A Comparison of U.S. and Russian Counterintelligence Strategies

The word ‘espionage’ is one that generally conjures elegant fantasies of men in crisp designer suits, women in fur hats with slits up their gowns that leave little to the imagination, brave heroes propelling down the sides of slick high rise buildings, and svelte femme fatales outwitting their opponents by using cat-like grace to slink their way through laser security systems. The term itself is almost antiquated, just a Hollywood illusion that retired along with private eyes and jewel thieves. In reality, though, espionage is not some silver screen daydream, it is a very real practice that poses very real national threats. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has even gone so far as to say that spies are currently “more prolific than ever” (FBI, 2010a), taking the form of more than just the nefarious big-screen villains one might imagine. The range and scope of dangers facing our national security is one that is addressed strategically, and collaboratively. However, the U.S. government’s efforts to protect our national secrets have not always been successful. Historically, agents of Russian intelligence have proven themselves to be worthy adversaries, engaging the U.S. in many a figurative game of capture the flag.

The philosophies of the U.S. counterintelligence strategy and that of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) are not dissimilar, however, there is a variance in emphases of each respective mission statement. The mission statement of the National Security Branch (NSB) of the U.S. focuses mainly on the detection, disruption, and deterrence of threats posed toward the country and its interests (FBI, 2011). The idea of collaboration is also heavily referenced in the United States NSB mission statement, which stresses the importance of “sharing information, producing joint projects, and conducting joint operations” (FBI, 2011). The SVR, on the other hand, tends to operate on a more autonomous level, stressing the role of the individual agent over the organization as a whole. A few of the SVR’s main legalities stipulate how its members may act upon independent judgments to ensure the security of the country, and that members are also welcomed to develop their own forms of communication (Bennett, 2000).

The prevailing policies of American counterintelligence are currently centered on “keeping weapons of mass destruction… from falling into the wrong hands,” and—with this deep and irreversible descent into the modern age—paying special attention to cyber threats (FBI 2010a). The Department of Homeland Security also helps to reinforce these policies. These, among the other similar policies, are part of the FBI’s narrative of protecting the wealth of information that the country already possesses. The SVR’s policies seem to be centered more around Russia’s economic determination, in other words: obtaining a greater wealth of information that may lead to a greater amount of economic prosperity. Russia has been exposed in the past as having an extensive “scientific-technical” espionage network (Bennett, 2000). These efforts are associated with Russia’s counterintelligence because part of the task of maintaining national security is to keep them adequately masked.

Both the U.S. NSB and the Russian SVR are organized into several specialized departments. Components of the NSB include the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Intelligence directorates, the Terrorist Screening Center, the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence divisions (FBI, 2011). These last two divisions are separated further into several more groups and divisions (such as the Cyber Division and the Training Division), which are all overseen by an executive assistant director (FBI, 2010b). The SVR has only three main categories under which there are several areas of interest: Operational, Support, and Regional. The president appoints the leadership of the Russian Intelligence and retains “control over operational and organizational matters” (Bennett, 2000). Contrary to the United States’ emphasis on collaboration, Russia has a history of conflict within its intelligence organization. However, these inner conflicts have not affected the SVR’s standing as a notable match for the U.S. National Security Branch.

References

Bennett, G. (2000). The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service (p. 24). Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre.

Counterintelligence. (2010, March 17). FBI. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence

Organization Chart. (2010, May 21). FBI. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/org_chart

National Security Branch. (2011, August 18). FBI. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/national-security-branch-brochure