Terrorists, and Economy, and Iran, Oh My!

Question 1:

Why is the level of discord in international trade negotiations in the last decade so much higher than in previous decades? What are the sources of opposition to globalization evident in US domestic politics?

Introduction

The Development Round (or, Doha Development Agenda) began in late 2001 – and still has yet to reach a resolution. The trade-negotiation round is still ongoing, with the objective to facilitate the increase of global trade by improving international relations and lowering various trade barriers around the world. Perhaps the most significant source of contention is between developed nations (such as those in the European Union and the United States) and developing countries, led mainly by India, Brazil, China, South Korea, and South Africa (Fergusson, 2013). This contention is understandable, as developed countries seek to maintain their market share, and developing countries seek to increase theirs.

While the round has seen ups and downs, the most significant break in negotiations came in 2006, during the talks in Geneva. The break-in reaching an agreement came about largely due to a disagreement about reducing farming subsidies and lowering import taxes. The agricultural subsidies in the United States are seen by many to act as a sort of barrier to trade (Hanrahan, 2007). This is, perhaps, the lynchpin of the negotiations. As Alan Beattie and Frances William state, “The US and the European Union want greater access to provide services to fast-growing emerging countries, including China and India. Meanwhile, developing countries want greater access for their agricultural products in Europe and the US” (2008). It is not hard to see why negotiations broke down, as an unstoppable force meeting an immovable object.

After this break-in negotiations, a successful outcome of Doha has continued to look less and less likely. This is due, in part, because of the expiration of the Trade Act of 2002 in 2007, which granted broad trade authority. The expiration meant that now, any trade agreement must have Congressional approval. This would mean a good amount of amendments, effectively hindering the negotiation and calling into question the value of participation itself by other, peripheral states.

The Benefits

It is important to note, however, that their continued involvement will be necessary. As Peter Mandelson, the European Union trade commissioner, stated following the collapse of negotiations in Geneva in 2006, “the consequences will fall disproportionately on those who are most vulnerable in the global economy, those who needed the chances, the opportunities most from a successful trade round” (Beattie & William, 2008). This demonstrates the concept of comparative advantage quite clearly – all countries participating in the negotiations believe that there is some economic benefit in adopting the agreement (Hertel & Keeney, 2005). Kym Anderson, a World Bank Lead Economist, found that global income could potentially increase by more than $3000 billion each year – with $2500 billion going to the developing world (Lynn, 2009). It is clear that both developed and developing countries would have access to vast new markets, should a trade agreement be reached.

The Problem

So, then, why is the level of discord in international trade negotiations in the last decade so much higher than in previous decades? What are the sources of opposition to globalization evident in US domestic politics? Fareed Zakaria with Foreign Affairs gives a convincing account for this, citing the US failure to adapt. “The American economy remains extremely dynamic,” he says. “But one has to wonder whether the US political system is capable of making the changes that will ensure continued success in a world of greater global competition and technological change” (2013). In other words, it is the increasingly polarized and partisan trade politics in the United States that is largely to blame for failed negotiations. This is especially reflective in light that the US economic policy is becoming more and more protectionist.

Much of those involved with the DOHA round negotiations would tend to agree with this. Even Mandelson has said that the talks (especially in relation to agricultural agreement) have been harmed by the US program of agricultural subsidies. He deemed the program “one of the most reactionary farm bills in the history of the US” (BBC, 2008). As a consequence, the EU and conjoining developing countries (especially Brazil and India) have asked the United States to take further steps in reducing “trade-distorting domestic support for agriculture” (Beattie & William, 2008). In turn, the United States has insisted that the EU and developing countries further reduce tariffs.

Zakaria goes on to show the specific way in which trade negotiations are being harmed by domestic policy, and is worth quoting at length:

When Western governments and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund offer advice to developing countries on how to spur growth, they almost always advocate structural reforms that will open up sectors of their economies to competition, allow labor to move freely between jobs, eliminate wasteful and economically distorting government subsidies, and focus government spending on pro-growth investment. When facing their own problems, however, those same Western countries have been loath to follow their own advice. With only a few exceptions, the advanced industrial democracies have spent the last few decades managing or ignoring their problems rather than tackling them head-on. Soon, this option won’t be available, because the crisis of democracy will be combined with a crisis of demography (2013).

This view of demography, government investment, and domestic policymaking is salient for the current issues facing DOHA trade negotiations. In its current situation, the US has an interest in maintaining the status quo, as they have the upper hand. The state wants to continue importing services into developing countries while maintaining their own agricultural independence, effectively keeping importation from being raised too high.

The Answer

As Zakaria states, the only way in which negotiations could move forward is for the US to face their domestic economic problems “head-on.” This is why international trade negotiations in the last decade have been so much more difficult. The US has realized its position – in order to maintain GDP and employment, they must curb the growth of globalization as it affects the domestic economy. Simply put, the benefit of inaction outweighs the cost of action.

Question 2:

Do you agree or disagree with the view of the United States as the “indispensable nation”? How effective have efforts at international cooperation been, and to what extent can their success or failure be attributed to US participation (as opposed to other factors)?

Introduction

There is no question in anyone’s mind – liberal, conservative, or otherwise – that the United States has long held its place on the “world stage”, so to speak. In terms of international prevention and development, fighting the global threat of terrorism, solving environmental problems, attempting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and taking a role in the development of the Middle East, the United States is a peer to no one. Of course, there are two important questions that result as a natural subsequence of this understanding. First, is the global “infiltration” of American interests and involvement boon for the world, or a detriment to development and international peace? This is the more difficult of the two questions, and will only be attempted to be answered in brief. Second, to what extent is this American involvement on the rise or on the wane? Of course, this question too remains to be seen, as the United States faces new challenges and developments in an ever-changing world. Both questions are important in addressing the United States as an “indispensable nation” – the conceptualization of the nation as being essential for international cooperation and international institutions (including developing states) to work effectively.

The View

The United States’ role in the abovementioned areas is quite clear. They have led the charge in civil war intervention, most notably in states like Egypt and Colombia. The global fight against terrorism has been spearheaded by American intelligence and military operations, coinciding with cooperation from other first world states. The United States had a principal role in determining the terms of international environmental policies, such as the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols and international energy institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Finally, and most recently, it is the United States that the world looks to for a policy response as the Middle East takes shape in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

In considering these five issues, yes, I agree that the United States’ input is a necessary component on much of the world stage. This may not be the ideal, but it is the reality as it stands today. This is, however, attached to an important caveat. As Frieden, Lake, and Schulz state in discussing the future of international politics, sometimes it is better for states to take a “back seat”, so to speak. This section, while discussing development specifically, applies to international intervention as a whole, and is worth quoting at length:

“Domestic social and political institutions can have a major impact on how these conflicts of interest affect development. They can either empower or overcome special interest groups that stand in the way of development. They can either facilitate or impede the ability of actors to cooperate to promote government policies conducive to economic growth. Successful economic growth requires that a country overcome both the domestic obstacles posed by interests and institutions that are detrimental to development and the international impediments created by conflicts of interest with wealthy nations, which can draw on superior reserves of economic and political power (World Politics, 2013, p. 389).

As such, I agree that the United States is an “indispensable nation”, with this important caveat: that it acts as such only in terms of its own interests.

The Priorities

The United States has taken on a role that, it may turn out, is “too big for its britches”, but one that it nevertheless must attempt to fulfill either as a power player or neutral arbiter. In keeping its domestic and international interests in this role, the United States must rank the five areas discussed above based on what is best for its demos. This ranking, I suggest, looks like this:

1) Aiming for nuclear non-proliferation

2) Developing a cohesive and correct policy response to the post-Arab Spring Middle East

3) Giving measured intervention in civil war and unrest

4) Fighting against Terrorism

5) Solving environmental problems with international cooperation

In addressing these priorities, the United States policymakers must face the dilemma of unilateralism versus multilateralism. World politics are increasingly turning to multilateralism to solve problems and overcome differences (for the betterment of humanity as a whole, I believe). However, even this cooperation may lead to friction. As Frieden, Lake, and Schultz said, “As globalization increases the scope of international cooperation, there will be greater demand for global institutions to govern these interactions. Although most people agree that stronger governance is desirable, there will be conflicts over the rules and decision-making procedures of any such institutions” (World Politics, 2013, p. 537). The United States has the power to utilize unilateralism as a direct result of its unmatched military power. Even if unilateralism is sometimes inevitable, it is not desirable, as it holds the unfortunate effect of burning bridges and creating assumed prejudices toward the United States’ involvement. As such, the United States must way the costs and benefits of multilateralism and unilateralism and, even in its role as an “indispensable nation” turn to supporting international institutions for legitimacy and burden-sharing.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The United States’ role and position in nuclear development non-proliferation negotiations are perhaps the strongest of the five areas listed above. The state still has a strong potential for deterrence, along with other developed nations, giving them an upper hand in negotiations. This position, it can be argued, is beneficial for the entire world. As Richard Betts states, “Deterrence is a strategy for combining goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war” (2013). The United States’ strength in the nuclear issue is obviously beneficial for the United States’ population. However, more far-reaching than that is its role in avoiding war altogether. It is in this role that the United States plays out the expectation of the “indispensable nation.” Without the United States as a global nuclear power, the world would be a much riskier place.

However, it is equally clear that the United States has neglected this role at times as well. As Betts goes on to state: “Since the Cold War ended, the United States has clung to deterrence where it should not have, needlessly aggravating relations with Russia.” He also notes that the United States has “rejected deterrence where it should have embraced it, leading to one unnecessary and disastrous war with Iraq and the risk of another with Iran” (2013). The United States must reexamine its position on nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry, taking careful aim where needed and withdrawing when best.

As stated above, throughout all of this the United States must turn to multilateralism in both deterrence and incentivizing. It is incentivizing that may be the most attractive option for the world the United States is facing. “At best, applying deterrence when it is unneeded wastes resources,” Betts states. “At worst, it may provoke conflict rather than hold it in check” (2013). In other words, deterrence may not be the best option for the United States’ interests, nor for the world’s. Instead, the United States may utilize its role as an “indispensable nation” to incentivize other countries to be involved in the process, making for agreements and treaties discussed by all. An agreement in which many have a stake in is, ostensibly, more likely to hold up under pressure and opportunity for action. This is the action that the United States must take if it is to maintain its current role on the world stage.

The New Middle East

The United States’ role in the Arab Spring was, to say the least, ambivalent. The White House tarried in determining a course of action and may have acted too late for any substantial change to be implemented. Since the change in government in countries like Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the United States’ role has been equally ambivalent. Despite this ambivalence, it was clear that the United States believed that it had a stake in replacing Middle East authoritarianism with democracy (much like we saw with earlier wars in the Middle East). However, here is where the United States needs to take a step back. As Seth Jones states, “The demise of Middle Eastern authoritarianism may come eventually. But there is little reason to think that day is near, and even less reason to think that the US can significantly increase its chances of happening” (2013). In other words, the United States should not focus on spreading democracy.

Instead, as stated above, it must act in preserving its own interests – such as “balancing against rogue states such as Iran, ensuring access to energy resources, and countering violent extremists” (Jones, 2013). While these two goals may not be entirely mutually exclusive, one does often eclipse the other. When given the choice, the United States must act in its interest. Doing so “will require working with some authoritarian governments and accepting the Arab world for what it is today” (2013). This is where utilitarian politics come in. Whereas multilateralism in nuclear non-proliferation will be beneficial for the United States, a unilateral decision to keep authoritarian relationships intact will be best for national interests. This is the crux of the United States' international position.

Civil War Intervention

In terms of international interventionism, the United States must again carefully keep its stand on the balance beam. It can have a strong role in bettering certain situations while recognizing the need to stay out of others (as noted above). Besides, international development and intervention are turning more to multilateralism. The United States may be better off handing off this responsibility to others in order to maintain its strong role, ironically enough. In addition to the multilateral aspect, the development field is putting more emphasis on civil society in the process. As Fortna states, “The practice of peacekeeping…now generally involves much more extensive civilian components: electoral observation, police monitoring and training, and civilian administration” (2004). The United States can keep its role, but pass the baton, so to speak.

This also emphasizes a turn in the normative approach to development, which is worth noting:

New models of intervention – including neo-trusteeship and shared sovereignty – that respond to these failures of governance. But these calls for intervention rest on two underlying assumptions that have escaped serious consideration: The idea that countries cannot recover from conflict on their own and the argument that intervention is the best strategy for state-building (Weinstein, 2005).

The United States must consider the tradeoffs of intervention versus autonomy – for instance, minimizing loss versus maximizing institutional capacity, creating coalitions versus strong victors, and eternal versus internal incentives for institution building.

Global Environment & Terrorism

Both of these are, clearly, important for United States interests in maintaining its voice on the global stage and maintaining its national security. Both have, however, waned in political importance. The United States, of course, holds a clear security interest in keeping up the “war on terror”, as it has been so aptly named. However, doing so does not hold much weigh on the international stage. Much in the same way, the United States should maintain its role in creating environmentally beneficial agreements (such as the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols), but should, at the same time, take a back seat to multilateralism. In a phrase, multilateralism will serve the best interests of the United States, until it does not.

Works Cited

Beattie, Alan, Frances, William. 29 July 2008. Doha trade talks collapse. Financial Times.

Betts, Richard. 2013. The lost logic of deterrence: What the strategy that won the cold war can – and can’t – do now. Foreign Affairs: (92) 87.

Fergusson, Ian F. 18 January 2008. World Trade Organization negotiations: The Doha development agenda. Congressional Research Service.

Fortna, Virginia Page. June 2004. Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after the civil war. International Studies Quarterly: (48) 2. Pp. 269-292.

Frieden, Jeffry A., Lake, David A., Schultz, Kenneth A. 2013. World politics: Interests, interactions, and institutions. New York: W.W. Norton.

Haas, Richard. 2013. Irony of American strategy: Putting the Middle East in a proper perspective. Foreign Affairs: (92) 57.

Hanrahan, Charles, Schnepf, Randy. 22 January 2007. WTO Doha Round: The agricultural negotiations. Congressional Research Service.

Hertel, Thomas W., Keeney, Roman. 2005. What is at stake: The relative importance of import barriers, export subsidies, and domestic support. World Bank.

Jones, Seth. 2013. The mirage of the Arab Spring: Deal with the region you have, not the region you want. Foreign Affairs. (92) 55.

Lynn, Jonathan. 16 August 2009. Doha deal could boost world GDP $300-700 billion: study. Reuters.

Weinstein, Jeremy. April 2005. Autonomous recovery and international intervention in a comparative perspective. Center for Global Development. Working Paper Number 57.

Zakaria, Fareed. 2013. Can America be fixed? The new crisis of democracy. Foreign Affairs: (92) 22.