Surrender Paradox and Territorial Rule

This paper will discuss the concept of sovereign or surrender paradox. As part of this discussion, the paradox will be described. In addition, the institutional capacity of territorial rulers to meet demands for change will be explored. Finally, the benefits packages offered by rulers will be explained.

SOVEREIGN OR SURRENDER PARADOX

The sovereign or surrender paradox involves the surrender of authority by all members of society to a central authority in exchange for certain benefits. These benefits are expensive and the means to pay for them are provided to the ruler by means of the power of taxation. This leads to greater centralization of institutional authority and an expansion in the administrative capacity of the state.

The sovereign paradox is part of the state's strategy to extend its power over its territory. As such, it is a power-building strategy for the ruler. It functions by means of such factors as clientele transfer and incorporation. Clientele transfer is the means by which rulers instigate incentives that can lead to a transfer of authority from non-territorial institutions to the territorial rulers' institutions. These incentives can manifest in the form of demands for services and public goods, litigation, and complaints. An example of such a transfer involves the transfer of litigation authority to decide disputes from courts, at the village or town, church or aristocracy, to that of the territorial ruler.

Incorporation is a tool used by territorial rulers as well. It involves the institutional assimilation of formerly independent public officials and institutions into the royal administration. This tool also can impact estates (Ertman). In this way, the institutional capacity of the ruler is expanded as well.

Another means to co-opt potential competitors is by means of the strategic use of resources to purchase their loyalty. The resources readily available to a territorial ruler include land and privilege. This can be used against the nobility to gain its support for royal prerogatives. An example of the use of such co-optation methods can be found during the reign of Louis XIV in 17th century France.

However, when all else fails the ruler can still fall back upon the tried and true method achieving compliance: coercion. It's likely that such heavy-handed tactics, while effective, do not always achieve satisfactory results in the long-term. That is, the extensive use of coercion can lead to an eventual backlash and harm the legitimacy of the territorial ruler's right to rule (Kishlansky 157-160; 185-189). This is exemplified in the rule of both Charles I and of his successor Oliver Cromwell, in 17th century England.

The ruler's centrality is a product of the state as a territorial hegemon. That is, the state's authority covers an entire, pre-defined geographic area and all the social groups that reside within it. The ruler's institutions form the target and focus of all interest group-related bargaining within the society. The result of this process leads to the disappearance, or significant weakening, of the estates. The state's monopoly on power is achieved by means of an incremental shift of authority from other institutional actors in society. Some examples of the sovereign center include St. Petersburg in Russia, Potsdam in Prussia, and Versailles in France during the reign of Louis XIV.

There are other benefits to this increased concentration of institutional capacity and power. That is, the state now can act to solve certain kinds of collective action and coordination problems. In brief, collective action problems arise when there is a need to mobilize a large population to achieve an objective (Aldrich). It's noted that majorities are unstable and so require organized coalitions in order to facilitate action. Thus when necessary, the territorial ruler uses the coercive authority of the state to overcome such collective action problems.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the territorial ruler has strong incentives to satisfy societal needs for change. These incentives include such benefits as increased command and control of resources, centralization of authority, and legitimacy. By satisfying societal needs, the ruler further consolidates his own authority by maintaining the support of diverse groups and institutions. As long as this equilibrium is maintained challenges to royal authority will likely remain unsuccessful.

TERRITORIAL RULERS, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CHANGE DEMAND FULFILLMENT

This section will discuss the demand function. This function involves the origins of societal demand for institutional change. When rulers successfully satisfy such demand it leads to an enhancement of the state's institutional capacity. That is, the institutions of the state, become more competent in providing public goods. It should be noted that change demand proceeds incrementally. The elements of change include such factors as population growth and conflicts over access to limited resources such as land.

First, the demand function also influences the expansion of other functions of the state such as security. Security is crucial in that it provides order for society and protection from external threats. In order to maintain its legitimacy, every state must develop or already enjoy, the institutional capacity to provide these benefits to its citizens or subjects in adequate measure. Thus internal security operates under the existence of a law enforcement infrastructure that protects property and people from harm by criminals. While external security functions by means of a strong military and war apparatus. It's critical that this external security be capable enough to deter external threats that impinge on the ruler's territory. Its capacity to increase the size of the territory may also provide a boon as well in terms of access to land and labor.

Indeed, war plays an important role in expanding institutional capacity due to a number of factors. First, war produces incentives that the state exploits to enhance access to extant resources by way of taxation and credit. War also provides a good explanation for why the rulers will bargain with their subjects to achieve certain goals and objectives such as improved security. When conducted successfully, war can also improve the reputation of the ruler. It can also provide access to new resources if fiscal policy allows.

Second, the demand function also operates in the legal sphere of society. This sphere is crucial because it sets down clear rules and regulations that govern the behavior, of not only the citizens or subjects of a state but also of the territorial ruler's boundary of authority. This expansion of legal rules, and its subsequent enforceability, both require the expansion of a state's institutional capacity. The legitimacy of any state would be severely challenged if its laws were not also, both regularly enforced, as well as regularly enforceable. These legal rules govern such characteristic features as citizens' rights and privileges. In addition, these rules also provide protection for property and the enforcement of contracts. They delineate the terms at which property can be transferred to others, such as descendants. A final element of the expansion of official and enforceable rules is manifest in the area of predictable criminal law.

The third area of demand is the manner in which population, food supply, markets, and religion are regulated. The regulation of population covers such areas as immigration, emigration or internal migration. That is, population movement is a legal regulatory term in that it delimits the circumstances under which the residents of a state can travel within or without a given jurisdiction. In addition, it provides limitations on when foreigners may legally visit or resettle in the ruler's territory.

The regulation of markets determines how goods and services are produced and distributed in society. The existence of a free market system indicates the rules of demand and supply are allowed to set prices within certain limits. However, the market system also requires standardization in order for an efficient transaction of goods to exist. Thus the state or territorial ruler must establish certain standards in the area of currency, weights and measures, and the available money supply. It should be noted that this power, to set crucial financial related standards for the market system, is exclusive to the state like the power of security. Yet without firm standards, it would not be possible to successfully conduct routine business transactions.

Religion is regulated as either a state institution or as one where no established official religious organization is recognized. The regulation of each of these areas requires a national state with the institutional capacity to enforce and control, as well as command, in the policy process. The existence of a state-sponsored religion, such as the Anglican Church in 17th century England, was designed to enforce compliance with the royal authority. The similar establishment of the Catholic Church in continental European states, when also meant to tie the interests of the ruler with those of organized religion. Thus, these two powerful institutions would present a united front of support against other groups in society.

The fourth area of demand is in the area of physical plant and infrastructure. This infrastructure includes communications systems, transportation systems (such as roads, bridges, canals, and harbors), and public works. The crucial factor that obligates state involvement is the cost of the construction and maintenance of such large-scale infrastructure projects. In most instances, private actors lack the resources to invest the necessary expenditure that produces expensive infrastructure projects. This means the state is the only viable actor in society that has both the financial resources and the large-scale organization to create infrastructure. It's noted that infrastructure is crucial to meeting the commercial and economic needs of both still developing industrial societies as well as fully mature ones. Thus this delegation of infrastructure to the ruler is an important component in the state's institutional expansion.

The fifth area of demand fulfillment is in the area of privilege. Thus privilege impacts the roles of certain elite strata of society not associated with the territorial ruler, such as the nobility. In order to maintain the support of the nobility, territorial rulers would provide such benefits as offices and franchises. The ability to provide such patronage further extends the ruler's monopoly on political and economic power.

It should be noted, the territorial ruler also provides benefits to non-elite members of society. These benefits, as noted in this section, were provided to all in exchange for distributing the expenses of rule throughout all members of the society. This was accomplished by means of providing the ruler with exclusive power to tax, borrow money, and ensure the overall compliance of all societal members. This extension of benefits enhanced the legitimacy of territorial rulers by enhancing access to usually excluded groups of the society such as serfs.

In sum, the expansion of the state to meet certain crucial and exclusive security and economic demands of society, led to a subsequent expansion of its institutional capacity. This expansion impacted the development and enforcement of a legal apparatus. But it also stimulated the expansion of the ruler's administrative capacity as well. This is also reflected the emergence of a bureaucracy that enabled the administration of state policies and public goods to the citizens or subjects of a state. A state that could not meet these demands suffered from problems of its legitimacy from the perspective of its residents.

RULERS' AND BENEFITS PACKAGES

The ruler's benefits package is provided to all groups in society. As noted above, the package includes such benefits as internal and external security, the rule of law, capital investment in infrastructure and public works development, and regulation. However, benefits packages are expensive to provide. As a result, they incur costs that can only be covered by means of the use of taxation and credit. Therefore the power to tax and raise funding is relinquished to the territorial ruler. This increased power to provide benefits, in turn, leads to the expansion of the state's institutional capacity. Another factor related to the provision of benefits is the greater institutional centralization of political functions in the court of the ruler.

The expansion of institutional capacity means that the state is the producer of public goods available throughout its territory and is made available to all groups of society. However, the territorial ruler is also involved in the production of more exclusive private and joint goods. It should be noted, that public goods are indivisible and non-excludable. Examples of public goods include both national security, clean air and clean water. In contrast, private goods are divisible, are subject to market forces, and are exemplified by most consumer products. Joint goods are a product of both public and private features. Healthcare and education can be both be included as joint goods.

The enhancement of institutional centralization also leads to the emergence of coalition building at the behest of the territorial ruler. That is, the ruler must now solicit the support of different members of society in order to secure and maintain the state's legitimacy to rule. Thus land and property-based conflict create opportunities for the state to form alliances with local governments against other institutional actors such as the Church or the aristocracy. These alliances can also be reversed as the needs of the ruler change. The existence of such coalition-building processes indicates a pluralistic political regime is at work.

Works Cited

Aldrich, John. Why Parties: Origin And Transformation Of Party Politics In America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Ertman, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Kishlansky, Mark. The Penguin History of Britain: A Monarchy Transformed, Britain 1630-1714, vol. 6. London: Penguin Books, 1997.