An Assessment of the Factors that are Conducive to the Formation and Continued Operation of Al Qaeda

Since the events of September 11, 2001, many Americans have come to believe that Al-Qaeda terrorists are motivated by disdain over U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, Western dominance of the world, economic exploitation of developing nations in the world, and other similar political issues. Yet, if these factors alone could explain why the Al-Qaeda organization engages in terrorist activities, then it would stand to reason that the world would be replete with terrorists trying to destroy America and the Western world. In reality, however, terrorist groups like Al Qaeda represent but an infinitesimal fraction of the people in the world who hold grievances against the United States and other Western nations. Obviously, other factors must exist that are conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda.

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of the current study is twofold. Number one, the discussion will identify the factors that are conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al Qaeda. Secondly, the factors will be assessed with respect to how, and to what degree, each factor is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al Qaeda.

Study Preview

The current study is organized into four main parts. Part 1: Background. Part 2: Factor Identification and Description. Part 3: Assessment of the Factors. Part 4: Conclusion

Part 1: Background

Although it is commonly believed that Al-Qaeda is a late 20th-century phenomenon, there is far more to the story than the typical media narrative which attributes the genesis of Al-Qaeda to social and demographic changes in the Middle East and events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Al-Qaeda has been in the making for decades and even centuries as the organization has its roots in radical Islamic traditions like Jihad. Jihadists are Islamic fundamentalists who believe and teach intolerance of any belief system that is different than their own. These radicalized Sunni Salafi Jihadi Muslims use the Quran to justify the killing of so-called infidels - “those without faith.” Summarily, the origins and continued existence of Al-Qaeda are rooted in age-old religious traditions and fanaticism.

With the fall of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, conditions in the Middle East and Africa were rife for the formation of Al-Qaeda. As leaders like the late Osama bin Laden championed the cause(s) of radical Islamic Jihadists, Al-Qaeda grew into a network of semi-autonomous radicalized actors motivated by growing disdain and hatred of the United States for its involvement in the first Iraqi War and other conflagrations in the Middle East. The so-called war on terror launched by former President of the United States, George W. Bush, definitely put a dent in the operations of the Al-Qaeda network. In fact, terrorist safe havens and bases in Afghanistan have largely been eliminated. Yet, in demonstrating its resilience, the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization has morphed into a global network of cells and actors. Thus, the history of Al-Qaeda over the last quarter-century demonstrates that the factors that are conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda must be dynamic in nature.

Part 2: Factor Identification

This section of the current study lists and describes the factors that many scholars and security experts claim are conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al Qaeda. The factors include: i) safe haven (physical and virtual), ii) lack of governance, iii) inadequate border security, iv) exploitable infrastructure, v) the presence of subversive groups, vi) favorable social and demographic factors, and vii) invisibility.

Safe Haven (Base for Operations)

Scholars and national security experts often identify physical and/or virtual safe haven as a key factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda. A physical safe haven refers to a geographic location or territory where Al-Qaeda terrorists can conduct organizing activities like training, indoctrination, and support operations. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Al-Qaeda terrorists operated bases in the far reaches of the Afghanistan countryside. Having literally been on the run for more than a decade, it is believed that members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network currently conduct activities like recruitment and training in virtual safe havens. In other words, Al-Qaeda operatives now use modern communications media like the Internet and cell phones to conduct their dubious business - something they can do from almost anywhere in the world.

Lack of Governance

As another factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify a lack of governance. As the term suggests, lack of governance refers to conditions in a country or territory that can be characterized as weakly governed or ungoverned. In short, lack of governance is a common condition in many remote regions of developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America where the rule of law is limited or entirely absent.

Inadequate Border Security

As a third factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify inadequate border security. Inadequate border security is a condition whereby a nation lacks the ability to control and police its own borders. Inadequate border security is not only a problem in developing nations, but it is also a challenge for developed nations like the United States and Canada that have literally thousands of miles of border to protect and police - a logistically difficult and even impossible task.

Exploitable Infrastructure

As a fourth factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify exploitable infrastructure. The Al-Qaeda network of terrorist actors does not operate in a resource vacuum. Just like any organization, legitimate or otherwise, Al-Qaeda needs access to banking systems, transportation, and communication systems to function.

The Presence of Subversive Groups

As a fifth factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify the presence of subversive groups. For Al-Qaeda cells to form and proliferate, the organization needs a supply of new recruits. As such, researchers and security experts have long recognized that the presence of subversive groups (i.e., criminal networks, militias, and insurgents), constitute the main source for recruiting new Al-Qaeda members.

Favorable Social and Demographic Factors

As a sixth factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify favorable social and demographic factors. Simply put, just as people are products of their social environments, so too are Al-Qaeda terrorists. Social and demographic factors that are most favorable to the formation and continued existence of Al-Qaeda include ethnoreligious cleavages (ideological differences between the terrorists and the general population), in-group norms, and shared grievances.

Invisibility

As a seventh factor that is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, scholars and national security experts identify invisibility. Invisibility refers to the ability of Al-Qaeda terrorists to avoid identification by law enforcement and other authorities. Invisibility is most often achieved by Al-Qaeda terrorists as they find ways to blend into their respective resident societies, both linguistically and culturally. It is widely recognized by researchers and security experts alike that Al-Qaeda terrorists are now invisible in nearly every nation of the world, both developed and undeveloped.

Part 3: Factor Assessment

This section of the current study presents an assessment of the factors identified in section 1. The explicit goal is to determine how, and to what degree, each factor is conducive to the formation and continued operation of Al Qaeda.

Safe Haven (Physical and Virtual Operations)

As a way of assessing the importance of safe haven for the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, it is essential to note that America’s ongoing fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and the Middle East has been relatively successful in eliminating physical safe havens for Al-Qaeda. In fact, as America eliminated the majority of physical safe haven locations in nations like Afghanistan and Iraq more than ten years ago, Al-Qaeda terrorists were literally put on the run. Yet, the Al-Qaeda terrorist network has been able to sustain itself by adapting its operations to a changing environment. While some Al-Qaeda operatives have moved operations into nations like Pakistan, many other Al-Qaeda members have stopped trying to establish physical bases of operation; instead, they have migrated to cyberspace. Through the use of common Internet applications like email, messaging, video sharing, Al-Qaeda terrorists now use the Internet as a type of substitute or replacement for traditional ways of conducting operations.

The migration of Al-Qaeda into the world of virtual operations shows that although physical safe haven is an important factor in the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda, it may not be essential in the future. Acts of terrorism can be planned and orchestrated in an entirely virtual mode of operation. In fact, just as easily as traditional recruitment and training of Al-Qaeda terrorists can result in an event like the recent Boston Marathon bombing, utilization of modern tel-com technology and the Internet can inspire and support any form of terrorism including cyberterrorism, bombings, suicide attacks, and more. The conclusive point is that Al-Qaeda terrorists need a safe haven to form cells and further their activities. In the aftermath of America’s war on terrorism and the advent of Internet technology, however, the physical haven is quickly becoming far less essential than a virtual haven for the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda.

Lack of Governance

As for assessing the lack of governance factor, much evidence exists to show that this factor is highly important in the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda. Researchers have found, for example, that in many African nations like Sudan, Algeria, and Somalia, lack of governance has opened the door for the insurgence of Al-Qaeda and other terrorists. In so many words, a lack of governance in a region or territory implies that lawlessness and terror are the prevailing social order. Whether physical or virtual, terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda need these types of conditions in order to exercise and test their capabilities. Thus, it can be concluded that the lack of governance factor is highly important for the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda.

Inadequate Border Security

As for the inadequate border security factor, findings of a study funded by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper (2013), suggest that inadequate border security or weakened border control play a crucial factor in both the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda. The united effort by America and other nations to fight Al-Qaeda has become a sort of cat and mouse game with the mouse (i.e., Al-Qaeda) on the run. As such, for new Al-Qaeda cells to form and sustain operations, terrorist operatives must have the option of moving from region to region or state to state. Additionally, when a nation cannot control and police its own borders, it exacerbates conditions where lack of governance is a problem. It can, therefore, be stated conclusively that inadequate border security is another highly important factor for the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda.

Exploitable Infrastructure

As for the exploitable infrastructure factor, Al-Qaeda cannot do its dirty deeds without resources - weapons, channels of communications, ways to share and gather information, and the means to transport Al-Qaeda members and their equipment, whatever it may be. Therefore, it can be concluded that without exploitable infrastructure the Al-Qaeda network would be incapable of conducting operations and, thus, virtually non-existent.

The Presence of Subversive Groups

As Al-Qaeda depends on a lack of governance to sustain its operations, physically and/or virtually, the presence of subversive groups plays a crucial role in the formation and continuation of Al-Qaeda. Subversive groups like criminal networks, militias, and insurgents, help destabilize state governments. In an atmosphere of lawlessness and disorder, Al-Qaeda can do what it does best - namely, terrorize people and entire communities. The bedfellows scenario (subversive groups alongside Al-Qaeda cells) has been a redundant formula throughout Africa and the Middle East for the past twenty-five years. Most recently, for instance, Al-Qaeda operatives have been able to establish residence in remote regions in Pakistan where the presence of subversive groups like the Taliban is commonplace. The pattern continues to repeat itself all over the world where subversive groups are present – Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America. Thus, it can be concluded that the presence of subversive groups is a highly important factor for the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda.

Favorable Social and Demographic Factors

Researchers have found that favorable social and demographic factors are crucial to the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan, for example, the formation of Al-Qaeda groups in rural regions of the country during the 1990s was abetted by ethnic and religious connections as well as social norms like the Pashtun Code which requires hosts to provide safe haven and protection for visitors from the outside. Even in cases where ethnic and religious norms differ, commonly shared hatred of Westerners and Americans can create cohesion and bonds between otherwise disparate groups of people. This is one of the reasons that Al-Qaeda has been successful in recruiting new members in nations all across the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia where anti-US sentiment runs high. In sum, favorable social and demographic conditions make the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda far more probable.

Invisibility

Last but not least, the invisibility factor is important in the formation and continued operation of Al-Qaeda because it affords certain freedoms in recruitment, planning of activities, and the carrying out of terrorist acts. By using virtual safe havens, Al-Qaeda terrorists can use invisibility to exploit vulnerabilities in developed nations like the United States. The safe haven/invisibility formula is exactly what enabled the recent Boston Marathon bombings. For that matter, safe haven and invisibility even made it possible for Al-Qaeda to carry out their sinister deeds on September 11, 2001. In fact, terrorists who planned and executed the attacks on the World Trade Center not only lived in America but were trained on how to carry out their mission in the United States.

Part 3: Conclusion

In the final comment, researchers are correct in arguing that shared hatred for America is not enough to spawn a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda. In fact, as findings of the current study clearly indicate, each of the seven identified factors (safe haven, lack of governance, inadequate border security, exploitable infrastructure, the presence of subversive groups, favorable social and demographic factors, and invisibility) plays a key role in the formation and continued operation of Al Qaeda. It would seem, nonetheless, that many researchers and policymakers are leaving an important variable out of the discussion – namely, the special psycho-logic that Al Qaeda operatives use to rationalize and justify the terrorist acts they commit. Terrorist behavior, in other words, is far more complex than what it appears to be according to political science theories and concepts. Individuals are drawn to terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda for a lack of a healthy personal identity. Researchers have found, in fact, that terrorist personalities show aggressiveness, flawed self-concept, a tendency to blame/scapegoat others, and a tendency towards failure; most critically, individuals join terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda because they feel significant for the first time in their lives and, therefore, readily succumb to leader dominance and group pressure. Like most terrorists, the majority of Al Qaeda operatives are inclined to a pathological "me versus them" mindset and worldview. If Al Qaeda is allowed to overrun and dominate countries like Afghanistan, then US leaders can be assured that such countries will become breeding grounds for terrorists. Thus, in the final comment, the best advice for policy makers is trying to advance the relative stability and governance of the regions in which Al Qaeda maintains its primary physical presence.

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