Balancing Efficiency with Security in the Post-9/11 Aviation Industry

Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed the devastating consequences of security gaps in aviation security. In this well-coordinated attack, hijackers were able to take advantage of weaknesses in airport security in order to board several airplanes and crash them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Yet, while the September 11 attacks had a devastating impact on the economy, poorly coordinated security responses following the incident also held economic consequences. Burdening security regulations deterred travelers and created inefficiencies that negatively impacted the aviation industry profits. This literature review will assess the importance of adopting efficient security policies and facilitating inter-agency cooperation to develop appropriate aviation security measures. Further, it will discuss the efficacy of access control and cargo reduction.

Introduction

Deficiencies in airport security resulted in the September 11 terrorist attacks, one of the deadliest and economically devastating terrorist attacks in United States history. Following the attacks, the federal government increased its involvement in administering airport security, expanding its relationship with private organizations in the aviation industry. However, the actions of the federal government have not always served the economic interests of the aviation industry. The introduction of bureaucratic organizations and inefficient security measures had been a needless detriment to the aviation industry. Though 9/11 demonstrates the necessity of improved airport security measures, efficiency must be the secondary goal of managers. In order to prevent economic losses from inefficient screening, security measures must facilitate inter-agency cooperation, address access control, and promote cargo control measures in order to protect the interests of the public and the aviation industry.

The September 11, 2001 attacks was the largest case of terrorism on American soil and highlighted the destruction that terrorists like Osama Bin Laden could cause by exploiting gaps in airport security. Further, the economic damages caused by 9/11 highlights the importance that aviation security holds for industry managers. According to Burke (2005), attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in awarded insurance claims that totaled $20 billion (p. 642). Further, aviation suffered in the United States when air travel in the United States decreased by 51 million passengers by the end of the year (2012, Jenkins, p. 4). Security measures that were adopted to restore faith in air travel led to the increased expense for the government and for the industry. Turney, Bishop, and Fitzgerald (2004) assessed that aviation security measures cost a total of $400 million in 2001 and increased to $1.5 billion in 2002, one year after the attacks (p. 60). Yet, while spending on security has been increased, this has not necessarily resulted in improved economic outcomes for the industry.

Though airline security measures have not been beneficial from a fiscal standpoint, supporters of stricter security measures highlight the benefits of increased screening practices. As Jenkins argued, the economic impact of a successful terrorist attack makes preventative measures crucial to the welfare of society (2012, p. 2). Further, because over 2 million individuals board planes every day, the potential for a terrorist attack onboard an airplane can cause major societal and economic disruptions that are unparalleled by any other method of attack (2012, p. 1). As Jenkins assessed, terrorists are unlikely to tackle security challenges and are more comfortable tacking advantages of weaknesses in a security system (2012, p. 3). Thus, security professionals must vigorously prevent opportunities for terrorists to hijack airplanes.

Critics of post-9/11 airline security measures argue that Congress enacted legislation that was largely insensitive to the needs of the aviation industry. Douglass Laird, vice president of BGI International Consulting Services asserted that the Travel Security Administration (TSA), an organization authorized by Congress to facilitate airport screening following the 9/11 attacks, failed to collaborate with the Federal Aviation Administration in order to utilize the best security practices (Response to ASR’s Survey, 2002, p. 1). Further, critics noted that the TSA was initially staffed by government employees who had little knowledge of issues pertaining to commercial aviation (2002, p. 1). As a result of inefficient screening measures, air travel remained stagnant following the security implementations. According to the U.S. Travel Association’s estimates, airport-screening practices caused passengers to skip as many as three flights each year (Freitas, 2012, p. 111). This resulted in $84.6 billion in lost revenue for the aviation industry and 888,000 lost jobs (2012, p. 111). Considering the profit loss that can result through poor security measures, managers have an increased interest in promoting inter-agency cooperation in order to advocate for effective security measures.

In order to prevent inefficient practices that delay travel and deter air travel, it is necessary to determine which security measures are most effective. First, controlling the access to the airplane cockpit and other sensitive areas should be prioritized among security personnel. As Riley (2011) noted, airlines already significantly reduced the chance of another 9/11-style attack from occurring when they enacted policies that limited access to the cockpit in the airplane (p. 151). Further, he assessed that these screening practices were more beneficial while less intrusive to the traveler than universal screening practices that take place at airport checkpoints (p. 153). As Riley’s assessments reveal, attention to specific access control measures can enable security professionals to adopt policies that are less burdensome to the general public.

Research supports that access control, rather than universal screening at airport checkpoints, is more significant in preventing hijackings. In their assessment of effective aviation security practices that could reduce incidents of terrorism, Turney, Bishops, and Fitzgerald (2004) noted that the post-9/11 laws mandating the FBI screening of all airline and airport controls were among the most significant access control measures adopted (p. 61). Also, the researchers determined that the implementation of identification scanners for employees was the most important method of securing access to the cockpit of the plane and the most important security measure overall (2004, p. 64). Additional access control measures that the researchers concluded to be most effective included barricading the cockpit doors, hiring a federal air marshal to be present on the aircraft, and improving chemical weapons screening methods (2004, p. 64). Thus, security measures that place a selective focus on preventing the opportunity to hijack an airplane can deliver the most efficient security results.

Finally, cargo control practices are one of the most overlooked methods of strengthening security at the airport. As Freitas (2012) admonished, the fear of future terrorist attacks has led to excessive screening practices that inconvenience travelers and needlessly slow air travel (p. 111). Yet, he asserted that simply reducing the cargo load and weight of planes could reduce the threat of terrorism (2012, p. 112). Through a physical analysis, Freitas determined that only heavier airplanes, such as the Boeing 727 used in 9/11, were suitable for causing a significant level of destruction upon collision with buildings (2012, p. 118). The factor that caused heavy planes to cause more damage was the high volume of fuel they carried in order to bear their weight (2012, p. 118). However, Freitas noted that the airline practice of combining commercial luggage with passenger luggage on flights increased the risk that “combination” planes would be targeted by terrorists (2012, p. 118). As Freitas’s findings demonstrate, the cargo management practices in airlines have a significant impact on terrorism vulnerability. This further suggests that reforms aimed at reducing the weight carried on a plane could lead to less intrusive measures of enhancing security for passengers.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it is evident that stricter security measures are an irreversible reality in American airports. However, the lack of coordination between the newly established Travel Security Administration and established aviation organizations has resulted in inefficiencies that have adversely impacted the aviation industry. Inept methods of securing flights have served to frustrate the public and deter travelers from utilizing airline services. In order to efficiently prevent destructive acts of terrorism, management should promote inter-agency cooperation, access control, and cargo control measures to improve security efficiencies and effectively protect the public.

References

Burke, R.J. (2005). International terrorism and threats to security: Implications for organizations and management. Disaster Prevention and Management, 14(5), 639-643. Retrieved from http://www.proquest.com

Coughlin, C.C., & Cohen, J.P. (2002). Aviation security and terrorism: A review of the economic issues. Review – Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 84(5), 9-24. Retrieved from http://www.proquest.com

Freitas, P.J. (2012, June). Passenger aviation security, risk management, and simple physics. Journal of Transportation Security, 5(2), 107-122. doi 10.1007/s12198-011-0085-0

Jenkins, Brian M. (2012). Aviation Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

“Response to ASR’s survey on aviation security post-Sept. 11”. (2002, September 11). Airport Security Report, 9(19), 1-1. Retrieved from http://www.proquest.com

Riley, Jack. (2011). Flight or Fancy? Air Passenger Security Since 9/11. In B.M. Jenkins and M. Godges (Eds.), Readings in Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism (pp. 149-162). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Turney, M.A., Bishop, James, C., & Fitzgerald, P.C. (2004). Journal of Air Transportation, 9(3), 56-66.