making its recommendations known. The creation of a DNI has had a middling effect on this deficiency in the IC. The issue of leadership is, of course, only one part in solving the IC’s managerial problems, but strong, centralized leadership is a start. In essence, it will make intelligence more relevant and less politicized.

Recommendation 2: Information Sharing

One of the major issues within the IC addressed by the Commission Report (2005) is that of information sharing – or, better still, the lack of information sharing within the so-called “community”. It is this lack of shared information that led to many of the failures of the IC leading up to the mandate of the Commission. Many officials and spokesmen highlight the need for information sharing. As Jervis (2006) asserts, “Anyone who has worked in or around CIA knows the proprietary attitude of the directorates” (p. 32). Senator Pat Roberts stated, “Key terrorism analysts…must be given access to every single piece of relevant intelligence data concerning threats to the homeland” (Jervis, 2006, p. 31). This seems an easy sentiment to agree with, a logical conclusion that almost anyone could reach after some critical thinking. It is, indeed, an important aspect of the IC’s successes, and something that is conspicuously missing in its’ failures. However, before looking into this recommendation, it is important to note some limitations.

Of course, dealing with the sensitive material often encountered within the IC, one agency cannot share its’ information freely, for fear of leaking and compromising. The Commission Report (2005) acknowledges that intelligence sources and methods must be protected, and therefore indicates that what is needed are “structures and processes for sharing intelligence information that are driven by commonly accepted principles of risk management” (p. 429). This structure, it suggests, should take the decision to share or not to share away from collection agencies, which may undervalue the need to share information, instead proposing a centralized method of program management under the DNI. This avoids the resistance associated with the proprietarily minded intelligence officials.

It is clear that lack of information sharing is one of the biggest reasons for the IC’s failures that the Commission was constituted to address. It addresses the IC’s treatment of an intelligence asset known as Curveball. Curveball was, essentially, the only contact to confirm the existence of WMDs in Iraq – and s/he was not even an American asset. Instead, Curveball was in contact with German intelligence, with US analysts receiving only secondary information (Commission Report, 2005, p. 429). It was the lack of information sharing in this case that led to the wrongful verification of Curveball’s information – “even under the best interpretation, the IC in general and CIA in particular failed to develop mechanisms and forums for scrutinizing Curveball’s reliability” (Jervis, 2006, p. 32-33). The Curveball instance is just one example of how a lack of information sharing can lead to a wrong or, at the very least, misinformed course of action.

In her analysis of the report, Ellen Laipson (2005) says that the Commission was wise to “take on one of the most dysfunctional parts of the way intelligence agencies create barriers to sharing of key information, which often makes a mockery of the concept of ‘community’” (p. 204). This is the key sentiment surrounding information sharing. Unfortunately, the IC is so entrenched in bureaucracy and self-entitlement; it will take a lot more than intelligence reform to overcome the proprietary culture within the IC. Instead, the Commission Report (2005) calls for a complete change in mindset – a mindset that views information as “owned” by the United States government, rather than a single intelligence agency (p. 432). It is this mindset that will ultimately make the needed changes, rather than specific intelligence policy reforms.

Whether this mindset has been achieved or not in the past decade is debatable, at best. Shortly after the release of the report, Fessenden (2005) acknowledged that there was “widespread agreement that coordination and information sharing have improved since the [9/11] attacks” but stipulated that “thanks to the years of entrenched independence of the individual agencies and a long tradition of information hoarding, major shortcomings remain” (p. 106). This is a state of affairs that has continued to this present day within the IC.

Recommendation 3: Self-Examination

Jervis (2006) captures the heart of the IC’s failure by stating “Although the IC did not lack in-depth knowledge of the technical questions of WMD, it may have lacked the time as well as incentives to step back, re-examine central assumptions, explore alternatives, and be more self-conscious about how it was drawing conclusions” (p. 46). This is, perhaps, the single most important failing of the IC that must be addressed. And, as the Commission Report (2005) recognizes, it is not one that can be legislated into reality. Instead, both the public and the President should ask more of the IC, ensuring that they keep one eye turned inward during their endeavors.

It is quite obvious that the IC has not moved forward on this front since the release of the Commission Report. The blame game continues as methods, processes, projects, and analysis go unchecked – albeit to a lesser degree than before. To be fair, this is not entirely the IC’s fault. As Tetlock and Mellers (2005) state, the IC is “asked to predict outcomes that may often be inherently unpredictable – and is blamed for the inevitable forecasting failures, be they false positives or false negatives” (p. 542). The IC must acknowledge these shortcomings in order to remain as effective as possible.

The Commission Report itself says that the IC needs to be pushed to be its’ best. “Analysts must be pressed to explain how much they don’t know,” the report states, “the collection agencies must be pressed to explain why they don’t have better information on key topics” (Commission Report, 2005, p. 2). Even more specifically, the Commission Report (2005) demands that “no important intelligence assessment should be accepted without sharp questioning that forces the community to explain exactly how it came to that assessment and what alternatives might also be true” (p. 2). This questioning ought to come from without and from within – with an emphasis placed on the latter.

Ensuring that adequate self-examination is established within the IC will take both time and a conscious effort. The Commission Report (2005) states, in its’ introduction to part two (“Looking Forward”) that the Commission “found an analytical community too quick to rely upon assumptions or conjecture, and too slow to communicate gaps and uncertainties to policymakers” (p. 309). It is this failure that was, is, and shall continue to be one of the most detrimental drawbacks for the IC. That is until it is addressed head-on.

One of the ways this can be addressed is through accountability. As Tetlock and Mellers (2005) go on to state, “ping-pong accountability pressures the IC to focus its collective analytic resources on defensive bolstering (justifying previous judgments) and strategic attitude shifting (providing the answers policymakers want” (p. 544). This does not encourage effective self-examination, but an attitude of adaptive shape-shifting and changing of key information. In a phrase, the IC needs an attitude adjustment.

Instead of this unhelpful attitude, Tetlock and Mellers (2005) argue that what is needed is a “constructive self-criticism focused on exploring methods of measuring and improving overall performance” (p. 544). While the attitude adjustment that the IC needs may be required to come within, these methods of self-criticism call for policy initiatives. In order for this self-examination to be ensured in the future, intelligence policy reform must address the structures needed for such methods of performance improvement. As of yet, this does not appear to be an aspect of the IC that has been adequately addressed.

Toward the Future

Eight years ago, Jervis (2006) summarized the effect of the Commission Report (2005) quite succinctly by saying: “While these reports convey a great deal of useful information…they are not satisfactory either intellectually or for improving intelligence. I think we can be certain that the future will see serious intelligence failures, some of which will be followed by reports like these” (p. 48). Very little has been proven otherwise in the subsequent decade, leaving many concerns and questions unanswered.

Perhaps the most pessimistic view is that nothing has changed at all. Fessenden (2005) writes that the entire affair of intelligence reform only serves to reinforce this pessimistic reality: “the resilience of turf protection and bureaucratic self-preservation in Washington” (Foreign Affairs). It is apparent that not much has changed. While some reform and even more mindset changes have been implemented since the release of the Commission Report in 2005, it is clear that the IC has a long way to go. One only need look to some of the more recent disastrous failures – Benghazi and Wikileaks, to name just two – to confirm this inkling.

After the brief examination of this paper, it is clear that the Commission Report did little to effect lasting change in the IC. The three recommendations discussed here – stronger leadership, information sharing, and self-examination – must continue to be addressed if any lasting change is to be achieved. As mentioned above, it is plausible to argue that this is because of the politically self-conscious nature of this self-examination.

All of this said, it is important to note that the IC is only a product of the United States as a whole. As Rovner, Long, and Zegart (2006) states, “September 11 was…a national failure. Policymakers, analysts, scholars, and citizens alike must share the blame” (p. 203). This is not a naïve standpoint, but one that takes into consideration the complex nature of the American system as a superpower. In order to fully address the failings of the IC, policymakers should reexamine their priorities, analysts should reexamine their abilities, scholars should reexamine their subject matter, and citizens should reexamine their interest in the whole matter. Moving forward, the US needs a more holistic view of an IC system that is often defined by hierarchy and elitism. This is what holds the most promise for the future of the Intelligence Community in the American system.

References

Bush, G. W. (2004). Executive Order 13328. The White House. http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040206-10.html

Fessenden, H. (Nov./Dec. 2005). The limits of intelligence reform. Foreign Affairs, (84)6, 106.

Froomkin, D. (March 30, 2005). All about the WMD Commission. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/administration/whbriefing/wmdpanel.htm

Gentry, J. A. (2008). Intelligence failure reframed. Political Science Quarterly, 123(3), 247-254.

Jervis, R. (2006). Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29(3), 3-52.

Laipson, Ellen. (2005). The Robb-Silberman report, intelligence, and nonproliferation. Arms Control Today, 35(5), 20.

Miller, G., & Drogin, B. (April 1, 2005). Intelligence analysts whiffed on a ‘Curveball’. Los Angeles Times.

Pillar, P.R. (March/April, 2006). Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Foreign Affairs.

Rovner, J., Long, A., & Zegart, A.B. (2006). How intelligent is intelligence reform? International Security, 30(4), 196-208.

Shelton, C. (2011). The roots of analytic failures in the U.S. Intelligence Community. International Journal of Intelligence and counterintelligence, 24(4), 637-655.

Silberman, L.H., & Robb, C.S. (March 31, 2005). Report to the President of the United States. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Tetlcok, P.E., & Mellers, B.A. (2011). Intelligent management of intelligence agencies. American Psychologist, 66(6), 542-554.